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Desk Review

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Security in Mozambique

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Contribution to the Project:

**DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building
and the Interests of the Poor**



**UNIVERSITY OF
BRADFORD**
MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

MOZAMBIQUE

1. The DDR Programme.

1.1 The Conflict Context

Even though Mozambique has a difficult history of colonial rule, followed by a 16-year civil war and regular famines, the country has made significant progress in recent years. However, it is still one of the poorer countries in the world and is affected by high levels of violent crime, both in rural and urban areas.¹ It also remains with the lowest life expectancy in the world.²

Mozambique was a Portuguese colony.³ It gained independence in 1975 and Samora Machel was the first president. He was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano. A few years later, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), supported by the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe, engaged in guerrilla warfare against FRELIMO government, which had a Marxist orientation. The country was plunged into a long and debilitating civil war that resulted in one million deaths, either directly through fighting or due to widespread hunger and disease. As such, Mozambique was home to six million internally displaced people (IDP's) and 1.7 million refugees out of a population of 14 million. In addition, the country also suffered from the massive destruction of the country's economic and social infrastructure.⁴

1.2 Post-conflict Developments.

On 4 October 1992, a General Peace Agreement was signed in Rome after more than two years of negotiations under the auspices of the Catholic Community of Sant'

¹ OSAC, Mozambique 2007 Crime and Safety Report, Jan 2007.

<https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=61624>. Accessed 08/04/2008.

² Save the Children, Save Children in Mozambique.

<http://www.savethechildren.org/countries/africa/mozambique.html>. Accessed 08/04/2008.

³ For historical background, please see

<http://www.storiamilitare.net/Quadro%20storico%20del%20Mozambico.pdf>.

⁴ http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/3ae6a6be14.html#_ftn1.

Egidio. The agreement was reached through a confidence-building approach rather than power-based mediation. The General Peace Agreement, establishing the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace, invited the UN to monitor the implementation of the Agreement by providing technical assistance and supervision of the general elections.⁵ Under the Agreement, a ceasefire was to come into effect on 15 October 1992 (commonly known as 'E-Day'). The ceasefire was to be followed rapidly by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in certain assembly areas, six months after the signature of the Agreement. The GPA also provided for the creation of a new armed forces, the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) based on voluntary recruitment.

The demobilisation of those troops who would not serve in the FADM would begin immediately and would have to be completed within six months after E-Day. The emphasis for this programme was on disarmament and demobilisation, with little attention being paid to social and cultural reintegration.⁶ Elections were scheduled to take place not later than 15 October, 1993. The implementation of the Agreement was to be supervised by a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission chaired by the United Nations.⁷ The GP Agreement also foresaw the creation of a reintegration commission composed of members of the government and RENAMO, representatives of the invited countries and representatives of the international organisations, presided by a UN representative.

On 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative, Mr A. Ajello, appointed the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) to guarantee the implementation of the Agreement and settle any disputes that might arise between the parties.⁸ The CSC was also chaired by the UN. On the same day, the CSC appointed the main subsidiary commissions: the Ceasefire Commission (CCF), the Commission for the

⁵ UN, UNOMOZ Mozambique - Background.

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozFT.htm. Accessed 08/04/2008

⁶ United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, "Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) and Stability in Africa", Jun 2005.

<http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/DDR%20Sierra%20Leone%20March%202006.pdf>. Accessed 08/04/2008.

⁷ UN, UNOMOZ Mozambique - Background, op. cit.

⁸ *The Blue Helmets, A review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, Third Edition, United Nations Department of Public Information, NY, 1996.

Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel (CORE) and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCGADM).⁹

On 16 December 1992, the Security Council with Resolution 797 (1992), authorised the deployment of ONUMOZ until 31 October, 1993. Elections were not meant to take place until the military aspects of the General Peace Agreement had been fully implemented. The mandate of ONUMOZ included four important elements: political, military; electoral; and humanitarian. The operational concept of the mission put strong emphasis on the interrelation between the different components. The UN Secretary General stressed several points: (i) that without sufficient humanitarian aid the security situation in the country might deteriorate and the demobilisation process might stall and that, without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination; (ii) that without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not be possible; (iii) that a civilian technical unit was to be deployed to support the logistic tasks relating to the demobilisation programme in the assembly areas; and finally, (iv) successful elections required prompt demobilisation and formation of the new armed forces.

In May 1993, ONUMOZ was fully deployed to Mozambique, followed by the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops which was successfully completed on 30 June. However, the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State Administration was still pending, along with several other important issues, such as, the cantonment and demobilisation of troops and the formation of the new army.

UNOMOZ applied lessons learned from the Angola experience, in particular that elections should be held only after demobilisation of both sides. In October 1994, the country's first multiparty elections were held with Mr Chissano, leader of the Government's party (FRELIMO) winning the parliamentary and presidential elections. The new Parliament and President were inaugurated on 8 and 9 December 1994,

⁹UN UNOMOZ Mozambique, Background, op. cit.

respectively. ONUMOZ withdrew at the end of January 1995.¹⁰ The operation was generally considered a success.¹¹

1.3 The DDR Programme.

1.3.1 Disarmament and Demobilisation under UNOMOZ

The DDR programme in the country was carried out by UNOMOZ. The main tasks of ONUMOZ during the 1992-1994 time period were to:

- monitor the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces of the two parties, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
- monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, and provide security in the four transport corridors;
- monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;
- authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and
- provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process.

However, major violations of the ceasefire were reported in various areas of the country and the high degree of suspicion between the Government and RENAMO had impacts on the DDR process, which became the main reason for delays in the implementation. Moreover, the majority of the troops opted for reintegration into civilian life and the FADM failed to recruit sufficient number of personnel.

The demobilisation was implemented by the UNOMOZ Demobilisation Technical Unit (DTU) which provided technical and administrative support. An extremely useful fact was the circumstance that Mozambique already had a planning unit for demobilisation that was trained two years prior to the end of the war.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/3ae6a6be14.html#_ftn1 and UN, Mozambique. <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4d-17.htm>. Accessed 12/04/2008.

While ONUMOZ was fully deployed by the beginning of May 1993, it was only on 30 November that troop cantonment formally commenced. The UNHCR started a three-year operation for the repatriation of 1.3 million refugees. At that time, it was the biggest operation ever undertaken by UNHCR in Africa with 20 out of 49 assembly areas initially opened: twelve for the Government and eight for RENAMO in order to allow the assembly of the troops to get started after such long delays. On 20 December, another 15 assembly areas were opened by the programme. During the initial stages of cantonment, government troops assembled in much larger numbers than RENAMO forces. However, this trend was reversed by mid-December 1993.

While the dismantling of government's paramilitary forces and militia was scheduled to begin simultaneously with the assembly and demobilisation of the regular troops, unfortunately, there were numerous delays. The encampment and disarmament of troops began more than a year after the signature of the General Peace Agreement.¹² On 12 January 1994, the dismantling of the troops of the paramilitary groups was finally initiated after several attempts to set a deadline for the beginning of this process. The beneficiaries for this process not only comprised the ex-belligerent forces but also all those citizens who had been armed by the State.¹³

The DDR process took place between March and late August 1994, involving more than 76,000 soldiers from both sides with 10,000 of them being helped by ONUMOZ to integrate into the new national army. Overall, the process involved the registration, disarmament, cantonment and discharge of the ex-combatants.

By mid-April 1994, 81% of RENAMO fighters and 55% of government soldiers were cantoned and 2,000 soldiers were trained for the FADM.¹⁴ A total of 12,756 troops (12,195 Government and 561 RENAMO, that correspond to the 20% and the 3% respectively) were demobilised and transported to the district of their choice.

On 26 August 1994, the assembly process and the demobilisation of both government and RENAMO soldiers were almost concluded.¹⁵ Moreover, 75 per cent of IDPs had

¹² http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/3ae6a6be14.html#_ftn1. Accessed 12/04/2008.

¹³ http://ssronline.org/ebooks_pages.cfm?b=7&id=178&p=115. Accessed 15/04/2008.

¹⁴ UN UNOMOZ Mozambique, Background, op. cit.

¹⁵ Ibid.

been resettled and most refugees had returned to Mozambique as well.¹⁶ On 21 October, the Secretary General stated that the essential conditions for holding elections were in place - more than 76,000 combatants had been demobilised and a unified army of 10,000 soldiers had been formed.¹⁷

The demobilisation process ended with the demobilisation of 92,881 soldiers and without the outbreak of major armed violence.¹⁸ However, not all forces and militarised groups were demobilised. Within the Rapid Intervention Unit, some government troops were not demobilised but incorporated into the police force. This led to high political tensions within the country.

Approximately 155,000 weapons were recovered by UNOMOZ.¹⁹ Evidences suggest, however, that ex-combatants as well as members of the local population kept hidden a certain number arms.²⁰ Moreover, weapons started to disappear from arms depots and ended up at the disposal of criminals.

The evaluation of the role of UNOMOZ in the DDR process is still controversial, as it can be argued that the DDR process under UNOMOZ was incomplete.²¹ This was due mainly to the inadequate and unrealistic time framework and the lack of human resources of the UN mission. Moreover, cantonments camps were often in areas difficult to access.

In Mozambique, the DDR programme did not taken women combatants into consideration. The demobilisation programme in the mid-1990s granted resettlement

¹⁶ UN UNOMOZ. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozS.htm. Accessed 08/04/2008.

¹⁷ UN UNOMOZ Mozambique, Background, op. cit.

¹⁸ http://ssronline.org/ebooks_pages.cfm?b=7&id=178&p=115. Accessed 08/04/2008.

¹⁹ UN, UNOMOZ Mozambique - Background, op. cit.

²⁰ BASIC, The Struggle Continues: Light Weapons Destruction in Mozambique, 1998.

<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP25.htm>. Accessed 15/04/2008.

²¹ http://ssronline.org/ebooks_pages.cfm?b=7&id=178&p=115. Accessed 08/04/2008.

allowances only to men and only men's clothing was issued.²² In addition, ex-child soldiers were excluded from the demobilisation process.²³

Deep mistrust and a lack of confidence resulted from the delays of the troop assembly and the start of the demobilisation process. Some have argued, that RENAMO was supporting the encampment of its troops only from regions that were not crucial to its election strategy. Others have said that RENAMO was encamping soldiers at a proportionally faster rate than the government.²⁴ The troops themselves were unsatisfied.²⁵

An additional cause of failure of the DDR process was that it became prey to political bargaining from both parties. RENAMO, for example, at the beginning of the process boycotted it to negotiate issues concerning its receiving funds guaranteed to transform itself into a political party.

In ONUMOZ's mandate, disarmament was implicit as part of the demobilisation process. However, as Alex Vines has pointed out, one of the causes of failure of the DDR under UNOMOZ was the lack of distinction between disarmament and demobilisation, as well its weak mandate regarding DDR.²⁶ On the other hand, the UN intervention had some positive effects in that the dispersal of the demobilised troops throughout the country provided them with reinsertion activities and diminished their potential to destabilise the peace process. Finally, it should be recognized that a major obstacle to the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants has been the country's ongoing weak economy. In the end, at the end of 2004, when UNOMOZ completed its mandate, the government of Mozambique was left in a difficult opposition, with overstuffed paramilitary institutions, disgruntled

²² UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, "Gender Perspectives on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration", *Briefing Paper 4*, 2001. <http://disarmament.un.org/gender/note4.pdf>. Accessed 15/04/2008.

²³ International Labour Organisation, "The reintegration of war affected youth, the experience of Mozambique", 1997. <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/training/publ/pub13.htm>. Accessed 15/04/2008.

²⁴ http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/3ae6a6be14.html#_ftn1. Accessed 15/04/2008.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ BASIC, 1998, op. cit.

armed forces, many jobless demobilised soldiers in a situation of economic stagnation and an unrecorded number of arms spread all over the country.²⁷

1.4 Other DDR Initiatives.

A range of international donors sponsored different programmes to assist the DDR process. The International Office for Migration (IOM) provided the means for transportation of the ex-combatants and their dependants. This ended up being very important to them as it strengthened their sense of self-determination as it gave these people a certain ‘freedom of choice’ with regard to their area of resettlement, which further supported the security objective of dispersing them.²⁸

1.4.1 Disarmament.

In 1991, the NGO, Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) introduced the programme, “Transforming Guns into Hoes” (TAE), to reduce violent crime by collecting illegal guns in exchange for sewing machines, farming instruments, bicycles and seed grain.²⁹ The programme was finally launched on 20 October, 1995 with the support of the government, of RENAMO and of civil society. By May 1998, 1,500 firearms and 34,000 explosives had been destroyed. Interestingly, some of these weapons were transformed into anti-militaristic sculptures. Unfortunately, the programme, which had been scheduled for two years, lacked financial resources and ended up being limited to an area around Maputo.

1.4.2 Reintegration.

In Mozambique, the reintegration of ex-combatants was one of the most comprehensive programmes ever attempted. Within this programme, a particular emphasis was put on the restoration of essential services in rural areas for returning

²⁷ ISS, “Disarmament Initiatives in Mozambique: the legacy of ONUMOZ”, 2004. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No94/Chap1.html>. Accessed 15/04/2008.

²⁸ http://ssronline.org/ebooks_pages.cfm?b=7&id=178&p=115. Accessed 15/04/2008.

²⁹ Challenge to the Churches, “Transforming guns into hoes”, 2001. <http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/international/mozam.html>. Accessed 15/04/2008.

refugees and IDPs, through the Coordinated Programme of Assistance, developed in cooperation with the two parties and the international community.³⁰

The United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC) focused on the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. The support strategy comprised four programmes:

1. A Reintegration Support Scheme: implemented by UNDP, that included cash payments, vocational training, credit facilities and promotion of small-scale economic activities;
2. An Information and Referral Service: implemented by IOM, aimed at assisting demobilised soldiers with low-level counselling;
3. A management framework for reintegrating demobilised soldiers with emphasis on business and skills development, executed by ILO, offered vocational kits and training to a limited number of ex-combatants; and
4. A provincial fund for the reintegration of demobilised soldiers.

During 1995, the World Bank developed the pilot Provincial Reintegration Support Programme (PRSP) in two provinces to facilitate the economic and social reintegration of ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups.³¹

The case of ex-soldiers' reintegration in Mozambique is a clear demonstration of the success of strategies deeply rooted in the social and cultural context. The peaceful reintegration of former combatants and former child soldiers was, in fact, facilitated by mediums and traditional healers (*kimbanda*) through purification rituals involving the whole community. Thanks to the purification rites, they redefined the rules necessary for community coexistence and survival.³² Several observers consider the role played by traditional healers essential for the success of the reintegration.

³⁰ *The Blue Helmets, A review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 1996, op. cit.

³¹ The World Bank Group, "War-to-peace Transition in Mozambique: The Provincial Reintegration Support Program", 1997. <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find90.htm>. Accessed 15/04/2008.

³² CERI, 'Les anciens combattants d'aujourd'hui Désarmement, démobilisation et reinsertion', 2004. <http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/cherlist/pouligny/rapportpouligny.pdf>. Accessed 20/04/2008.

By October 1994, the international humanitarian assistance programme aided the resettlement and reintegration of 200,000 former combatants and their dependants and 3 million IDPs.³³ Different international organisations and NGOs sponsored programmes for the reintegration of former combatants: ILO, IOM, UNDP, CORE, GTZ, COSV and ISCOS, among others.

Despite being an expensive process, family reunification was successful.³⁴ In 1988, the Tracing and Reunification Programme was launched by the Children and War Programme to facilitate the reunification of 12,000 unaccompanied children and youths with their families in seven provinces.³⁵

The ILO, IOM and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) provided reintegration assistance for demobilised soldiers. However, even if successful it resulted to be insufficient in comparison to the needs of the beneficiaries.³⁶

1.4.3 Repatriation

Several programs and initiatives were planned to address the issue of repatriation in Mozambique. The 1988 Tripartite Agreement between UNHCR, the government of Mozambique and Malawi was followed by a series of repatriation plans between 1989 and 1992. These plans were highly criticised by the donor community for their impracticability: the logistic scheme to transport refugees from Malawi from Mozambique was extremely expensive and complex.³⁷

³³ *The Blue Helmets, A review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, 1996, op. cit.

³⁴ UN Reintegration of youth into society into the aftermath of war.
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/namibia_honwana.pdf. Accessed 20/04/2008.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ http://www.unhcr.org/home/RSDCOI/3ae6a6be14.html#_ftn1. Accessed 20/04/2008.

1.5 SALW's.

The General Peace Agreement included the provision for the collection, registration and custody of arms, ammunition and explosives. Moreover, the ONUMOZ mandate provided for the destruction of weapons.³⁸ However, the DDR programme under the UNOMOZ provisions encountered problems concerning the proliferation of SALW. For example, of the 200,000 SALW were collected by UNOMOZ, only 24,000 were destroyed³⁹ with many weapons continuing to flow into neighbouring South Africa. UNOMOZ had problems with the control and destruction of SALW, due to the reluctance of ex-combatants and individuals to register weapons.⁴⁰

In 1995, the Mozambique and South African governments launched Operation Rachel⁴¹, a joint initiative to dismantle arms caches that was followed by other similar operations through the years.⁴² This operation proved to be one of the most successful initiatives of its kind.⁴³ In particular, the objective of Mozambique was the general disarmament of civilian populations, especially in rural areas.

In 1998, more than 11,891 weapons were publicly destroyed thanks to 'Rachel' operations. A series of ongoing civil society initiatives, such as the Arms for Tools project (TAE) sponsored by the Christian Council of Mozambique complemented the government programme.⁴⁴ Even if the two initiatives have been very successful and were strongly supported by the international community, an ad hoc initiative with a broader focus should have been put in place earlier.

There was a strong support and involvement of the civilian population in these activities and several times there were large public events where guns were destroyed. In 2000-2001, the EU decided to support this kind of operation with financial support

³⁸ http://ssronline.org/ebooks_pages.cfm?b=7&id=178&p=115. Accessed 20/04/2008.

³⁹ ISS (2004) Disarmament Initiatives in Mozambique: the legacy of ONUMOZ, op. cit.

⁴⁰ Bayo, Adekanye, "Arms and Reconstruction in post conflict Societies", *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(3), 1997; pp.359-366. <http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/3/359>. Accessed 22/04/2008.

⁴¹ SaferAfrica, 2003.

<http://www.saferfrica.org/DocumentsCentre/Monographs/Rachel/RachelPortuguese.pdf>, p.5. Accessed 22/04/2008.

⁴² http://ssronline.org/ebooks_pages.cfm?b=7&id=178&p=115.

⁴³ ISS (2004) Disarmament Initiatives in Mozambique: the legacy of ONUMOZ, op. cit.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

of €200.000 Euros.⁴⁵ However, increasing crime and ethnic violence in South Africa have helped to fuel regional the trade in small arms. Guns in particular are often sold across the border.⁴⁶ The landmines, laid by both government and rebel forces during the civil war, are equally prevalent and dangerous.

In order to prevent and control the illicit trade of SALW across the region, in August 2001, Mozambique signed the *SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials*, which was ratified by the parliament in September 2002.⁴⁷ The government of Mozambique established COPRECAL, a multi-institutional body to supervise and coordinate the implementation of the SADC protocol.

1.6 Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The Lisbon declaration, by which France, Portugal and the UK set out a programme to assist the formation of the new unified army, was approved on 22 July 1993. In December 1993, the training of instructors was completed. However, many police officers still lack the necessary training to be effective and the police are incapable of deterring crime and investigating criminal acts.⁴⁸

1.7 Justice Sector.

The justice sector improved considerably since 1994, however the independence of the courts is still not guaranteed.⁴⁹ The police are poorly paid, poorly equipped and not professional.

⁴⁵ GRIP, Le micro disarmament. https://www.grip-publications.eu/pub/rapports/rg01-1_microdesarm.pdf. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁴⁶ Challenge to the Churches, “Transforming guns into hoes”, 2001, op. cit.

⁴⁷ ISS, Disarmament Initiatives in Mozambique: the legacy of ONUMOZ, 2004, op. cit.

⁴⁸ <https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=61624>

⁴⁹ IRIN, “Mozambique: Judiciary not always independent”, Oct 2006. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=61264>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

2. Human Security

2.1 Macro-economic Profile.

Although the Mozambican economy has been growing on average 8% from 1994 to 2006, Mozambique still ranks among the poorest countries in the world (168th out of 177 countries according to the 2006 HDI).⁵⁰ This notable economic recovery was boosted by the budget support from donors – it is estimated that official development assistance in 2008 will finance more than half of the State expenses - revealing the confidence of the donor community towards Mozambique.⁵¹ The reduction of the debt of Mozambique contributed towards the easing of the burden of natural disasters, and has allowed the country to focus on its own development.⁵² In 1999, Mozambique signed a SADC Trade Protocol aimed at creating a free trade zone in Southern Africa by 2015.⁵³

Mozambique, due to its fast growing economy, has reached a period where investment opportunities are flourishing, in particular in infrastructure, water supply, tourism and related services. Nonetheless, international awareness of corruption in Mozambique, see for example, the World Bank's *Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostic Survey*⁵⁴, has led to a growing concern with direct link to donor policies.

⁵⁰ US Department of State Background Note: Mozambique, May 2008.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7035.htm>. Accessed 26/04/2008; DFID, "Leading the British Government's fight against poverty", Mozambique, Jan 2008.

<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/mozambique-factsheet.pdf>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁵¹ BAdF/OCDE, Mozambique, 2008.

http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/OCDE_Afrique2008_Mozambique.pdf, p.492. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁵² US Department of State, Background Note: Mozambique, May 2008, op. cit.

⁵³ <http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/protocols/trade.php>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁵⁴ Austral Consultoria e Projectos, Lda., Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostic Survey. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Relatorio_Final_da_Pesquisa-ingles.pdf. Accessed 24/04/2008.

2.1.1 Impacts of Conflict.

Due to the long civil war, there is an almost complete lack of social indicators available with regard to the period of the conflict. The first data was collected after five years of research in a post-conflict period, and indicated a national rate of absolute poverty of around 70 per cent.⁵⁵

Mozambique is still considered to be one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, but few maps were kept of the landmines laid during the civil war. Almost all provinces were mined, but more heavily in the frontier provinces along the border with Zimbabwe, in the central areas of Zambezia, Sofala and Tete and in the southern provinces of Maputo and Inhambane, Gaza and Manica.⁵⁶ Many civilian areas located besides strategic military positions were also mined. Landmines are present around arable land, water points, schools, clinics, roads and supply routes deeply affecting the transition of the country to a post-conflict situation, particular in northern-rural areas.⁵⁷ Moreover, the floods of 2000 and 2001, represented a renovation of the threat, as landmines were shifted to other parts of the country-side.⁵⁸

As a result of the conflict, a third of the population was internally displaced, many others sought refuge in neighbouring countries, leading to national agricultural collapse⁵⁹. Infrastructures were heavily damaged and an increasing number of people concentrated on urban centres, as people felt it would provide them with additional opportunities.⁶⁰ This flux of people has played a key role in the transition from a

⁵⁵ World Bank, 'Post Conflict Mozambique's Reconstruction: A Transferable Strategy in Africa.', N. 260, Mar 2006. <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/english/find260.pdf>. Accessed 24/06/2008.

⁵⁶ Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Services Database, Mozambique. http://www.lsndatabase.org/country_landmine.php?country=mozambique. Accessed 24/06/2008.;

Human Rights Watch, Landmines in Mozambique: After the Floods, Mar 2000. <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/mines-moz.htm>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁵⁷ Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Services Database, 'Mozambique', op. cit.; Landmine Monitor, 'Mozambique', 2006. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/country/mozambique#fn17>. Accessed 24/04/2008; The Springfield Centre for Business in Development, "Microfinance During and After Armed Conflict: Lessons from Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda", Mar 2002. <http://www.springfieldcentre.com/publications/sp0202.pdf>, p.47. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, Landmines in Mozambique: After the Floods, Mar 2000, op. cit.

⁵⁹ Stewart, Frances, "Costs of War", *Oxford Today* 14(1), 2001.

<http://www.oxfordtoday.ox.ac.uk/2001-02/v14n1/02.shtml>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁶⁰ McKay, Susan and Mazurana Dyan, "Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War. Rights and Democracy",

relief-to-development stage in the post-conflict era, bringing down the levels of mistrust, rebuilding a civil society through the participation of the people and the promotion of democracy.⁶¹ However, the huge population movements, as well as conflict and natural disasters brought with them the disruption of families (a cornerstone in Mozambique traditional society) and communities and high levels of mortality.⁶² Moreover, the high rates of economic growth witnessed in post-war Mozambique and the rates of population under absolute poverty show a high discrepancy between rural and urban areas.⁶³

2.1.2 Post-conflict Economic Challenges and Programmes.

The resettlement of the refugee populations, political stability and continuing economic reforms have led to a high economic growth rate over the last few years.⁶⁴ However, the economic recovery has also allowed for higher expectations amongst the population which have not yet been met: unemployment, social alienation, economic inequality, corruption, political exclusion, clientelism and patronage are important social issues still to be addressed by the government and the society⁶⁵.

The enhancement of the agricultural sector is also a challenge, for which Mozambican government has been receiving considerable budget support. The current food crisis and lack of modernisation are the main issues hindering the development of the agricultural sector. Agriculture is the backbone of the country's economy⁶⁶,

2004. http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/ICHRDD_wherearethegirls.pdf, p.110-111. Accessed 24/04/2008; <http://www.springfieldcentre.com/publications/sp0202.pdf> p.36-39, and 46-49.

⁶¹ The Maputo Province had a rapid increase of urbanisation rate of 40% in 1991, according to UNEP, 'Environmental and Socio Economic Impacts of Armed Conflict'.

<http://www.unep.org/dewa/Africa/publications/AEO-2/content/204.htm>. Accessed 24/04/2008 ; The Springfield Centre for Business in Development, Mar 2002, op. cit., p.46.

⁶² Baden Sally, "Post-Conflict Mozambique: Women's Special Situation, Population Issues and Gender Perspectives", Bridge, 1997. <http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/re44c.pdf>, p.92. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁶³ Lundin, Iraê Baptista; "Africa Watch: Will Mozambique Remain a Success Story?", *African Security Review*, 9(3), 2000. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9No3/AfricaWatch.html>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁶⁴ US Department of State, Background Note: Mozambique, May 2008, op. cit.

⁶⁵ Vaux, Tony, Mavela, Amandio, Pereira, Joao and Stuttle Jennifer, "Strategic Conflict Assessment: Mozambique", Apr 2006. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/strategic-conflict-assessment.pdf>. Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁶⁶ Mouzinho, Mário and Débora, Nandja, "A Alfabetização em Moçambique: Desafios da Educação Para Todos, Paper presented at *EFA Global Monitoring 2006 UNESCO*", Paris, 2006. http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/files/44013/11327142641Mouzinho_Alfabetizacao.doc/Mouzinho_Alfabetizacao.doc. Accessed 24/04/2008.

representing 26 per cent of the GDP in 2005⁶⁷. However, as already pointed out, the sources of agricultural growth in Mozambique (centred on area expansion and increase in labour force) are not sustainable, and efforts to modernise agricultural technologies are increasingly necessary.⁶⁸ In March 2007, the IFAD supported a programme to modernise the agricultural sector in Mozambique.⁶⁹ Most recently, the African Development Bank (ADB) granted \$140 million USD for the period of two years (2009-2010) to deal with the food crisis. In addition, the G-19 pledged a total amount of \$774.3 million USD for 2009.⁷⁰

The *Water Services and Institutional Support Project*⁷¹ supported by the World Bank was designed to increase water service coverage in the cities of Beira, Nampula, Quelimane, and Pemba and to establish an institutional and regulatory framework for water supply in smaller cities and towns. It was approved in September 2007 and it should be completed by October 2012.⁷²

The Government of Mozambique has launched an Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) for the years comprising 2001 to 2005. The second phase of this project (PARPA II) is now underway (2006-2009). The central objective of this project is “to reduce the incidence of absolute poverty from 70% in 1997 to less than 60% by 2005 and less than 50% by the end of this decade”.⁷³

Operation Rachel is currently still active. So far, figures estimate that as of 2005, Operation Rachel has destroyed on-site 40,000 Small Arms and Light Weapons, over

⁶⁷SADC Review, Agriculture.

http://www.sadcreview.com/country_profiles/mozambique/moz_agriculture.htm . Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁶⁸ World Bank, *Mozambique Agricultural Development Strategy*, 2006.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MOZAMBIQUEEXTN/Resources/Moz_AG_Strategy.pdf . Accessed 24/04/2008.

⁶⁹ IFAD, “New IFAD- supported programme to modernise agricultural sector in Mozambique”, 2007. <http://www.ifad.org/media/press/2007/3.htm>. Accessed 26/04/2008.

⁷⁰ All Africa, (May 2008) “Mozambique: ADB supports Agriculture in the country”. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200805160919.html>. Accessed 26/04/2008.; All Africa, “Mozambique Partners Pledge More Budget Support, But Concerned Over Corruption”, May 2008. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200805231012.html>. Accessed 26/04/2008.

⁷¹ World Bank, *Water Services and Institutional Support Project*, Aug 2007.

<http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projectid=P104566>. Accessed 26/04/2008.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Republic of Mozambique, *Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2001-2005*, 2001. http://poverty2.forumone.com/files/Mozambique_PRSP.pdf. Accessed 26/04/2008.

23,000 cannon rounds of ammunition, almost 14,000 grenades, over 13,500 rockets or projectiles and over 22,500 000 rounds of ammunition.⁷⁴

2.2 Human Security: Freedom from Want.

Although Mozambique has witnessed a remarkable economic growth over the past decade, unemployment still needs to be addressed and its impacts analysed.⁷⁵ The latest unemployment figure (dating back to 1997) reports an unemployment rate of 21%.⁷⁶ According to the CIA World Factbook 2008, 70% of the population are below the poverty line, a number that can be a source of instability in the country⁷⁷.

The Government of Mozambique has been taking measures to fight illiteracy and to promote education, access to healthcare and improved infrastructures. The Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) and PARPA II aim at raising the standards of education and healthcare and to improve access to healthcare and sanitation as well as to provide universal schooling. The document sets out two priorities: (i) to raise the access and improve the efficiency of education, taking into special account women and girls, children with special needs, orphans and children from the rural areas; and (ii) to expand the coverage of healthcare services, water supply and sanitation.⁷⁸

2.3 Freedom from Fear.

The regional context has changed much since the civil war ended. IRIN Africa reported in May 2008, that an outbreak of hate and xenophobe crimes in South

⁷⁴British High Commission Maputo, 'UK gives 3 400 million MTS for Arms Destruction in Mozambique', Sep 2005.

<http://www.britishhighcommission.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1025782354080&a=KArticle&aid=1128332354655>. Accessed 26/04/2008.

⁷⁵ Vaux, Tony, Mavela, Amandio, Pereira, Joao and Stuttle Jennifer, "Strategic Conflict Assessment: Mozambique", Apr 2006. Op. cit.

⁷⁶ CIA The World Factbook, Mozambique, June 2008. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html>. Accessed 26/04/2008.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Republica de Moçambique, *Plano de Acção Para a Redução de Pobreza Absoluta 2006-2009*, May 2006. http://www.mpd.gov.mz/documents/parpa/PARPA_II_aprovado_com_Matriz_Final.pdf, p.33. Accessed 26/04/2008.

African led over 25,000 Mozambicans fleeing to their home country.⁷⁹ This forced migration can be a source of future conflict.

Several floods have hit Mozambique in 2000, 2001, 2006 and 2007. These floods have hampered more recent progresses and slowed down economic growth. The rushing water of the floods has caused the dislocation of landmines and buried other explosive devices, causing uncertainty and fear amongst the population.⁸⁰ According to the UN, Mozambique is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, with more than 100 million square metres remain to be demined in mostly rural areas.⁸¹

In March 2007, a military arsenal crammed with decades-old arms exploded, killing more than 100 people⁸², raising critiques that the military had been slow to carry out promises to destroy the aging rockets and shells, dating from the nation's civil war⁸³. Although the country has set a goal to be mine-free by 2010, it has refused the aid of the UN twice.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ IRIN, "Mozambique: Returnees at a loss after fleeing South Africa", 27 May 2008.

<http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78429>. Accessed 10/06/2008.

⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, 'Landmines in Mozambique: After the Floods', Mar 2000, op. cit.

⁸¹ Mail and Guardian Online, 'Over 400 sites still plagued by mines in Mozambique', 13 Sept 2007.

http://www.mg.co.za/articlepage.aspx?area=/breaking_news/breaking_news_africa/&articleid=319164. Accessed 10/06/2008.

⁸² The New York Times, 'World Briefing Africa: Mozambique: Unexploded Munitions Recovered', 29 May 2007.

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E1D71530F937A15750C0A9619C8B63&scp=14&sq=mozambique&st=nyt>. Accessed 10/06/2008.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ New York Times, 'Fears Linger in Mozambique Over Unexploded Weapons', 29 May 2007.

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/world/africa/29mozambique.html?_r=1. Accessed 10/06/2008.

MAP of MOZAMBIQUE⁸⁵



⁸⁵ Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.