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Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Security in Haiti.

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Contribution to the Project:

**DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building
and the Interests of the Poor**



**UNIVERSITY OF
BRADFORD**
MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

HAITI

1. The DDR Programme.

1.1 The Conflict Context

Haiti gained independence from France in 1804 after 300 years of colonial rule. It was the first modern state governed by people of African descent. Throughout its history, Haiti has been plagued by widespread poverty, racial discord, natural disasters, political instability and dictatorial systems of government. During the first year of independence the situation of the new “republic” was very unstable and precarious. France did not recognise Haiti’s independence and sought to establish a protectorate in the country. Moreover, Haiti was economically and diplomatically isolated. Around 1804, the plantation-based economy was disrupted by recurring power struggles and civil wars. The already weak Haitian economy was further dragged down by the indemnity to France. The hostility between blacks and mulattoes was growing and the government interventions proved inadequate. Coups d’état and assassinations became commonplace. The July 1915 civil unrest that followed the assassination of President Vilbrun G. Sam provided a pretext for U.S. intervention.

In 1930, the USA allowed free elections to take place in the country. The new President, S. Vincent re-established independence but at the same time he strengthened the Haitian legacy of dictatorial leadership. In 1957, François Duvalier won the presidential election and became known as “Papa Doc”. During his 14 years in power, he created the Presidential Guard and the *Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale*, a secret paramilitary group that used terror in order to control Haitian citizens. His son, Jean Paul, better known as “Baby Doc” took over the leadership when he was 19 years old. His approach was similarly autocratic and on February 1986, a revolt broke-out, lead by Brigadier Prosper Avril. However, this was short lived with Avril resigning two years later in 1990. Presidential elections were announced for December of that year.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the election and tried to rid the country of the ethnic, racial and economic hierarchy. Aristide immediately circumscribed the military's power by establishing a separate Presidential Security Force, closing military facilities, and reducing the armed forces budget. Aristide organised the demobilisation of members of the Haitian Armed Forces (Forces Armées d'Haiti, Fad'H) around the border of the Dominican Republic and in central Haiti, but without providing any compensation to the ex-combatants.¹

Moreover, he antagonised the economic elite by collecting back taxes. A military coup d'etat was organised in September, 1991. A junta led by Brigadier General Raoul Cédras seized control of the government. Dissidents were systematically repressed and tens of thousands of Haitians attempted to flee to Florida by boat. The U.S. condemned the coup and pledged to see Aristide restored to office. The UN Security Council refused to recognise the new leaders and imposed economic sanctions on the country.

In mid-1994, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a multinational force to restore civilian authority in Haiti. U.S. troops entered Haiti unopposed with the aim of restore Aristide to office on 9 September 1994. President Aristide completed his term in 1995 and for the first time in the history of the country, one democratically elected government was replaced by another. The incoming government led by René Préal whose tenure was characterised by partisan rancour and deadlock of the executive-legislative.

In the summer of 2000, all official development assistance was suspended by international donors as a consequence of human rights violations, government corruption and election fraud. The November 2000 election saw the return of Aristide, but was not considered free and fair by the OAS observer mission. During the second term of Aristide, political violence increased as the economic recession reached new levels and the rule of law broke down.

¹ Human Rights Watch (2004) Haiti: Recycled Soldiers and Paramilitaries on the March. Available at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/27/haiti7677.txt.htm>. Accessed 09/02/2007.

In 2004, as the consequence of bloody rebellion and pressures from the U.S. and French governments, Aristide was forced to leave the country and was airlifted out by the United States government. In accordance with the Haitian constitution, the President of Haiti's Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre, then, assumed the Presidency.

After several postponements, the first round of new elections for president and the National Assembly took place on February 7, 2006. The election was won by former President Préval.² The country is still affected by violent confrontations between gangs and political factions.³ Thierry Fagart described the human rights situation in the country as, "...catastrophic with summary executions, mob violence, torture and arbitrary arrests".⁴ After several months of delay, municipal and local elections were held on 3 December 2006. Despite some violent incidents, the UN said it was satisfied with the process.⁵

While there is a multiplicity of independent and linked armed groups which make the situation very complex, the following major armed groups can be identified:

- Milices Populaires: is the most dangerous group as they have official legitimacy and are the most numerous. Their principal target is the local population in stigmatised areas;
- Brigades de Vigilance, Brigades de Quartier and Milices Populaires: are composed of adults and adolescents with a lot of women members.
- Organisations Politiques: they are a politically motivated group which does not target women and girls;
- Groups de Bandits: in which girl and women are the principal victims through gang rape and extortion;

² Library of Congress (May 2006) Federal Research Division Country Profile: Haiti. Available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf>. Accessed 09/02/2007.

³ BBC News (June 2008) Country profile Haiti. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/1202772.stm. Accessed 09/06/2007.

⁴ T. Fagart is the Human Rights Official in the MINUSTAH Mission, for more information about his declaration see <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/10/un-warns-of-catastrophic-human-rights.php> and <http://en.epochtimes.com/news/5-10-15/33340.html>.

⁵ Security Council Report (January 2007) Haiti. Available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.2294409/k.89A9/January_2007BRHaiti.htm. Accessed 10/02/2007.

- Vagabonds: groups of adolescents who specialise in the gang rape of girls; and
- Modern Rara Groups: who support the Groups de Bandits.

1.2 Post-conflict Political Developments.

The establishment of the rule of law in Haiti remains elusive. Today, Haiti remains a fragile country, with widespread poverty, few paved roads, unreliable electricity and poor education and health services. The political system is chronically unstable; violent civil protests routinely breaks out. The economic, political and social crisis undermines human security and impedes humanitarian aid and development initiatives. Data provided by human-rights groups show a growing number of murders and kidnappings committed by armed groups, extrajudicial executions carried out by the Haitian National Police and deaths resulting from the alleged indiscriminate shooting by UN troops.⁶ In 2006, Transparency International rated Haiti as the most corrupt country in the world.

1.3 Intervention Forces.

United Nations involvement in Haiti started in February 1993, when the joint UN – OAS International Civilian Mission was deployed. Four United Nations peacekeeping operations have been deployed in Haiti since that time. To a greater or lesser degree, all the UN operations focused on the restoration of the rule of law.⁷ On 23 September 1993, the Security Council established the first peacekeeping operation in Haiti. UNMIH was authorised by UNSC Resolution 867 (1993) to help implement the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement signed by the Haitian political parties on 3 July 1993. The Governors Island Agreement included, amongst other things, the organisation of a political dialogue between representatives of the political parties in order to agree to a political truce and to promote a social pact to create the conditions

⁶ Oxfam (2006) The call for tough arms control Voices from Haiti. Available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/country/amer_pdf/americas-haiti-2006.pdf. Accessed 11/02/2007.

⁷ Refugees International. Available at www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/list/?country=2949&type=4&update=1. Accessed 09/02/2007.

necessary to ensure a peaceful transition and to implement the assistance for modernizing the armed forces, as well as establishing a new police force.⁸

The UNMIH mandate was to assist in modernising the Haitian Armed Forces, and establishing a new Police Force. However, in October 1994, due to the fact that the mission could not carry out that mandate because of the non-cooperation of the Haitian military authorities, UNMIH's mandate was revised by UNSC Resolution 940 and later Resolution 975 (1995). The main responsibilities were now to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in: protecting international personnel and key installations; professionalization of the Haitian Armed Forces and the creation of a separate Police Force.⁹ However, even though \$70 million USD was invested in the project, it was unsuccessful. The US government played an important role in leading UNMIH¹⁰ which officially start on 31 March, 1995. On 17 December, 1995, Presidential elections were again held and on 7 February, 1996, power was transferred to the new President. Following a request from the President of Haiti, UNMIH's mandate was extended by UNSC Resolution 1048 (1996) until 30 June 1996. A number of successive UN peace keeping operations have been deployed to Haiti since 1996.

The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was initially established for a period of six months with the passing of UNSC Resolution 1063 (1996) on 28 June 1996. Its mandate was to assist the Haitian authorities in: the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; in maintaining a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an effective national police force; and in promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation. After two extensions, UNMIH's mandate expired on 31 July, 1997.

The United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) was the third peacekeeping operation in Haiti. It was established on the basis of the July 1997

⁸ US Command and General Staff College. Governors Islands Accord. Available at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/kretchik/appendixd.asp>. Accessed 10/02/2007.

⁹ UNMIH mandate. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihmandate.html. Accessed 08/02/2007.

¹⁰ Escola de Cultura de Pau (No Date) "Haiti". Available at <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/mapa/haitii.pdf>. Accessed 08/02/2007.

Report by the Secretary General to the Security Council (S/1997/564)¹¹. The mission comprised both military and civilian police elements. Their mandate was to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police (HNP), to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel implementing the mandate and to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation¹²

The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) was established by the General Assembly resolution A/54/193 of 17 December 1997 and it completed its mandate on 15 March 2000 which was to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalisation of the Haitian National Police. Special emphasis was on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialised police units.¹³

The new International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) was established on 16 March 2000. It was also approved by UNGA Resolution A/54/193 of 17 December, 1999. Its mandate is to consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions of the United Nations in Haiti as well as by the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). The main tasks of this mission are to promote human rights and reinforce the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary, and with coordinating and facilitating the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.

On 30 April 2004, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, agreed to establish, under UNSC Resolution 1542, the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004.¹⁴ MINUSTAH was established with the following mandate:

¹¹ See: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/183/45/IMG/N9718345.pdf?OpenElement>

¹² UN, UNTMIH operation Haiti. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm.. Accessed 08/02/2007.

¹³ UN, MIPONUH operation Haiti. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm. Accessed 08/02/2007.

¹⁴United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre (No Date) Country Programme Haiti. Available at <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80>. Accessed 08/02/2007.

- to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment and in monitoring, reconstructing and reforming the Haitian National Police;
- to assist, particularly the Haitian National Police, *with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures;*
- to assist with the restoration and maintenance of rule of law, public safety and public order; to protect United Nations personnel and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
- to support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti;
- to assist the Transitional Government in its efforts to bring about a process of national dialogue and reconciliation; and
- to organise, monitor and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections and to support good governance at the local level.¹⁵

Concerning human rights, their main tasks are to support all the efforts to promote and protect human rights particularly of women and children and to monitor and report on the human rights situation.¹⁶

1.4 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

Since the mid-1980s, a number of small-scale disarmament efforts were launched by both international and national actors in Haiti. Many of these have adopted coercive strategies, while others have entailed a combination and voluntary approaches and buy-back strategies. In the late 1990s, the focus of the programmes was on small-scale public awareness campaigns and the formation of a National Focal Point on small arms but these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Since 1993, fewer than 4,265 weapons have been collected. In addition, 15,236 weapons were collected by the US operation in 1994-95 but only 2,435 of the total (about 12 per cent) have been destroyed. Most programmes have focused narrowly on weapons collection rather

¹⁵ See: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/mandate.html>

¹⁶ UNSC Resolution 1542 (2004), 30 April 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/332/98/PDF/N0433298.pdf?OpenElement>.

than the broader objectives of reconciliation, violence reduction, or peace-building. Virtually every disarmament effort in Haiti has failed until now.¹⁷

The UN, through MINUSTAH, has taken the lead amongst the international actors in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration work in Haiti. It is important to note that the DDR process in Haiti is not the result of the previous peace agreement.¹⁸ The key provisions for establishing the mandate of the current DDR programme in Haiti were set out in UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1542) of 30 April 2004. However, it was recognised, with UNSC Resolution (S/RES/1702) of 15 August 2006, that the conditions for conventional DDR strategies did not exist in Haiti at that time. This statement recognised that fact that although security was a necessary condition for the success of the transitional process, it was not sufficient on its own. No sustainable peace could be achieved without a parallel political process involving all segments of the society.¹⁹ The new approach promotes an innovative strategy requesting MINUSTAH to reorient its DDR efforts towards a comprehensive community violence reduction programme adapted to local conditions, including assistance for initiatives to strengthen local governance and the rule of law and provide employment opportunities for former gang members and at risk youth.²⁰

This new approach constitutes the first institutional integration between a UN Peacekeeping Operation and a national UNDP office and it was developed in cooperation with the government of Haiti.²¹ It focuses on addressing the specific character of armed violence in Haiti through the development of a holistic approach based on a comprehensive community violence reduction capacity. It is a vision of community security which implies that the different actors of the society have a role

¹⁷ Muggah, Robert (2005) *Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration*. Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/sas-hti-apr.pdf>. Accessed 20/02/2008.

¹⁸ Escola de Cultura de Pau (February 2006) *Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes existing in the world during 2005*. Available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/disarmament/disarm_pdf/2006_Carmes_et_al.pdf. Accessed 12/02/2007.

¹⁹ UN, Haiti MINUSTAH background. Available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minustah/background.html>. Accessed 08/02/2007.

²⁰ UNSC Resolution 1702 (2006), 15 August 2006, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Haiti%20SRES1702.pdf>

²¹ United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre (No Date) *Country Programme Haiti*, op. cit.

in increasing human security, that the community can have an important role in conflict management and that it has the ability to develop the capacity to respond to potential threats at an early stage.²² Initiatives directed towards socio-economic reintegration as well as reconciliation have been included as well.²³

The change in the UN Security Council approach toward disarmament in a peace keeping operation is significant. It recognises the limitations of the DDR approach utilised in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Afghanistan and the role of local community in preparing Haiti for a gradual withdrawal of the peace keeping mission in a secure and stable environment. This innovative strategy has a strong focus on putting weapons beyond use in a context of a community security approach. It intends to build confidence, stability and security in the country by empowering state actors and community members who will then be the future key players in preventing and reducing armed violence, thereby trying to link security to development.²⁴

1.4.1 The DDR Programme: Objectives.

The DDR programme in Haiti focuses on both short-term stabilisation objectives of the UN peace keeping operation and the longer term sustainable objectives of UNDP.

The main stated objectives are:

1. To disarm and demobilise armed groups, in particular to evaluate armed groups; to register and construct a database of members of armed groups; forced disarmament and voluntary disarmament by creating livelihood opportunities; assessment, listing and collection of firearms and destruction or recycling of firearms.
2. To strengthen institutional capacity in order to ensure the success of the disarmament process and monitoring, in particular with the creation of a mixed inter-ministerial commission and an operational technical committee,

²² Ibid.

²³ Muggah, Robert (October 2005) Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/o_papers_pdf/2005-op14-haiti-eng.pdf. Accessed 11/02/2007.

²⁴ UN, DDR Quarterly Report (July- August 2006) The Intergated DDR Section: UNDP-MINUSTAH 3rd Quarterly Report. Available at http://unddr.org/docs/3rd_Quarterly_Report_2006_version_3.pdf. Accessed 3/05/2008.

the development and implementation of a National Disarmament Programme and the development of a legal framework to control weapons.

3. To promote the mobilisation of all sectors of society with special attention to women and children, in particular in implementing awareness national campaign and organizing community activities to contribute to the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts.
4. To ensure the rehabilitation and socio-economic reinsertion of armed groups, in particular in introducing programmes, services and projects to facilitate reinsertion and rehabilitation of former combatants; in carrying out a programme of short-term technical and professional training for disarmed troops (also human rights, HIV/AIDS), in creating employment opportunities (local development projects, micro-business), in ensuring special help for the rehabilitation and reintegration of children through school projects and therapy.²⁵

Greater emphasis has been put on the reintegration process in order to encourage the process of transition and reconciliation. Provisions have been made for individual reinsertion options.²⁶ With regard to women associated with armed groups, the plan is to reintegrate them and to strengthen their role as vectors of peace.²⁷

1.4.2 The DDR Programme: Implementation.

On 29 August 2006, the Haitian Government created a National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reinsertion (NCDDR) that coordinates the Committees for the Prevention of Violence and for Development. It is also responsible for the efforts to empower youth, women and the elderly to be partners of the National Police and Local Authorities in the fight against violence.²⁸ In cooperation with UNDP, the MINUSTAH's DDR Unit focuses on the following main areas: (i) the disarming and reintegration of gang members; (ii) the re-integration of youth and women; (iii) legislation to control arms and community disarmament.

²⁵ Escola de Cultura de Pau, "Haiti", op. cit.

²⁶ Escola de Cultura de Pau (February 2006) Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes existing in the world during 2005, op. cit.

²⁷ Escola de Cultura de Pau, "Haiti", op. cit.

²⁸ United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre (No Date) Country Programme Haiti, op. cit.

The target for DDR activities are the illegally armed gangs and groups in urban centres, mainly located in Port-au-Prince. Women and children involved in these groups are included as beneficiaries. The eligibility criteria that have to be respected in order to be part of the programme are: handing in one SALW per DDR beneficiary; completion of the demobilisation form; and acceptance of appropriate reintegration package and monitoring by the DDR Section.²⁹

In recent years, the government of Haiti has shown a determination in dealing with insecurity. On August 2006, President Préval stated that the only choices for urban gangs were “disarm or die”.³⁰ On the 12 September, Prime Minister Alexis established the new National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reinsertion to support this strategy.³¹ Since early August, MINUSTAH has set-up 32 checkpoints in order to reduce the gangs’ ability to operate in Cité Soleil.

With regard to the DDR program, violence reduction projects for the communities have been designed to create jobs, infrastructure and services and bolster the State’s presence in Bel Air, Cite Soleil and Martissant localities. Individuals have the option to dismantle their gangs and disarm voluntarily.³²

On 8 August 2006, the government adopted the National Police Reform Plan elaborated in coordination with MINUSTAH and pursuant to Security Council

²⁹ The MINUSTAH DDR Section is the first institutional integration between a PKO and UNDP. It was established in September of 2004. See <http://www.actionaid.org/wps/content/documents/ActionAid%20Minustah%20Haiti%20Report%20July%202006.pdf>.

³⁰ Haiti Democracy Project (2006) Disarm or Die. Available at <http://www.haitipolicy.org/content/3625.htm>. Accessed 10/02/2007.

³¹ DDR Quarterly Report, The Integrated DDR Section : UNDP MINUSTAH, July-August-September 2006.

³² International Crisis Group (30 October 2006) Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b12_haiti_security_and_the_reintegration_of_the_state.pdf. Accessed 20/05/2008.

Resolution 1608 (2005).³³ The Strategic Plan for the Reform of Justice still has to emerge.³⁴

The pre-requisite for the implementation of the programme was agreed to be the establishment of the NCDDR for two reasons. First, it can guarantee the national appropriation of resources for the process. Secondly, it can be the essential intermediary for technical, strategic and political discussion in the framework of DDR. The 4 September 2006 was the “not before day” for the launch of the disarmament campaign.³⁵ The main points of this campaign are that:

- the negotiation and identification of beneficiaries is a state responsibility;
- gangs leaders wanted by police are not eligible to enter in the DDR process;
- all weapons handed in the DDR process must be registered in the UN data-base system; and
- beneficiaries are hosted in the Reinsertion Orientation Centre (ROC) for four weeks in preparation for the transition to a ‘peaceful’ way of living.

Training includes, non-violent communication, human rights, gender sensitivity, among others. In addition, the integration process spans over a period of 18 months, with two possible scenarios: (i) nine months of vocational training followed by job placement; or (ii) business management training and micro-enterprise. The monthly allowance is \$60 USD and is provided during the initial period in order to support the family of the participant.

During the period between the exit of the ROC and the starting of the reintegration phase, beneficiaries have access to gainful employment through a community vital infrastructure “Stop gap” Project.

³³United Nations Security Council (12 September 2006) Letter dated 31 August 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. Available at <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/Haiti%20S2006726.pdf>. Accessed 03/05/2008.

³⁴ Security Council Report (January 2007) Haiti, op. cit.

³⁵ DDR Quarterly Report, The Integrated DDR Section : UNDP MINUSTAH, July-August-September 2006.

1.4.3 Reintegration

The individual reintegration of former armed group members is divided into two objectives aimed at both preparing the individual and the community. It is a mutually supporting process that has to be implemented simultaneously in order to ensure a sustainable contribution to the peace process. Its main objective is for the beneficiary to secure a sustainable livelihood without resorting to armed violence. The main components of this programme are: social (the beneficiary has to re-link with the community); economical (to secure a sustainable livelihood through peaceful means); and psychological (a new lifestyle without violence).

The NCDDR and the Community Violence Prevention and Development Committees have the task of monitoring the reintegration process. In order to ensure a successful reintegration, beneficiaries of the reinsertion programme are monitored for 18 months. The unit cost per beneficiary is \$3,000 USD³⁶ with a total estimated budget for the period from July 2004 until September 2007 of \$50.1 million USD.³⁷ However, there are serious challenges in identifying the appropriate beneficiaries with the estimated number thought to be around 6,000 individuals.³⁸

1.5 Implementation Challenges Identified.

The current DDR effort has to overcome the history of failed past attempts at the disarmament of violent groups and a backlog of failures which includes: the US-led gun buy-back and demobilisation program; the transitional government's payment of pensions to demobilised ex-Fad'H members; and the first MINUSTAH DDR program. There are several interlinked challenges which explain the Haitian DDR programme's lack of success to-date. First of all, the political environment is inappropriate for reconciliation and significant disarmament. Second, encouraged by the disintegration of the rule of law, armed groups have not seen it in their interests to negotiate or compromise. Third, reform of the security sector has been insufficient to reduce violence. Finally, international interventions have been ineffective in acting as a

³⁶ DDR Quarterly Report, The Integrated DDR Section : UNDP MINUSTAH, July-August-September 2006.

³⁷ Escola de Cultura de Pau, "Haiti", op. cit.

³⁸ Escola de Cultura de Pau, "Haiti", op. cit.

deterrence to violence and criminality.³⁹ There are no parties-to-the-conflict with a clear set of political goals or defined agendas. Even worse, there are no peace agreements where the parties-to-the-conflict have agreed on a DDR process. The number of small arms and light weapons circulating in the communities is incredibly high. There are currently no fewer than 210,000 small arms in Haiti. The majority of which, are in the hands of private citizens. Moreover, the Haitian Constitution gives every citizen the right to armed self-defence at home, as long as, the weapons are registered. Unfortunately, the majority of the weapons are not registered and therefore, illegal.

The MINUSTAH's DDR Unit, in co-operation with the NDC and the UNDP, has significantly restructured its approach to DDR in Haiti to ensure a solution that addresses the country's specific problems and encourages community participation.⁴⁰ This new approach focuses on the goal of the reduction of violence in the communities, at the same time as having the aim of changing the people's mindset 'from a community that values weapons to one that values development'.⁴¹ Its purpose is to reduce violence through a bottom-up process. The focus on youth is of particular importance for the future of the country, as many young people are engaged in armed violence due to a lack of opportunities in the country.⁴²

However, in order to be effective, the current DDR Integrated Approach severing the links between armed gangs and communities should include the moderate use of legal force coupled with intelligence services with a focus on justice and reparations to the victims of violence. There is still a huge gap in communications between the MINUSTAH DDR Unit and the local communities to such an extent that often, they do not even know that there is such a possibility. Moreover, there are still serious tensions between the international community who want to restructure the armed

³⁹ Country Programme: Haiti. Available at <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80> Accessed 01/07/2008.

⁴⁰ Action Aid International (October 2006) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: What Role should the EU play in Haiti. Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/actionaid-hti-03oct.pdf>. Accessed 11/02/2007.

⁴¹ Prime Minister Alexis' Speech 29th of August 2006, Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/actionaid-hti-03oct.pdf>. Accessed 11/02/2007.

⁴² www.actionaid.org/wps/content/documents/Haiti%20report%20-%20english.pdf

forces and the Haitian people that fight for their complete abolition.⁴³ The International Crisis Group (ICG) has reported that some gang leaders are convinced that there would be no disarmament without a general amnesty, something that MINUSTAH and the government say is impossible.⁴⁴ The ICG goes on to report that the poor coordination between MINUSTAH and the government have almost derailed this new programme since its inception.⁴⁵

One of the main obstacles for a successful DDR programme is the fact that armed civilian groups have control of Cite Soleil and the DDR Unit does not enjoy freedom of movement in that area. The effective implementation of DDR activities is also difficult in other unstable areas such as, Bel Air, Carrefour Feuille and Martissant. Finally, one regrettable effect of the DDR programme was the involvement of UN peace keepers in sexual abuses and exploitation.⁴⁶

1.6 Synergies with Other Programmes.

1.6.1 SALW.

In October 2006, Action Aid reported that there are still an estimated 210,000 small arms in Haiti. The majority of these are not in the hands of armed gangs but of ordinary citizens and private security companies. Initially, kidnappings were carried out in retaliation for the alleged kidnappings during the Aristide era. Now it has become a way for criminal gangs to sustain themselves financially. Moreover, the previous DDR approaches were focused only on disarming and demobilizing the former Haitian Army (F'adH), leaving other armed groups untouched.

Following from a survey conducted by Action Aid in April 2006, the small arms proliferation in the country can be explained by the fear and intimidation of ordinary

⁴³ Escola de Cultura de Pau, "Haiti", op. cit.

⁴⁴ Crisis group interview, Amaral Duclona, 1 September 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b12_haiti_security_and_the_reintegration_of_the_state.pdf.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Refugees International (July 2005) Haiti: Sexual Exploitation by Peace Keepers Likely to be a Problem. Available at <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/5315/>. Accessed 14/02/2007.

citizens by armed groups; the people's lack of power to change the situation; and the absence of state authority and socio-economic development opportunities. In some cases, communities will protect armed groups because they too can benefit financially from their crimes.

Action Aid, on the basis of the June 2006 UNDP / MINUSTAH study on women and armed violence in Haiti, concluded that the categorisation of women as actors, dependents, supporters or victims of armed groups and the consequent DDR typology cannot be applied to the Haitian context.⁴⁷

The only type of firearm produced locally is the home-made 'Creole' guns which are usually crude handguns or rifles refurbished from old models. The majority of the small arms present in Haiti are smuggled in from neighbouring countries in the region, including from the USA. Additionally, several countries including, France, Brazil, Italy, UK and the US have licensed the transfer of small arms to Haiti over the past decade. Since the 1980s, the USA has been the largest supplier of arms to the country as the 1991 US imposed Arms Embargo allows for exceptions to be made for the authorisation of transfers of some US weapons on 'a case-by-case-basis'. Since March 2004, there have been several such transfers on this basis.

2. Human Security in the Post-conflict Period.

2.1 Freedom from Fear.

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on the 12 September 2006, UNICEF finally has a remit to operate in Haiti. However, DDR for children will not be supported by the UN before a formal commitment by the Government.⁴⁸

Recently the DDR Integrated Programme's Western Office in collaboration with the Equipe de Recherche et d'Intervention en Psychologie launched a project called,

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ DDR Quarterly Report, The Integrated DDR Section: UNDP MINUSTAH, July-August-September 2006.

‘Minimum Fare’, aimed at the rehabilitation and reinsertion of 25 women victimised by rape in Carrefour Feuilles. Eventually, it is hoped that hundreds of women will be targeted for awareness raising and basic community support.⁴⁹

2.1.1 Justice Sector.

Different measures have been planned by the government in order to combat impunity, such as, the organisation of fair and impartial trials and the strengthening of investigation procedures and the penal system. Emphasis was put on the examination of legal capacities in the case of psychological violence, sexual violence and economic and financial crimes. In order to promote an independent judiciary, the focus was put on the development of basic legal texts.⁵⁰ However, no great attention has been devoted to improving the judicial system: judges are corrupt; people are arrested without due process; some people responsible of kidnappings are not prosecuted; and prisons have been described as inhumane.⁵¹ The UNDDR reports in its country analysis that impunity is widespread. Moreover, the Haitian penal system and justice system face limitations concerning the lack of financial and human resources.⁵²

2.2 Freedom from Want.

Haiti is considered the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with 80% of the population living below the poverty line and 54% in abject poverty.⁵³ Two-thirds of the population depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming. The vulnerability to damage from frequent natural disasters and the country's widespread deforestation remain sources of concern.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Escola de Cultura de Pau, “Haiti”, op. cit.

⁵¹ Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=4475>.

⁵² United Nations Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre (No Date) Country Programmes. Available at <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=80>. Accessed 14/02/2007.

⁵³ CIA (June 2008) The World Factbook. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>. Accessed 28/06/2008.

The country suffers from high inflation, a lack of investment, because of insecurity and limited infrastructure, as well as a severe trade deficit. In 2005, Haiti paid its arrears to the World Bank, paving the way for a reengagement with the Bank.⁵⁴ The GDP per capita is \$1,663 USD.⁵⁵ Unemployment and underemployment are widespread. More than two-thirds of the labour force did not have formal jobs in 2002.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Human Development Report 2007/2008, Haiti. Available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs HTI.html. Accessed 28/06/2008.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

MAP OF HAITI⁵⁷



⁵⁷Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.