



Centre for
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Desk Review

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Security in Afghanistan

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Contribution to the Project:

**DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building
and the Interests of the Poor**



**UNIVERSITY OF
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MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

AFGHANISTAN

This Desk Review analyses two DDR processes. First, the DDR of the Afghan Military Forces that started on February 2003 and ended the 30 June 2006. Second, the disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups which started in 2005 and is still ongoing.

1. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.

1.1 The Conflict Context.

Afghanistan's geo-strategic position at the crossroads of central, west, and south Asia, have made it a frequent theatre of war. Afghans have experienced continuous war and conflict since 1978. Now Afghanistan is central in the War on Terror. Afghanistan served as a buffer between the British and Russian empires until it won independence from British control of its foreign policy in 1919, and later became a fighting ground in the Cold War. The Soviet Union invaded the country in 1979 to support the weak Afghan Communist regime, setting off a long destructive war. In 1989, the USSR withdrew because of considerations on international politics. Subsequently, a series of civil conflicts led to Kabul finally falling to the Taliban in 1996. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, a US, Allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action ("Operation Enduring Freedom") overthrew the Taliban for sheltering Osama Bin Laden. Officially, the two decade long conflict came to an end with the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which is an agreement between victors in a war and not a traditional peace agreement¹.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Taliban supporters and members have re-grouped and are now a resurgent force, particularly in the south and the east. Fights between local warlords over power and territory are a central feature of the post-Taliban period and have intensified in the last three years. The government tries but repeatedly fails to extend its authority beyond the capital, while attempting to disarm regional militias and address the illegal drug problem. Afghanistan remains a fragile

¹ Security Council Report (2006), Report Profile – Afghanistan; 7 November, New York: SCR. p.7. Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Profile%20Report%207%20Nov%202006_Afghanistan.pdf Accessed 01.07.2008.

state, especially as the Taliban resistance is gaining power in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

The Afghan insurgency gained strength in 2006 as intense military clashes in the south-eastern provinces and a series of suicide bombings in the urban centres claimed more than 4,000 deaths. Part of the general upsurge in violence followed from the Afghan army and the coalition troops expanding their presence into new areas. Observers also agree that the Taliban helped by money from the booming opium trade and by cross-border infiltrators from Pakistan has been able to regroup with unexpected strength.

1.2 Post-conflict Political Developments.

The UN-supported Bonn Conference in 2001 provided with the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” (Bonn Agreements) for the establishment of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) and the convening of the emergency *Loya Jirga*, as well as the establishment of a process for political reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution (January 2004), a presidential election (October 2004), and National Assembly elections in 2005. No explicit reference to DDR was included. Hamid Karzai became the first democratically-elected president of Afghanistan on 7 December, 2004. Following parliamentary elections in September 2005, the National Assembly was inaugurated on 19 December, 2005.

At an international conference in London in January 2006, the government presented the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (IANDS), which outlines its priorities for accelerating development, increasing security, tackling the drug trade and strengthening governance. In January 2006, the “Afghanistan Compact”, a five-year plan for international involvement and peace building in Afghanistan, was signed by the international community. The Compact included the promise of \$10.5 billion USD for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan over the next five years.

1.3 Intervention Forces.

Following Bonn, the UNSCR 1386 of 20 December 2001 authorised a Chapter VII intervention of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

ISAF's function was the protection of civilians and the provision of public security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. Only in 2003, was the mandate of ISAF extended to include the whole of Afghanistan through UNSCR 1510. In August 2003, NATO took responsibility for the command and coordination of ISAF with 8,000 troops under the UN Mandate. The aim of the NATO mission was to help the Afghan government maintain security and assist in the training of future security forces. In August 2004, EUROCORPS took command and control of ISAF under NATO auspices. In October 2006, ISAF included 31,000 troops from 37 countries, as the troops originally under Operation Enduring Freedom were added to ISAF.

Resolution 1401, approved by the UNSC on 28 March 2002, established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with the aim of providing support for rebuilding, national reconciliation and the implementation of the 2001 Bonn Agreements, including assistance with the DDR programme. UNAMA was established as an integrated structure for the planning and conduct of all UN activities in Afghanistan.

From 23 March 2006 onwards, UNAMA's mandate contains six main elements: (1) providing political and strategic advice for the peace process; (2) providing good offices; (3) assisting Afghanistan's government towards implementation of the Afghanistan Compact; (4) promoting human rights; (5) providing technical assistance; and (6) continuing to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the government. UNAMA's mandate was extended until 24 March 2007 and was expanded to include the responsibility to co-chair the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (General Assembly resolutions 60/32 A and B of 30 November 2005; Security Council resolution 1662 of 23 March 2006)².

1.4 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

² General Assembly resolutions 60/32 A and B of 30 November 2005; Security Council resolution 1662 of 23 March 2006.

The DDR process in Afghanistan was from the beginning a political process³. The proposal for a DDR programme in Afghanistan was devised by International Organisation for Migration (IOM) together with UNAMA, the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF and the transitional Afghan government. In 2003, the programme was refined and UNDP and the newly founded ‘Afghanistan New Beginnings Program’ (ANBP) were in charge of its implementation. ANBP is supported by the Disarmament Commission and the Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (both established in January 2003 by the Afghan Transitional Authority) in strategy and direction of the project, and the ANBP coordinates the actions for the Ministry of Defence.

DDR in Afghanistan was initiated in February 2003, with the implementation of the programme starting in pilot projects in October 2003 and finally at the national level in May 2004. The reintegration component of DDR lasted until June 2006.

The ANBP DDR programme was aimed at disarming 63,380 former officers and soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) and at decommissioning of 259 AMF units⁴. Thus, the disarmament of the Taliban, other militias and the general population is not part of the programme. According to BICC, the Afghanistan DDR is very much focused on the disarmament and demobilisation rather than reintegration, as the dismantlement of the AMF is part of the process of building the Afghan National Army (ANA).

1.4.1 Disarmament and Demobilisation.

As membership in the AMF is the pre-condition for participation in the DDR programme, a Regional Verification Committee (RVC) was deployed to each region to identify and verify the list of potential DDR candidates provided by special Ministry of Defence teams. Each RVC consisted of 8 civilian individuals with strong

³ Rossi, Simonetta and Giustozzi, Antonio (2006); “Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities”, *Working Paper 2 Series 2*, London, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, p.3. Available at <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wp2.2.pdf> Accessed 01.07.2008

⁴ UNDP Afghanistan Press. Available at: http://www.undp.org.af/media_room/press_rel/2006_07_01_DDR.htm. Accessed 05.02.2007.

credentials responsible for identifying special cases (i.e., drug addicts, child soldiers, soldiers needing psychological support).

The decommissioning of verified ex-combatants has been conducted through a disbandment parade at their Unit Headquarters. The demobilised soldiers are presented with certificates of honourable discharge and medals, while an ANBP weapons inspector in special Mobile Disarmament Units (MDU) collects their weapons. The DDR plan also allows for the handover of operable heavy weapons instead of light arms by specifying a crew list for each piece of machinery such as tanks or anti-aircraft guns.

The decision to put heavy weapons under central government control was seen as essential in reducing the power of Commanders and allowing security sector reform. The heavy weapons collection is based on the Presidential Decree of 27 March 2004, which provides for the cantonment of all AMF heavy weaponry by the Defence Ministry, with ANBP assistance. The project was completed in October 2005, when 98% of heavy weapons were cantoned in seven regional sites under government control.

Following the disbandment parade, ex-combatants were given day passes and were requested to report the following day to one of ANBP's regional offices for their demobilisation. Fingerprints and photos were taken, and a set of questions about demographics and skills were asked. Individual reintegration consultations included counselling and an explanation of the reintegration programme. Each ex-combatant received a food package (130kg) and clothing items. The provision of one-off cash payments of \$200 USD in the early stages of the programme was discontinued after Commanders extorted cash payments from their soldiers. The payment was then distributed in alternative ways, for example by raising the daily reintegration allowances to \$3 - \$4 USD.

Representatives of implementing partners were stationed in the demobilisation offices of ANBP, so that gaps between demobilisation and reintegration could be minimised. A Mobile Reintegration Unit (MRU) was founded to service former combatants in remote areas.

1.4.2 Reintegration Programme

ANBP's reintegration programme was mainly implemented by the IOM. However, the process was quite complex and about 30 Implementing Partners, including government institutions, international organisations, NGOs, and private institutions were involved.⁵ The ANBP's reintegration programme offered each ex-combatant 6 – 12 months training for job opportunities. ANBP offered the following reintegration training options: agriculture; vocational training; business opportunities; de-mining; wage labour; ANA; ANP; teacher training; and construction.

The DDR programme in Afghanistan is interesting in so far as it did not include encampment. Instead, the Mobile Disarmament Units of the ANBP travelled through the region to disarm military units. This strategy was necessary, because by the time the DDR programme had started, many AMF members had established strong ties with their local communities and many had never left their homes during the fighting. Encampment would thus have been a counterproductive strategy.

A special \$5 million USD 'Commanders Incentive Programme' (CIP) addressed the strong social dependency between soldiers and their Commanders by offering Commanders different integration packages including, financial redundancy packages; training; government positions; and trips abroad. Since 2004, the programme has integrated 320 Commanders and 150 Generals. The commanders would receive a salary of \$1,200 USD for one year in exchange for their full compliance. Low and mid-level commanders were not eligible for the CIP and would thus receive the same package as their soldiers. According to the Japanese Afghan NGO Network, it is these Commanders that are now a source of difficulty.

The reintegration component of DDR lasted until June 2006. A follow-up reintegration programme, the 'Reintegration Support Project' (RSP) ran until December 2007 and trained civil servants in dealing with reintegration issues. It also

⁵ Rossi Simonetta & Antonio Giustozzi, (2006); "Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities", *Working Paper 2 Series 2*, London, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE. Available at: <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wp2.2.pdf>. Accessed 01.07.2008

continued to give assistance to the reintegration efforts, while slowly moving skills and responsibility to the Afghan government.

When the ANBP was founded in spring 2003, UNICEF was involved in designing a D&R programme targeting young soldiers. A mechanism was created, whereby the ANBP would demobilise the underage soldiers along with the adult soldiers and then, following this demobilisation phase, hand them over to UNICEF for their reintegration. UNICEF aimed to expand the reintegration assistance to a broad group of war-affected and vulnerable youths.

The World Food Programme (WFP) supported DDR by providing 153,915 children of ex-combatants with de-worming and 'Food for Education' assistance programmes⁶. The WFP has signed a letter-of-intent which includes 4,455 women from ex-combatant community in a 2006–2010 WFP-related project⁷.

1.4.3 Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG).

With the end of the D&D phase of the AMF demobilisation, the government and ANBP planned the next phase of demilitarisation by targeting irregular militia forces. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project is designed to follow-up on the AMF DDR programme. DIAG began on 1 July, 2005 and was meant to last till 30 June, 2006⁸. However, due to its inability to achieve all of its goals, the DIAG mandate has been extended by the Afghan Government and it is now expected to be completed by 2011⁹. Although there is no legal definition, it is agreed that an Illegal Armed Group consists of the following: at least five persons; is organised under a leader to whom its followers pledge full allegiance, be it out of fear or devotion; operates in full impunity outside the Afghan government framework and authority;

⁶ UNDPANBP (2006) "DDR: Reintegration has been completed in time and within costs." Available at: <http://www.undpanbp.org/> Accessed 02.02.2007.

⁷ UNDPANBP (2006) "DDR: Reintegration has been completed in time and within costs." Available at: <http://www.undpanbp.org/> Accessed 02.02.2007.

⁸ Rassoul, Zalmay (2006); "Strategy for Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan (DIAG)"; DIAG Strategy. Available at: <http://www.diag.gov.af/DIAG%20Strategy%202006-01-26.pdf> Accessed 06.02.2007

⁹ IRIN (2007), "Afghanistan: Disarmament programme extended", IRIN News, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Kabul, 31.10.2007. Available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=75084>, accessed 04.07.2008;

and prevents the government from extending its authority in several parts of Afghanistan¹⁰.

Its objective is to improve governance, stability and security in Afghanistan by disarming and dismantling 1,870 Illegally Armed Groups in the country (i.e., tribal militias, community defence forces, warlord militias and criminal gangs) involving some 129,000 militiamen¹¹. In July 2004, the remnants of the AMF and groups who had never joined the AMF were declared illegal by Presidential Decree 50¹². DIAG thus covers militia who had not been absorbed into the AMF and were therefore not eligible for the DDR of AMF soldiers. The legal framework for DIAG is the Gun Law and the Law on Private Security Companies¹³. The Afghan government and ANBP, with Japan as the leading donor nation, implement DIAG with the support of the Joint Secretariat which comprises of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior, UNAMA, ANBP, UNAMA, ISAF, and the Demobilisation and Reintegration (D&R) Commission.

In contrast to the AMF DDR, DIAG does not offer stand-alone reintegration packages as incentives to individual commanders or members of armed groups, but instead links reintegration of these groups to community development projects. The DIAG initiative used community development projects to get groups to disarm voluntarily and military force to pressure uncooperative groups to disarm. The Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Directorate aim to convince most low-threat groups to disarm voluntarily, but the ANP and ANA can use force in enforcing the DIAG programme¹⁴. The first phase of the DIAG programme is focusing on disbanding the four most important IAGs in each province in parallel with dismissing linked government officials that retain relationships with IAGs and abuse their positions of trust.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Sedra, Mark (2006) "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency." International Peacekeeping Vol. 13/1, p.101. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424868>. Accessed 01.08.2008

¹² DIAG (2007) "DIAG" Available at: <http://www.diag.gov.af/history.htm> Accessed 05.02.2007.

¹³ Rassoul, Zalmi (2006), op. cit.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group (2005) "Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track." *Crisis Group Asia Briefing No.35*; 23 February. Available at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/000241.doc Accessed 06.02.2007

Regional Weapons Collection Points have been established by local security officials and the ANBP. The weapons are registered and transported to a central depot where they are refurbished and when appropriate, reissued to Afghan security forces. In addition to the dismantling of illegal armed groups, part of the DIAG programme is creating a code of conduct for weapon ownership and punishment for holding illegal firearms.

Further information is needed on whether UNICEF is also involved in the DIAG programme or how underage soldiers from IAGs are cared for.

1.4.3.1 DDI Phase III.

On February 2008, the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (D&RC) has launched DDI Phase III (DIAG District Implementation¹⁵) supported by the ANBP and founded by several international donors. This programme is the implementation of the DIAG at the district level, composed of District Disarmament Initiatives (DDI).¹⁶

According to the DIAG, the first and second rounds of DDI are ongoing in 51 districts nationwide and, by February 2008, 21 districts have complied so far. DDI Phase III will target 18 districts in the Central, East, North East, North and Central Highlands¹⁷.

2. Funding Sources and Total Number of Beneficiaries.

The \$141 million USD AMF DDR project was funded by: Japan (\$91 million USD); UK (\$19 million USD); Canada (\$16 million USD); USA (\$9 million USD); the Netherlands (\$4 million USD); Norway (\$0.8 million USD); Switzerland (\$0.5 million USD); and the European Commission (\$1.9 million USD).

¹⁵ See more on DDI in JCMB Secretariat (2007): “Annex One: Progress on Short-Life Benchmarks – May September 2007”, in *JCMB VI*, available at:

<http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/jcmb/site/index.asp?page=j6>, accessed 04.07.2008

¹⁶ DIAG (2008), “New Round of DDI Launched”, Kabul, 21.02.2008; available at:

<http://www.diag.gov.af/DDI.pdf>, accessed 04.07.2008

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

UNICEF managed to secure funds of nearly \$5.3 million USD for its programme from the US Department of Labour (\$2.8 million USD), SIDA (\$0.5 million USD) and smaller amounts from the Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, as well as the UNICEF National Committees from Germany, Japan, the UK and France.¹⁸ These funds are meant to finance the first phase of the programme which targets the north, northeast, east and central regions of Afghanistan, while the same amount will have to be raised for the second phase covering the west, south and southeast.

Donors for the \$11 million USD DIAG project include: UK (\$2.5 million USD); Switzerland (\$1.5 million USD); UNDP (\$0.5 million USD); Denmark (\$0.2 million USD); and Canada (\$0.1 million USD). Japan has also earmarked \$35 million USD for development projects. The DIAG programme has also enjoyed political support from the donors such as the Netherlands, EU, Italy, Germany, US, and ISAF. In July 2006, a conference on DDR in Tokyo led to the pledge of \$90 million USD by donors, much of which will be allocated to DIAG development projects¹⁹.

Originally, the ANBP DDR programme had been estimated to involve 100,000 ex-combatants, but after one year, this number was lowered to 50,000 soldiers, as AMF Commanders had overstated the number of soldiers²⁰. In the end, 63,380 former officers and soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) were disarmed, and 250 AMF units were decommissioned. Around 62,000 ex-combatants were demobilised and 55,804 ex-combatants chose to participate in the reintegration programme.

The ANBP DDR can be separated into one pilot phase and four main phases:

Pilot Phase: (1 October 2003 – 31 May 2004)	6,271 disarmed, 7,550 demobilised in Kunduz;
Main Phase 1: (1 June 2004 – 30 August 2004)	8,551 disarmed, 7,257 demobilised;

¹⁸ Chrobok, Vera (2005) “Demobilizing and reintegrating Afghanistan’s young soldiers.” *BICC Paper 42*, Available at: <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper42/paper42.pdf> Accessed 05.02.2007.

¹⁹ UNSG (2006) “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security.” 11 September 2006, A/61/326 – S/2006/727.

²⁰ Sedra, Mark (2006) “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency.”, op. cit.

Main Phase 2: (1 September 2004 – 30 October 2004)	7,169 disarmed, 3,733 demobilised;
Main Phase 3: (1 November 2004 – 31 March 2005)	22,440 disarmed, 20,375 demobilised;
Main Phase 4: (1 April 2005 – 31 July 2005)	18,949 disarmed, 23,461 demobilised.

The DIAG programme was launched in five provinces between 1 May and 7 June 2006. Within DIAG, a total of 137 Commanders and 42 government officials linked to armed groups were issued notification letters. Only 41 Commanders and 16 officials surrendered a small amount of weapons²¹.

3. Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Until July 2005, a total number of 36,571 light weapons were collected, and 11,004 items of heavy artillery were handed over within the framework of the AMF DDR²². Within the follow-up DIAG programme, to-date a total of 28,916 weapons and 24,196 pieces of boxed and 252,765 pieces of unboxed ammunition have been handed over to and verified by ANBP collection teams in Afghanistan.²³

There have been and continue to be strong linkages between DDR and SALW, especially due to their institutional link within the ANBP. The heavy weapon collection programme, for example, was a very successful programme connected to DDR. It would also be interesting to address the issue of the heavy weapons still left in Panjshir, but this task can not be accomplished in this Desk Review. Linked to the DDR process is also the ‘Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programme’ (APMASD) which assists the government in collecting and destroying mines and ammunition. Canada funded its \$16 million USD budget.

The original DDR programme had left illegal militias and the disarmament of the general population out of its mandate, but the DIAG follow-up aims to address the

²¹ UNSG (2006) “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security.” 11 September 2006, A/61/326 – S/2006/727

²² Sedra, Mark (2006) “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency.”, op. cit.

²³ Information based on personal communication with ANBP Afghanistan (11.02.2007).

disarmament of the former group. There has been a significant shift in focus of ANBP, now involved in Heavy Weapons Cantonment, Anti-Personnel Mines and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Project, and the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). DIAG's, however, progresses only slowly and lacks the proper incentives for greater success.

The Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) signed an Agreement on Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction in July 2005. This project is assisting the Government of Afghanistan in meeting its anti-personnel mines stockpile destruction obligations as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention. The total cost of the operational two-year project is \$16 million USD. Key donors include: Canada (\$5.1 million USD); the UK (\$3 million USD); the European Commission (\$1.8 million USD); and the UNDP (\$0.5 million USD). This effort is strongly linked with DIAG, which operates in-parallel with the Anti-Personnel Mines and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction Programme. DIAG yields stockpiles of mines and ammunition that are handled within this project²⁴.

4. Security Sector Reform.

In Afghanistan, DDR is undertaken within the framework of security sector reform which was established at the G8 Security Donors' meeting in Geneva in the spring of 2002. The SSR process is divided into five pillars, each to be overseen by a leading donor nation: (I) Military reform (USA); (II) Police reform (Germany/USA); (III) Counter-narcotics (UK); (IV) Judicial reform (Italy); and finally (V) DDR (Japan).

Part of the military reform was the creation of a multi-ethnic Afghan National Army (ANA) with up to 70,000 troops. Police reform involved re-establishing the National Police Academy and establishing various training centres and programmes. Germany and the United States aimed to train 50,000 regular police and 12,000 border guards by the end of 2006.²⁵ The third pillar of SSR in Afghanistan is Counter-Narcotics, which saw: the establishment of the Counter Narcotics Ministry in December 2004; an information campaign; providing for alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers;

²⁴ DIAG (2007) "DIAG" Available at: <http://www.diag.gov.af/history.htm> Accessed 05.02.2007.

²⁵ Sedra, Mark (2006) "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency.", op. cit.

interdiction and law enforcement including a Counter-Narcotics Police in the Ministry of the Interior; criminal justice; eradication of poppy crops; demand reduction and treatment; as well as regional cooperation mechanisms.²⁶ Judicial reform involved the rebuilding of physical infrastructures, training of jurists, updating of legal statutes, and coordination among stakeholders in the judicial reform process. DDR and the dismantling of the AMF was included as well.

While the DDR project was part of the five pillar SSR strategy, the institutional linkages between the programmes were relatively modest. Central to the link between the DDR and SSR is that the dismantling of the AMF was essential to the establishment of the ANA. Part of the DDR reintegration programme was the option for ex-combatants to be integrated into the ANA or ANP, an option of which, a total of 811 ex-combatants (1.46%) took advantage.

5. Review, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).

The ANBP has a Monitoring and Evaluation team that visits regions to evaluate the success of the DDR programmes. The M&E system is designed to cover programme performance, effectiveness and efficiency. The ANBP prepared a Monitoring and Evaluation Manual to standardise managing procedures and provide guidance on effectiveness improvement.

The International Observer Group (IOG) has provided oversight of the DDR process and activities by the RVCs and the Ministry of Defence.

6. Contextualising Human Security.

6.1 The Post-conflict Socio-economic Challenges.

The economy had slowly started to recovery since 2002, with extremely low levels of activity recorded by the Central Statistics Office in Afghanistan. 80% of the Afghan population lives in rural area and it is an agricultural country.

6.1.1 DDR/ Counter-narcotics:

²⁶ Ibid.

Afghanistan accounts for the majority of the total world supply of opium and heroin. A large part of the population depends on growing poppies for their survival. Illegal armed groups such as the Taliban control large parts of the poppy fields and are involved in the drug trafficking. Therefore, there is a clear linkage between the counter-narcotics strategy and DDR / DIAG programmes. The lack of coordination between the five SSR pillars and the donor countries involved in them, means that there are no clear linkages in the programme conception and implementation.

6.1.2 Internally Displaced People (IDPs):

Afghanistan has the world's largest refugee population, and the continued fighting, especially in the south, leads to further displacement. According to IDMC, more than 20,000 families had been displaced following the fighting in the provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, and Kandahar as of November 2006²⁷.

Specific projects for the integration of IDPs were developed by the IOM in coordination with MoRR, UNHCR, FAO, and WFP. The IDP programmes do not have explicit linkages with other organisations involved in labour market integration, such as the reintegration of ex-combatants.

6.1.3 DDR / Development:

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy's (ANDS) sole overlap with DDR and DIAG is the mentioning of anti-mine projects by the ANBP.²⁸

7. Human Security Dynamics in Post-conflict Period.

7.1 Freedom from Fear.

²⁷ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2006) "Fighting in the south sets off new wave of displacement." 22 December. Available at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/DFADB5842F9262BF802570A7004BA6F0?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/DFADB5842F9262BF802570A7004BA6F0?OpenDocument) Accessed 08.02.2007.

²⁸ Government of Afghanistan (2005), "Afghanistan National Development Strategy." Available at: <http://www.ands.gov.af/> Accessed 08.02.2007.

Rearmament of previously disarmed groups poses a significant threat to local security. Dennys lists a series of incidences as examples of reoccurring themes of stockpiling, rearmament and repression by demobilised AMF Commanders²⁹. In addition, the ongoing “rule of the gun” culture leads to continuing human rights violations.

The focus of the first DDR programme on the AMF left the unofficial, private militias across the country untouched, which were a great source of insecurity for the Afghan population. The follow-up DDR programme in the form of the DIAG is thus an essential part of the demilitarisation of Afghanistan. Its success will decide whether the human security situation can be improved.

Human rights abuses and factional fighting by illegal militias, who control political and economic interests, including illegal drug trafficking are continuing. Communities and individuals are subjected to arbitrary rule of law and insecurity³⁰. Clientelism, patronage and corruption in the security institutions due to an entrenchment of warlords in the government severely endanger the security of the population. Constantly evolving illegal militia structures in Afghanistan are linked to Governors or District Administrators, so that the government does not manage to establish its authority.

The handing over of mostly old and malfunctioning weapons means that the disarmament programme has not significantly reduced the weapons in circulation. They continue to represent a threat to the security of individuals and communities. Weapon stores by Commanders are a continuing danger to the fragile security situation in Afghanistan. The incentive programmes for commanders could address this issue by giving incentives to Commanders to hand over these weapons stores³¹. Excluding the low- to mid-level Commanders from the CIP, has led to a negative impact on local security and criminality in several areas, as these Commanders have

²⁹ Dennys, Christian (2005) “Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament.” 6 June. Available at: <http://www.jca.apc.org/%7Ejann/Documents/Disarmament%20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf> Accessed 07.02.2007

³⁰ UNSG (2006) “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security.” 11 September 2006, A/61/326 – S/2006/727

³¹ Sherman, Jake (2005); “Disarming Afghanistan’s Warlords”, Praxis – The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, Vol.20; Available at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/archives/xx/sherman.pdf> Accessed 05.02.2007

kept weapon arsenals and engage in criminal activity³². The increase in insurgencies in the last few years has led to reluctance by Commanders to lay down their weapons.

The upsurge in violence in the south and east of the country in 2006, led to insecurity for many Afghan civilians. In September 2006, the UN Secretary-General reported that over 2,000 people had lost their lives in 9 months, representing at least a three-fold increase in the rate of casualties when compared to 2005³³. The clashes between insurgent groups and the military lead to the displacement of at least 450 families in the Uruzgan and Kandahar provinces alone, a reoccurring theme in many areas of insurgency fighting³⁴. The democratic political process has been improved through DDR, as political parties were forbidden to have links with militias. This improvement of democracy, would improve human security of the population by making government more accountable to the people.

7.2 Freedom from Want.

Development and reconstruction efforts, which could improve human security and alleviate poverty, are severely disrupted by factional fighting and local power struggles between illegal armed groups that harm the rule of law and civil administration in many parts of the country. The attacks on aid organisation led to a termination of many operations in the region, so that a large proportion of the population is deprived of the 'peace dividend'. This insecure situation has likewise lowered the capacity of the UN and aid organisations to deliver humanitarian programmes in the areas affected by insurgencies, slowing down the reconstruction and development efforts aimed at reducing poverty.

The difficult economic situation in Afghanistan limits the impact of a reintegration training programme for ex-combatants. The problem of reintegration in Afghanistan is not an issue of bringing families together, as the fighting had often been short-term or localised around villages. However, a lack of employment opportunities means that ex-combatants do not manage to meet their basic needs and those of their families.

³² Dennys, Christian (2005) "Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament." , op. cit.

³³ UNSG (2006) "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for peace and security.", op. cit.

³⁴ Ibid.

Illiterate ex-combatants and their families have trouble in earning a livelihood, as agricultural and livestock packages often fail to make a positive impact on their economic security.

Gaps between the demobilisation and the start of the reintegration package led to human security shortfalls, as it left ex-combatants in a precarious situation - the food package provided for two months of sustenance, but the gaps were often as large as six months. The delays in their delivery led to anger about the programme as a whole, and a possible rearmament of the previously demobilised ex-combatants. While the AMF DDR failed to focus on wider communities and lower level Commanders, the DIAG DDR is swinging towards the other extreme, by focussing solely on the communities, without providing for individual assistance. It is not clear, in how far community development projects are successful in providing reintegration options for illegal militia combatants. The focus on armed groups, instead of individuals, also means that the situation of vulnerable groups within illegal militias, such as underage combatants, is not specifically addressed.

UNICEF's phased approach in its D&R programme meant that underage soldiers in some regions of Afghanistan had to wait too long for their support, a period in which they were very vulnerable. The failed coordination and linkages between the UNICEF and ANBP DDR programmes meant that while the adult process has been ongoing in the southern and western parts, the underage soldiers were excluded from these benefits. The one-year long reintegration programmes for underage soldiers by UNICEF are inadequate in reaching the human security needs of these targeted youths. The lack of long-term planning leaves the youths vulnerable after graduation from the programme. Links with the World Bank's Japanese Social Development Fund would have allowed the D&R participants access to micro-finance options and private sector employment opportunities.

7.3 DDR and Justice:

In the Afghan context, the Afghan leadership and the UN have been reluctant to push a transitional justice process, as this could upset the fragile "peace"³⁵.

³⁵ CMI (2007) "Afghanistan Transitional Justice." Available at: <http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/?id=300&Transitional-Justice> Accessed 08.02.2007.

Nevertheless, the Bonn Agreement provided for the establishment of an Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) in 2002. The AIHRC was mandated to develop a mechanism and national strategy for transitional justice, including mapping past abuses and deciding how to deal with these. The Commission has: publicly highlighted a range of human rights issues begun recording human rights violations; and emphasised civic education. UNAMA has been assigned a particular responsibility to assist the AIHRC together with UNHCHR.

A consultation carried out by the AIHRC in 2004, revealed that as many as 70% of those consulted considered themselves victims of gross human rights violations and that many have lost confidence in the government and its office-bearers³⁶.

8.0 Conclusion.

The objective of the ANBP DDR programme was to dismantle the active military formations in order to create an appropriate environment for development and reconstruction. Furthermore, it aimed at reinforcing the authority of the government, by breaking the dependency between Commanders and soldiers and giving ex-combatants the ability to achieve economic independence. Therefore, the ANBP's goals are: the collection, storage and deactivation of SALW in the possession of ex-combatants; the cantonment of heavy weaponry; the decommissioning of AMF units; and helping ex-combatants return to civilian life.

The objective of the DIAG programme is to improve governance, stability and security in Afghanistan by disarming and dismantling 1,870 illegally armed groups in the country including 129,000 militiamen.

The original ANBP DDR targeted the registered soldiers and officers who were members of the AMF, the assembly of the factional militias that had made up the Northern Alliance. The ANBP programme provided special assistance for any soldiers

³⁶ Ibid.

who may fall into the category of under-age (less than 18 years old), mentally disturbed, drug-addicted, disabled or over-age³⁷.

Only a small proportion of the AMF were women, with four female members of the AMF entering the DDR programme, two in 2004 and two in 2005. All of whom chose the ANBP's small business training and support package. While special programmes for female AMF combatants were not established, surplus funding was channelled into supporting literacy, small nursery and teacher training programmes for wives and female family members of former soldiers. In total, 24,536 women have received additional education and income generation opportunities in developmental projects by July 2006³⁸. UNDP and the Internal Affairs Ministry signed an agreement to train female relatives of former combatants to become teachers and thereby, facilitate their integration into civilian life. This programme is meant to last five month and involves 560 women³⁹. However, it is important to clarify that these female 'combatants' were in most cases, camp followers.

The proportion of disabled soldiers in the AMF was small, as many of them had been discharged before the ANBP was initiated. The few disabled soldiers still serving, did receive access to all reintegration packages, and in addition, the ANBP provided them and elderly veterans with livestock to support reintegration packages.

According to a 2003 UNICEF survey, around 8,000 underage soldiers were involved in the AMF. Views differed between ANBP and UNICEF on how necessary was a youth component in the DDR strategy. According to Chrobok, it was a "grave mistake" to make a separate programme for underage soldiers in the Afghan context, due to the largely similar needs of underage and adult ex-combatants⁴⁰. In mid-2003, two separate programmes were established for adult and underage combatants. Following ANBP RVC screening, soldiers of the age of 17 or younger were referred to UNICEF for a separate programme of demobilisation and reintegration. It is

³⁷ UNDPANBP (2006) "DDR: Reintegration has been completed in time and within costs." Available at: <http://www.undpanbp.org/> Accessed 02.02.2007.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Escola de cultura de pau (2006) "Afghanistan." Available at: <http://www.pangea.org/unescopau/img/programas/desarme/mapa/afganistani.pdf> Accessed 07.02.2007.

⁴⁰ Chrobok, Vera (2005) "Demobilizing and reintegrating Afghanistan's young soldiers." *BICC Paper* 42, Available at: <http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper42/paper42.pdf> Accessed 05.02.2007.

important to note that disarmament was not a part of this programme, and thus participants were allowed to keep their weapons⁴¹. It might be worth pointing out that because of the delay in starting the program, by the time the census of child soldiers was carried out, many of them were no longer under-18 years of age.

UNICEF's programme extended to war-affected youths includes: households headed by children; refugees/IDPs; migrant child labourers; trafficked children; disabled children; street children; young people out of school; and children from households with limited food⁴². Chrobok notes that the D&R programme primarily targets former combatants and allows only for a limited number of other war-affected youths⁴³.

Afghanistan is a special case as most of the combatants were part-time combatants residing in their communities or leaving only for short periods of time. This system means that many of the child soldiers were not separated from their community and thus had fewer difficulties in reintegrating into the community than might otherwise have been the case⁴⁴. It is stressed that, the UNICEF D&R programme itself does not include youth-specific aspects, so that the main difference between the reintegration options for youths and adults is the higher benefits in the adult reintegration package.

The DIAG programme targets illegal armed groups, including groups such as the Taliban, regional groups, militias, and criminal organisations. The target is the group and not the individual fighter, as can be seen in the lack of individual package dispensing.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

MAP of AFGHANISTAN⁴⁵



⁴⁵Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.