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Emerging Human Security Issues in the Planned Implementation of MDRP Fund in Burundi

Mini Case Study

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1. A Background on the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Process

Soon after starting its operations in Burundi, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was invited by the World Bank to join the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration programme (MDRP). As a result, AMIB formed part of a joint planning group preparing the plan for the implementation of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). This group, whose work started during August 2003, consisted of representatives from the MDRP, AMIB, Executive Secretariat of the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration NCDRR (ES/NCDRR), and United Nations Mission in Burundi (UNOB), assisted by UNICEF, which specialises in the handling of child soldiers. The relationship developed very well, and resulted in the design of the DDR process. Even though AMIB was replaced by ONUB in June 2004, this planning group, which is known as the DDR Cell, continues to function to this day as part of the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). It has a link to the international donor community, which enables it to seek funding for activities outside the scope of the World Bank grant. In return the group provides progress reports to the donors.

1.1 Structures Managing the DDR Process

As a result of the Arusha Accord and subsequent ceasefire agreements and protocols, a number of structures, described in greater detail below, were set up to help implement the agreements. The most important are: the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC); the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC); National Commission on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR); and the National Programme on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR). They were assisted by AMIB, UNOB¹ and UNICEF, which supported the National Programme for the Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers (NPRCS). The DDR process was guided by the Joint Operations Plan (JOP), dated 9 November 2004, for pre-disarmament, disarmament, combatant verification, and demobilisation. The JOP also gives direction to, and serves as a Memorandum of Understanding for ONUB, the JCC, the MDRP and the NCDRR.

¹ UNOB represented the UN Office in Burundi. The Security Council-approved UN mission named ONUB – the UN Operation in Burundi, replaced it during 2004.

1.2 The Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC)

The IMC was one of the most important committees to take part in the transitional process. It was formed on 28 November 2000, with its mandate defined in Protocol V of the Arusha Accord. Its responsibilities included monitoring, following up, supervising, co-ordinating and ensuring the effective implementation of all the provisions of the peace accord. This committee also managed all the committees set up to deal with security sector reform (SSR) and DDR. These included the Technical Committee implementing the procedures preliminary to the establishment of a national defence and police force, the Ceasefire Commission, the Reintegration Commission and the National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Displaced People. The IMC was also authorised to decide whether new parties could be allowed to participate in the national political process.

The IMC included 18 members drawn from the Burundian signatories to the Arusha Accord. Other members were from civil society (six), one each from the UN, AU, the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, and the donor community. There were a total of 31 representatives. The IMC met every second month under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for the Burundi mission.

1.3 The Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC)

The JCC was created to oversee compliance with the ceasefire accords and the reform of the army. The commission was chaired by UNOB and included members of both the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) and of the different armed groups.

The responsibilities of the JCC were outlined in the Arusha Accord as follows:

- to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- to monitor the parties and investigate violations of the ceasefire agreements;
- to identify armed groups;
- to decide on cantonment areas and the number of armed combatants to be placed in them;
- to monitor DDR and the disarmament of illegally armed groups in the country; and
- to oversee the reformation of the army. ²

The Arusha Accord spelled out how the political and military powers in Burundi were to be shared, and the ceasefire agreements set out the process that should be followed before the former fighters could be reincorporated into civilian life. Brigadier General El Hadj Alioune Samba, from Senegal, a member of UNOB, was appointed chairman of the JCC. The ONUB Force Commander, Major General Derrick Mgwebi, from South Africa, replaced him in April 2004.

² Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. 28 August 2000.
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_toc.html.

1.4 The Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP)

The World Bank's MDRP provided both finance and support to Burundi by assisting the ES/NCDRR. The MDRP's Secretariat assumes a dual role in the DDR programme, by making grants using its fiduciary funds and by supplying technical support for the different processes involved. The World Bank's MDRP will evaluate the success of the programme, and set up specific mechanisms for financial management, the provision and the payment of funds, in conformity with the regulations and procedures of the Bank. In addition, the partnership between the World Bank and the MDRP has provided a platform for reflection and consultation with, and inclusion of, other agencies (such as UNICEF) in the preparation of the Joint Operation Plan (JOP).³

1.5 The National Commission on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR)

The NCDRR was established by a presidential decree in August 2003 and has been supported by the World Bank, which pledged US\$33 million towards the establishment of a demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration programme. However, this offer was contingent on the TGoB's meeting certain conditions. These included: the promulgation of a law pertaining to donor aid; a presidential decree defining the status of a combatant; and a ministerial ordinance defining the status of the *Gardiens de la Paix*.⁴ Because of the time spent fulfilling these requirements and many unresolved operational hitches in the field, the DRR programme only started on 2 December 2004.

The National Programme on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR) was launched to implement the demobilisation process and facilitate the reintegration of the ex-combatants. It had four objectives:

- to assist the voluntary demobilisation of members of the FAB and ex-combatants from the APPMs;
- to facilitate the reinsertion of those demobilised into civilian life;
- to promote the socio-economic reintegration of former armed fighters; and
- to lobby for the reallocation of national resources from the defence to the social and economic sectors.⁵

1.6 Planning the DDR Process in Burundi

The DDR process in Burundi is being implemented according to the guidelines provided in the Arusha Accord and by the structures that were subsequently put in place. The most important legal framework for DDR is provided by the JOP and the NCDRR Strategy for Reintegration. The objective of the JOP "is to indicate an

³ D Nkurunziza and C Muvira, op cit.

⁴ The *guardians de la paix* were militias associated with TGoB, while the *militants combattants*, another militia group, had links with the CNDD-FF Nkurunziza.

⁵ Joint Operational Plan, 2004, p 5.

exhaustive set of procedures and mechanisms for the disarmament and the demobilisation of the ex-soldiers/ ex-combatants of the APPM and the FAB." ⁶

The disarmament and disbandment of militias was not included in the JOP. The TGoB published a national decree in May 2005 that their disarmament and disbanding process would be managed under stage 1 of the National Commission for the Disarmament of the Population's operational plan.⁷

The concept of operations as outlined in the JOP allowed for the completion of DDR in two stages:

- Stage 1: One year was allotted for the voluntary disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of members from the ranks of the APPMs and of the FAB. The target was to create a BNDF of not more than 30,000 men and a BNP with a maximum size of 20,000, always bearing in mind the principle of 50/50 ethnic representation.
- Stage 2: A period of two to four years was envisaged as the time frame for ongoing DRR of excess soldiers from the BNDF, in order to reduce its size to an internationally acceptable and affordable security sector structure.⁸

The JOP spells out the detailed planning for the demobilisation process. The plan makes provision for the members of the APPMs to gather in pre-disarmament assembly areas (PDAAAs) in which they will be disarmed and moved to the DCs. Candidates who have volunteered for integration into the security forces will follow another route to either the BNDF or the BNP. During the process the government troops were to return to their barracks if the security situation permitted, while their weapons were to be deposited in armouries.

Ex-combatants who failed to meet the conditions for recruitment into the new army would be demobilised and handed over to the NCDDR. The JOP identified the following six steps illustrated in Table 1 for the DDR of combatants:⁹

- Step 1: pre-disarmament assembly or cantonment;
- Step 2: selection for demobilisation;
- Step 3: disarmament of demobilising combatants;
- Step 4: combatant status verification;
- Step 5: demobilisation; and
- Step 6: discharge.


⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The World Bank grant made provision for the disbanding of 20, 000 guardians and 10, 000 combatants.

⁸ The additional element of combatants on foreign soil (COFS) became visible during 2005 only and will be added to this stage, although it is not intended to last longer than one year.

⁹ Joint Operational Plan, 2004, p 5.

Table 1: Overview of Activities
Overview of Activities



(Source: Joint Operational Plan, 2004.)

For every activity, the following responsibilities were selected:

Table 2: Responsibilities of Role-players

Activity:	Venue:	Responsibilities:
Pre-disarmament	Assembling area	JCC/ AMIB/ ONUB
Disarmament	Disarmament point	AMIB/ ONUB/ JCC
Demobilisation (verification status and discharge)	Demobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Liaison Team (JLT)/ NCDRR/ JCC/ AMIB/ ONUB • JLT/ JCC/ NCDRR/ UNICEF/ AMIB/ ONUB

(Source: D Nkurunziza and C Muviru, Report on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Burundi. Paper presented at the conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Stability in Africa, 21 to 23 June 2005. Freetown. Sierra Leone.)

1.6.1 Disarmament

It was initially envisaged that AMIB should plan and implement the process of disarmament. However, AMIB was replaced on 1 June 2004 by ONUB, which assumed the operational responsibilities originally undertaken by AMIB. ONUB was given the task of guaranteeing security at the disarmament points and during the movement of the ex-combatants to the DCs. The JOP framework determined that the registration, storage and/or destruction of the weapons handed in should be the

responsibility of ONUB and the JCC, while the ES should be charged with the registration of all combatants after disarmament.¹⁰

Disarmament of former FAB members who volunteer for demobilisation falls under the government. Once disarmed in their barracks, the former soldiers are registered and moved to the DCs, where they undergo the same procedures as the ex-combatants.

1.6.2 Demobilisation

Demobilisation involves a change of status for the individual from soldier or ex-combatant to civilian. This process is implemented by the ES/NCDDR, supported by the MDRP, ONUB and UNICEF where required, and consists not only of demobilisation but also reinsertion support to those returning to civil society.

The following table shows the steps followed in the DC, explains each phase, and lists the agencies involved.

Table 3: Steps Followed in the Demobilisation Centres

Steps	Observations	Actors
Disarmament	Each ex-combatant who enters a demobilisation centre is disarmed, and given a paper attesting to the fact.	ONUB AMIB
Verification of identity and of a combatant's status	The JLT (which includes ONUB units) establishes personal identification and the fighter's status following criteria accepted by all parties to the conflict, and then given a non-transferable identity card. ¹¹	JLT JCC
Medical screening	Some medical structures are under contract to the ES/NCDDR and are have a permanent base in the demobilisation centres. Each ex-combatant is given a medical clearance.	NGO
Registration	The socio-professional profile of each ex-combatant is established with the help of a questionnaire, to capture information about him or her, and to build up a reliable data bank	ES/NCDDR
Delivery of identity cards	Combatants will receive identification cards.	ES/NCDDR
Orientation before departure	An orientation talk is given to each ex-combatant in preparation for his or her economic and social reintegration, so that choices about ways of making a livelihood can be made in advance.	ES/NCDDR NGO
Allowances for reinsertion and transportation	A fixed reinsertion allowance (to the equivalent value of 18 months' wages, calculated on the index balance of the FAB) is given to each demobilised person who leaves the DC, to assist with socio-economic	SE/NCDDR

¹⁰ The World Bank grant was very specific in requiring all participants, whether ex-FAB or ex-combatants, to be disarmed before they became eligible for any privileges under the programme.

¹¹ Minor cases of fraud were observed, but had no major consequences for the process in general.

Steps	Observations	Actors
	reinsertion. The 18 months' pay is issued as follows: nine months' wages on leaving the DC, and three tranches of three months' pay, deposited into the ex-combatant's bank account at regular intervals. A unique transportation fee of US\$20 is also given to every demobilised person, regardless of his or her destination.	
Period of stay in the DC	The length of each ex-combatant's stay in the DC is between six and seven days. It should not exceed 10 days.	ES/NCDRR

(Source: Joint Operational Plan, 2004.)

1.6.3 Reinsertion Payments

On the basis of the lessons learned from DDR in other countries, such as Sierra Leone and East Timor, the NPDRR adopted the following two-phase approach for post-demobilisation support.

(1) Reinsertion package: This grant was intended to help the beneficiaries of the programme to see to their own and their families' immediate and basic needs as they re-enter communities and resume civilian life. The total reinsertion benefit (*Indemnité Transitoire de Subsistance* — ITS) for ex-combatants and ex-soldiers is differentiated by rank, and amounts to a minimum of FBU 566,000 per candidate (indexed on the ex-FAB salary scale), which is paid in cash. Upon discharge from the DCs, each demobilised person receives the first of the four installments, as shown in Table 4.

(2) Subsequent payments: These are made through the banking system in the place where each former fighter resettles. This approach also enables ex-combatants and ex-soldiers to familiarise themselves with the banking system, and indirectly makes access to credit easier. The remaining three instalments are paid to ex-combatants once they have resettled in their community of choice over a 10-month period. This schedule is also outlined in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Reinsertion Payments by Rank and Schedule in Burundi National Defence Force

Rank Category	In demob centre	4 months after demob	7 months after demob	10 months after demob	Total
Troops	300,000	88,676	88,676	88,676	566,028
Non-Commissioned Officers	570,000	168,272	168,272	168,272	1,074,816
Junior Officers	600,000	175,162	175,162	175,162	1,125,486
Senior Officers	970,000	284,179	284,179	284,179	1,822,536
	1,770,000	518,524	518,524	518,524	3,325,572

Source: ONUB, *DDR-SSR Newsletter*, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006

The money allows the ex-combatants and ex-soldiers to meet the expenses that come with her or his social re-entry into the community and finance a basic livelihood for about 18 months. Initial findings by ONUB are that ex-combatants are not

experiencing difficulty in accessing these payments, and that the money is generally used well.

The phasing of the reinsertion package allows the ES/NCDRR to ensure ex-combatants not only receive assistance for the first 10 months after their return to civilian life, but also "buys" extra time for the ES/NCDRR to prepare reintegration assistance activities in communities where ex-combatants and ex-soldiers have settled.¹²

1.7 The Design of Reintegration

The ES/NCDRR is responsible for the overall implementation of the National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR).

(1) Reintegration Strategy: The ES/NCDRR prepared a strategy to support the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants and ex-soldiers as they resumed civilian life. This was developed on the basis of the aspirations expressed by the ex-combatants and ex-soldiers at the time of demobilisation, on current socio-economic opportunities and the contributions of a broad spectrum of stakeholders (i.e., government and UN agencies, national and international NGOs and donors). It is important to note that the ex-combatants themselves, their dependants and the receiving communities are the central players in the reintegration process.

(2) Reintegration Support: Once they have resettled in their community of choice, demobilised ex-combatants may seek in-kind support from the PNDRR to assist their reintegration.

(3) Social Reintegration: This is provided through the direct engagement of the staff of the Provincial Offices with the ex-combatants, ex-soldiers and their communities. It is also supplemented through special activities in the communities and through special activities which will be conducted by NGOs and community organisations, contracted by the ES, in the communities.

(4) Economic Support: Various options are available to assist each ex-combatant and ex-soldier to start or develop a means of livelihood. The members can select their (targeted) economic support from five "tracks":

- (i) targeted community-based assistance: a comprehensive scheme responding to the income-generating preferences of ex-combatants;
- (ii) training and self-employment: the use of institutional agreements with service providers;
- (iii) continued education: the provision of access to schooling by September 2005 for all those who wanted it;
- (iv) business skills improvement: a scheme to upgrade business skills and training, and possibly to raise funds for those that have already established a credible business; and

¹² N Meden, *ONUB: The Reintegration of Ex-Combatants*. Bujumbura, 2005.

(v) promotion of employment: a project to offer referrals and special arrangements with employers who will provide employment that includes a training element.

Partners are being identified and will be contracted to carry out each of these activities. Most of them would have ongoing activities. In each of the five tracks some additional benefits will be made available to those ex-combatants who successfully complete the first phase, as reflected in the following table.

Table 5: Targeted Economic Reintegration Support

Options	Basic support	Additional support
(i) Income-generating activities	Provision of investment and operating inputs for a broad spectrum of income-generating activities	In situ technical assistance
(ii) Vocational training for self-employment	Vocational training	Kits and materials for self-employment
(iii) Formal education	School fees and subsistence stipend	Assistance with school books and supplies
(iv) Promotion of entrepreneurship	Management and business development training	Funding for expansion and improvement of ongoing activities
(v) Employment promotion	Subsidized employment and referral	Permanent employment

(Source: D Nkurunziza and C Muviru, Report on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Burundi. Paper presented at the conference on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Stability in Africa, 21 to 23 June 2005. Freetown. Sierra Leone.)

(5) *Child Soldiers*: The demobilisation and support process relating to under-age combatants is implemented by the National Structure for Child Soldiers (SNES), with assistance and funding from UNICEF and the MDRP trust fund.

1.8 Direct Integration

The DDR process slowed down after all the combatants had moved into the PDAs and during the period of handing and taking over between the AMIB and ONUB. This was frustrating, both for the Burundian leadership and the international community. In order to ensure that the integration of former combatants and force members into the security structures maintained momentum, the TGoB entered into a bilateral agreement with the Dutch government, which agreed to accelerate the process by providing camp infrastructure. A base was established at Tenga on the northern outskirts of Bujumbura. Some 2,000 men, comprising former members of the FAB and ex-combatants from CNDD-FDD joined the unit. The other parties were also invited to send members, but the most important pre-condition was that all reporting

soldiers must be in possession of their own weapons. The other parties could not adhere to this condition. Once more, the requirement for a proper definition of how combatants could qualify for integration into the BNDF or the BNP was raised. The intake at Tenga became the first integrated unit of the BNDF. Two additional intakes of recruits followed, in which members of all parties were included, after some flexibility had been exercised over the weapons requirement.

Soon after the establishment of the first base at Tenga, a similar process was followed at Bururi, where the Ministry of Defence attempted to create the long-awaited Security Protection Unit. Those assembled constituted combatants from the CNDD-FDD and FAB only. A unit of 1,200 men was integrated and given basic training. This unit remains in existence, but awaits specialised training and resources from the international community to enable its members to carry out its protection duties.¹³

1.9 Launching the DDR Process for Child Soldiers

UNICEF and the NPDRR worked very hard to compile lists of child soldiers amongst the ranks of the FAB and the *guardians de la paix*. They traced their families and appointed partners in each province who could supervise the reintegration of the child soldiers with their families. The DDR process for children started in August 2004, while that for the adults was still under negotiation. More than 2,300 child soldiers had been disarmed, demobilised and returned to their communities by November 2004, and although the agencies involved experienced problems with the quality of the services rendered by some of their partners, this first stage of the demobilisation of children was successfully completed.

After the official launching of the DDR process, the NPDRR and UNICEF started the demobilisation of all child soldiers in the PDAAs who had fought for the APPMs. Special arrangements were made to allow this programme the dedicated use of one DC. The process was concluded by the end of December 2004, after more than 600 child soldiers belonging to the APPMs had been demobilised.

The only outstanding target for the child soldier demobilization programme is those serving in the ranks of the *combatants militants*. A list of about 120 children has already been submitted to UNICEF and the NPDRR, and the tracing of their families should be completed soon. As soon as this stage has been concluded, UNICEF and the NPDRR will focus their attention on the reintegration of child soldiers. Although such a programme began at the end of August 2005, it is to be extended to include the reintegration of all demobilised children.¹⁴

1.10 Launching DDR for ex-FAB Members and Ex-combatants

As previously mentioned, the DDR programme was eventually launched in Muramvya, after many delays, on 2 December 2004. Only minor hitches were experienced, and the process has continued ever since. Even though the movement

¹³ ONUB, *DDR-SSR Newsletter*, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006

¹⁴ Ibid

from the PDAAs to cantonment sites was required for political reasons, the demobilisation process proceeded. Excluding the Palipehutu FNL, the ES completed Stage I, when all former APPM combatants were demobilised. Nkurunziza boosted the effect of demobilisation and the transition that Burundi was going through when he presented himself for demobilisation just before he was inaugurated as president of Burundi.

Stage II will involve the demobilisation of sufficient FAB soldiers to reduce the size of the BNDF to a maximum of 30,000 members by the end of December 2005, and a further reduction of numbers to a force of 25,000 by the end of 2007. This process of demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration of volunteers from the Army, together with the dismantling of the militias and resolving the issue of combatants still on foreign soil (COFS) will be the focus of the ES in the coming months.¹⁵

1.11 The Cantonment Phase

The delays preventing the start of the demobilisation process and the regional pressure imposed on the TGoB to schedule the national elections presented the administration with a legal dilemma. All leaders had to relinquish control over their combatants before their movements could register as political parties. The text of the Arusha Accord, however, provided that parties could be allowed to register from the time when their troops were cantoned. In order to take advantage of this, President Ndayizeye issued a decree in February 2005 ordering ex-combatants to report to different cantonment sites, as follows:

- Gashingwa and Mabanda for CNDD-FDD candidates to be integrated into the BNDF;
- Kibuye for candidates from all the other parties to be integrated into the BNDF;
- Rugazi for all candidates to be integrated into the BNP; and
- Buramata for all candidates awaiting demobilisation.

Although this development caught UNOB by surprise because the movement of ex-combatants happened very quickly, it had the advantage that parties could register to participate in the elections. In addition, the decree made the final disarmament of the remaining ex-combatants possible, although Buramata had insufficient resources available for them. It also made clearer the numbers of those who wished to be considered for integration into the BNDF and BNP. The PDAAs were closed very quickly, and after inspections of the terrain to ensure that it was safe, the sites were handed back to the provincial authorities.

By the end of June 2005, all cantonment sites had also been emptied and returned to the provincial authorities. All troops still to be demobilised were already being processed, and candidates for integration had been moved to their new bases. The expected delay in releasing the cantonment sites did not happen. If anything, the presidential decree assisted in speeding up the integration process.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Ibid

1.12 Rank Harmonisation

The harmonisation of rank continued to be a challenge until the eve of integration. All parties were guilty of rank inflation, but the acceptance of some of their members was dictated by political requirements. The Integrated Chiefs of Staff developed a formula to determine the ranks at each level based on the number of combatants from each given party. The result of their deliberations was eventually published in a presidential decree, which specified actual appointments to the BNDF and the BNP. Although it is true that some people were dissatisfied with the entry levels allotted to them, all members of the new forces accepted their appointments and are now serving in the BNDF and the BNP.¹⁷ It now remains to be seen whether the Government will maintain these appointments and whether appointed officers are allocated new responsibilities fulfilling their appointments fully. Early indications are that future problems will still be experienced on this matter and it is already clear that future Security Sector Reform will have to address this matter in more detail.

1.13 Quotas for Integration Purposes

Permitted quotas for the purpose of integration were as big a challenge as rank harmonisation. Once again the Integrated Chiefs of Staff developed a formula considering the actual numbers of combatants versus the number of weapons that a party had in its possession. After these were filled, the remaining members were selected for demobilisation purposes.¹⁸

1.14 Verification Challenges

As the end of demobilisation approached, it became clear that the government would have to deal with persons claiming to have been combatants whose names were not recorded in the master lists provided by the parties. These lists should have been submitted to the JCC before DDR began. This issue nearly caused a political crisis, but fortunately the combatant status verification procedure allowed for actual testing of skills as an alternative to using the name list. This enabled those administering the tests to determine whether a combatant could qualify for demobilisation benefits. The dual verification procedure made it possible for the last group of combatants to be processed.

Just before the integration exercise came to an end, the JCC issued an instruction that all outstanding party lists had to be submitted by 15 August 2005. Some lists were submitted after the deadline date, and it is now up to government to determine whether it will allow those named on the lists to be processed or not.¹⁹ At present, the Minister of Defence has refused any further demobilisation of combatants who appear on the lists received after 15 August 2005 claiming that if these members were indeed combatants, they had ample time to join the process and elected not to do so.

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Ibid

1.15 The Dismantling of the Militias

Another challenge facing the DDR process is the dismantling of the militias. There has been a long delay in finalising the list of the *guardians de la paix* and the process seem to have broken down. There are also other concerns. While the World Bank grant allows for the disbanding of a maximum of 20,000 members, more funds would be needed if the government accepts more ex-combatants. Several lists of *guardians*, which set the numbers at between 11,700 and more than 35,000, have been submitted. The National Commission for Disarmament of the Civilian Population did not resolve this matter. It was not until late 2005, that the Minister of Defence appointed a Ministerial Commission to finally resolve this matter. This Commission was successful to the extent that dismantling of militia commenced late in November 2005 and was ongoing until the NCDRR closed for the December festive season. Despite these initial delays, the process is now on track. At the end of March 2006, 10,059 *guardians de la paix* and 5,029 *militants combatants* were demobilized. The remaining 14, 213 members of the militias are scheduled to be disbanded by mid-2006.²⁰

On the other hand, the demobilisation of the *combattants militants* is on track. The World Bank has approved funding for 10,000 members. Although, those on the verified list are below that number. As soon as the list for the *guardians* has been finalised, both sets of militias will be disbanded together.²¹

1.16 Status of Reintegration

A number of demobilised ex-combatants in two provinces held a demonstration, demanding of the provincial offices and governors that their reintegration support be given to them immediately and in cash. In response, the ES/NCDRR took measures to ensure that the personnel of the provincial offices are appropriately briefed on how to handle the demonstrators' demands, and to increase the latter's overall capacity to respond.

Concerns have also been expressed about the ability of the ES to implement the reintegration component of the National Programme at the required and expected pace. The MDRP Secretariat and the World Bank share this concern, and have done the following to help address the situation:

For several months, the MDRP Secretariat has been providing the ES/NCDRR with direct technical assistance.

- The MDRP Secretariat and the World Bank have worked closely with the ES/NCDRR to ensure that the latter proceeds with the recruitment of the required technical assistance without further delay. This entails: the appointment of a senior advisor to provide technical assistance on

²⁰ UN Security Council/S/2006/163, *Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operations in Burundi*. Posted: 21 March 2006. <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/5701235.html>

²¹ ONUB, op cit.

reintegration issues; a consultant to assist in outlining the implementation procedures for reintegration support; and the solicitation of international technical assistance with a focus on contracting executive partners for reintegration projects, to support the procurement section.

- An MDRP-funded institutional capacity assessment of the ES/NCDRR was conducted in July and August of 2005.
- A review of the Information and Sensitisation activities (including the reintegration component) of the ES/NCDRR is also about to begin.

On 14 June 2005, a mission from the World Bank completed an investigation that focused on the reintegration component of the PNDRR. Although those demobilised to date had received reinsertion assistance which allowed them to see to their immediate needs, the mission expressed its concern at the delays in the implementation of concrete reintegration activities under this programme component.

To make the provision of reintegration activities more effective, the World Bank has agreed to work with the ES/NCDRR on the following activities:

- to devise an action plan for the implementation of the national reintegration strategy that follows a strict timing schedule;
- to adopt a number of measures to strengthen the ES/NCDRR's Reinsertion and Reintegration Unit, both in terms of staffing and equipment;
- to recruit international technical assistance; and
- to fund operational implementing partners as a matter of urgency.

With the demobilisation of ex-APPMs almost out of the way, analysts expect that the management of the ES/NCDRR will be able to focus most of its efforts on making the reintegration programme work.

1.17 Combatants on Foreign Soil

The ES is now turning its attention to the question of arranging the return of Burundian combatants who are on foreign soil. A draft strategy that seeks the best solutions for the cases in hand has been circulated between members of the government. At present, this strategy focuses on: Burundians in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); combatants in refugee camps in Zambia and in Tanzanian jails; and Congolese combatants in Burundi who must be repatriated.²²

1.18 Results

(i) Demobilisation

²² ONUB, op cit.

As of 25 January 2006, a total of 19,739 ex-combatants and former soldiers have been demobilised. Of these, 16,242 are adult males, 482 adult females and 3,015 children. During the second half of 2005, demobilisation primarily concerned members of the FDN, mostly ex-FAB and ex-Gendarmes. While activities were interrupted earlier in the period to allow the ES/NCDRR to support Government's efforts to dismantle the *guardians de la paix* and *militants combattants* by processing the payment to the militias of their one-off service allowance, they resumed and picked up momentum at the beginning of October. The total number of ex-FAB/ex-Gendarmes demobilised since the inception of the programme is 7,332 adults. The Ministry of Defence indeed achieved its targeted strength of 30,000 for the FDN by the end of 2005, releasing some very valuable budget assisting finance from the EU and France. Further downsizing of the National Defence Force by an additional personnel selection, in accordance with the Government's declared demobilizing policy, it was expected to be completed by the end of 2006

Table 6: Summary of Combatants Demobilised as on 25 January 2005

Affiliation	Men	Women	Children	Total
FAB/FDN	7,332	0	2,273	9,605
CNDD-FDD	5,947	437	593	6,977
KAZE-FDD	399	1	23	363
PALIFE-AGAKIZA	533	1	32	566
FNL-ICANZO	243	3	37	283
CNDD-NYANGOMA	1,321	30	51	1,402
FROLINA	582	10	5	543
TOTAL	16,242	482	3,015	19,739

(Source: UNOB, DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006)

(ii) Dismantling of the Militias

The ES/NCDRR in collaboration with the Ministerial Commission responsible for the name lists made very good progress towards the end of 2005 in the dismantling of the militias. Operations have not resume in 2006 mainly because of technical errors in budget submissions and the availability of cash to proceed. This matter was easily resolved and operations did resume before the end of January 2006. At the end of March 2006, 10,059 *guardians de la paix* and 5,029 *militants combattants* were demobilized. The remaining 14, 213 members of the militias are scheduled to be disbanded by mid-2006.

(iii) Weapons Recovered To-date

In total, 5,640 weapons have been surrendered by the various APPMs, either to the TGoB or the FDN (5,403 weapons were obtained through the direct integration process), or to ONUB (237 weapons recovered during the DDR of ex-combatants). The nature of these arms widely ranges from the traditional AK-47's to light machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers to RPG-7or SPG-9 guns. Some of these weapons require more than one handler, but for the purpose of this document, the actual numbers were counted as one combatant to each gun. In view of the above, the ratio of ex-combatants to guns handed in can be calculated as follows.

Table 7: Weapons Recovered To-date

APPM members demobilised	10,134
APPM members integrated into the FDN	9,240
APPM members integrated into the NP	6,921
Total	26,295

(Source: DDR-SSR Newsletter, 03 to 31 March 2006 – Issue 26/2006)

Calculation 1: $26,295 \text{ ex-combatants} \div \text{total weapons } (5,640) = 4.66 \text{ troops to each weapon.}$

Calculation 2: When the 742 demobilized child soldiers formerly associated with the APPMs are deducted from the total of ex-combatants, the same formula indicates a ratio of 4.53 combatants to each weapon.²³

(iv) DDR OF the FNL

The DDR of the FNL was planned by the new AU Mission to Burundi, the UN Office in Burundi and the CNDDR. Because of the breakdown in negotiations between the FNL and the Mediation Commission nothing is happening. However, the planning provides for 3,000 FNL combatants to be demobilised.

²³ Continued Government and donor forums will be a very important requirement. This strategy will focus on good governance, sound financial management and civilian oversight while redesign of ministerial policies, structure, training and facilities will also be required.

2. Observations from Fieldtrip on the Reintegration Process

The fieldtrip did take place over the period 2-to-5 September, 2007 mostly in Bujumbura. During my stay I did interview the following people:

- Madjior Solness Dingamadji, MDRP Burundi;
- Hermenegilde Niyonzima, Director Special Projects, CNDRR;
- Silas Ntigurirwa, Executive Secretary CNDRR;
- Natacha Kunama, Program Assistant SSR and small arms, BINUB;
- Col Mbaye Faye, Director SSR, BINUB;
- Leanne Bayer, PADCO, Burundi;
- Col Nibizi Isare, Africare, Burundi;
- Col Hein Visser, AMIB Force Commander;
- Jenny Theron, Accord;
- Matthew Garret, US Embassy; and
- Christo Schutte. AMA.

I also communicated with Edward Ball and used his report, dated 12 April, 2006, as to identifying challenges to the MDRP program.

The report will answer the question but under the following subjects:

- Current thinking and approaches to DDR;
- Linkages between DDR and SSR;
- Linkages between DDR and SALW control; and
- Linkages between DDR and other transitional assistance programmes in the reinsertion phase.

Annex 1: Questions for Working Papers

Working Paper 1: Current Thinking and Approaches to DDR

- 1. What has been the influence (if any) of the IDDRS (UN integrated DDR standards) and SIDDR (Stockholm Initiative on DDR) on the design of the DDR process? If there has been no influence, why not?*

When visiting Burundi and observing the Integration Process, a key question was what has been the influence (if any) of the IDDRS (UN Integrated DDR Standards) and SIDDR (Stockholm Initiative on DDR) on the design of the DDR process? If there has been no influence, why not? From the foregoing analysis of the demobilisation and reintegration execution plan in Burundi, it is possible to make a theoretical assessment of whether the said planning is concomitant with the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards as well as the SIDDRS. The IDDRS have been drafted on the basis of lessons and best practices drawn from the experience of all the departments, agencies, funds and programmes involved to provide the UN system with a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for the planning, implementation and monitoring of DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context. However, while the IDDRS were designed with peacekeeping contexts in mind, much of the guidance contained within these standards are also be applicable for non-peacekeeping contexts, in-line with the three main objectives of IDDRS, namely:

- (i) to give DDR practitioners the opportunity to make informed decisions based on a clear, flexible and in-depth body of guidance across the range of DDR activities;
- (ii) to serve as a common foundation for the commencement of integrated operational planning in Headquarters and at the country level; and
- (iii) to function as a resource for the training of DDR specialists.

On the other hand, the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration Standards provide a holistic view of such programmes where opportunities and limitations are considered from the perspective of the overall approach to ensure the long-term personal security for people, rebuild post-conflict societies and lay the foundations for sustainable development.

SIDDRS takes cognisance of the fact that processes on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration had to be addressed through a comprehensive approach that supported the post-conflict society at large. It is critical to ensure that a combatant need not return to using violence to survive. The report therefore endorses the provision of what has come to be known as a 'transitional safety net' that enables the combatant to survive, take care of his / her family and cope while adjusting to his / her new status as a productive member of society. SIDDRS also places emphasises on the need for the immediate short-term focus on ex-combatant through reinsertion, which takes care of the combatant before the longer term focus of sustainable reintegration.

Similarly, SIDDRS advocates for the creation of alternative incentives to violence for ex-combatants in order to make it less likely for them to disrupt ongoing peace efforts while awaiting a more long-term, sustainable reintegration and return to a productive civilian livelihood. Concurrently, according to SIDDRS, the local communities need to be taken into account in order to build their capacity to absorb returning soldiers as well as minimising possibilities of new tension between ex-combatants and their communities of return.

Thus, SIDDRS report endorses the idea of establishing parallel programmes early on to provide communities with support for receiving ex-combatants as a direct complement to the DDR programme.

From interviews with the role players, it was clear that the UN IDDRS and the SIDDR were taken into consideration as principles but not implemented in full.

- 2. If there has been a significant influence, what have been the implications (both positive and negative)?*

Some of the positive influences taken from both the UN integrated DDR standards and the IDDRS were the establishment of the National Programme for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NPDRR). (See page 8 for a full explanation of the program.)

- 3. What are the relationship and the nature of the dynamics between the MDRP process and other national DDR processes in the Great Lakes region?*

From the interviews with both the MDRP and NPDRR representatives, it seems that the relationship and interaction is based on irregular meetings of countries participating in the MDRP plan and there are no lessons learnt or best practices developed. Therefore, it could be very useful to set up a more formal structure to coordinate lessons learned and best practices.

- 4. What do MDRP staff regard as the greatest successes achieved whilst implementing their respective national DDR processes?*

The key to the success of the program in Burundi was the ability of the program to successfully set-up a coordination structure through the CE/CNDDR. This ensured the participation of the government, the World Bank, the international community, NGO's, civil society, ex-combatants and the population. The official structure was authorised on 17 July 2006, by President Nkurunziza and remains in-place. The detailed structure is available. The CE/CNDDR also completed an update on the "Plan of Action, National Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration of Ex-combatants" during August 2007. I was very impressed with what I saw as for implementation of the national plan on the level of the NGO's involved. I refer to the two I did visit, Africare and PADCO. The fact that all role-players did give their support also contributes to the success of the program.

One of the other successes is the spin-off of peace, disarmament of combatants and militia and the demobilisation of the rest.

5. *What are the most significant problems/challenges that MDRP personnel have encountered in the implementation of their various projects, and how did they address them?*

The biggest challenge in Burundi was the late start of the program. The demobilisation part of the MDRP started in December 2004, four years after the Arusha peace accords (which, it is worth noting, were *not* in the end signed by the main rebel group now in power, CNDD-FDD). This gave, in theory, plenty of time to prepare the procedures and financing mechanisms but because the transition government had such little real authority, discussions took place in a semi-vacuum, picking up speed with the advent and completion of the elections in mid-2005.

Predictably, before the ‘D’ process actually began, national power-holders (notably, the Tutsi-led army and in-coming Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD party) talked-up the figures on the number of fighters in their ranks, giving an estimated total of about 80,000. The idea was, of course, to maximise the cash coming to their people. Meanwhile, the donors found funds (in a number of inventive ways) to pay for food and supplies to the fighter’s camps in a bid to avoid chaos and to maintain basic stability in the cease-fire arrangements pre-elections.

The greatest difficulty causing delays in initiating the programme was reaching agreement on the harmonisation of ranks between the different sides. Also crucial, was preparation and agreement on the documents (a type of questionnaire) to “prove” who was actually a combatant and would therefore, have the right to receive MDRP payments. A narrow definition of ex-combatant was used, primarily due to financial reasons.²⁴

Once started, it did proceed relatively well. The key challenge now is the demobilisation of the FNL once they are back in the peace process. The following problems were also raised during the interviews:

- To find the correct staff to work on the CE/CNDDR structures, not only on national but also on provincial and local level. This is an ongoing process.
- Demobilisation design problems. The MDRP does not have a disarmament element (although ex-combatants cannot enter the demobilisation camps with weapons) and no one knows how many guns were taken out of circulation during the demobilisation process. Civilian disarmament is only just now being discussed through a UNDP programme. Most strikingly, in 16 months, at best estimates, only 19,000 have been demobilised - this is why DDR and SSR need to be addressed together. Even assuming that the original 80,000 estimated total was excessively high and that none of these 19,000 have now joined the FNL, there are thousands of ex-combatants who remain in the army or have been levered whole-sale into the “police”. This can be seen by the fact that Police numbers have increased from 3,000 pre-war to an estimated 20,000 now – although there is little certainty on numbers due to lack of data. Many national politicians like to think that this is SSR but, essentially, the police have no training in their civilian tasks and have retained their guns and are more-or-less, CNDD-FDD-led. Mechanisms for internal and

²⁴ Informal paper by Edward Ball, 12 April 2006.

external oversight and accountability in a Western sense are basically non-existent – whether in parliament, civil society or the relevant ministry. Aside from the near total lack of infrastructure (i.e., police stations, cars/bicycles, accommodation, etc.), they have no understanding of what their new role is. Meanwhile, the police, like the still essentially Tutsi-led army of 30,000 or so are over-sized and represent a huge and not exactly transparent burden on the national budget. This constitutes a major issue considering that aid is, of course, fungible, underlining again that DDR and SSR (like DDR and Development) cannot sensibly be separated.

- The time-lapse for the appointment and recruitment for projects from OXFAM and AMA, are almost one year.
- Some combatants have been waiting almost two years to be helped. For a myriad of political and technical reasons, there has been an extensive period between the first waves of ex-combatants (which began with the most junior ranks) and the initiation of measures necessary for “reintegration” (as the term is currently formulated). In addition to the jostling for power within the Burundian elite, a cause of the delay has been the World Bank’s agreement to the processes drawn-up by the National Commission. My understanding is that even where the funding comes as a grant, the World Bank rules require parliamentary approval – with all the capacity, and competency issues and political manoeuvrings that this entails and implies for the Burundian National Assembly. There are, of course, other concerns in World Bank HQ about transparency and integrity in the flows. For example some delays have occurred in negotiating the procurement procedures for the National Commission. The external consultant’s report for preparing the “Reintegration Manual” is apparently very long and needs to a heavy edit in order to be of practical use.²⁵
- Allocation of land to ex-combatants.
- Large number of combatants still to be demobilised
- The extension of programs, reintegration will not be finished in the allocated time period.
- Benefits only goes to the ex-combatant them self and not to their family.
- Lack of local NGO capacity to support the integration plan.
- Ex-combatants see reintegration as a right. Burundians have not understood the decision-making on demobilisation payments and the design of the ‘D’ and ‘R’ process. The MDRP agreed with the national power-holders to fund 18 months salary (i.e., \$600) in one payment on exit from the demobilization camp after 8-10 days, to be followed by reintegration payments in three tranches over the next two years or so. The process was no doubt tortuous because the armed groups’ original financial requests were higher and it is extremely difficult to balance the need for a “deterrent payment” (i.e. enough to persuade fighters not to return to war) with the necessity of not making involvement in war too attractive an option (which is now a

²⁵ Ibid

problem with the outstanding FNL grouping). However, Burundians do not see why an ex-combatant gets \$600, while a *Gardien de la Paix* (armed to support a “political” party locally) gets only \$100, when many of them were fighting from the beginning in the name of their movement. Minors (perceived rather differently from a Western view of a child’s ‘innocence’) get about \$330. Although not substantiated on this trip, it seems likely that communities do not understand (and/or are dismayed) that no MDRP funds have yet flowed to them.²⁶

- Technical difficulties and planning issues for reintegration: The reintegration process at a technical level faces four main challenges according to Edward Ball in his report:²⁷
 - i. A lack of national capacity, which undermines the ability of the National Commission to manage the process efficiently. There is a provincial office in only about three-quarters of the provinces and there is only one office in each, and the HQ in the capital city is very small relative to the size of the task. It is perhaps worth researching further how long it took to set-up and staff these offices and whether this could have been prepared further in advance.
 - ii. The banking infrastructure and usage which makes the disbursement, receipt and saving of reintegration payments patchy and problematic. Most ex-army had accounts but the other armed groups do not and require “education” in opening one – from all sides, most lack experience in how to use money and make it last. More generally, there are serious constraints on access to financial services which reduces the ability of people to realize business plans or improve on subsistence living conditions.
 - iii. The very small number of local NGOs that are capable of supporting community-level reintegration. To qualify for funding from the National Commission, these local NGOs have to be able to offer 100% guarantees for the money. Only 11 contracts have therefore been signed – covering only 3,300 demobilised fighters in all. Underlining again, how much of the strain is taken by the unreformed army and “police”. There are now moves to involve the INGO’s, with proposals currently being finalized for three “reintegration” regions. Again, it can be asked whether the ground could have been laid for this more in advance. In addition, it would be worth exploring opportunities for using or deepening partnerships with international organisations in order to develop local NGOs’ long-term capacities.
 - iv. The problems within the secondary and vocational education system, which is not equipped to absorb ex-combatants who either are, or still of “education” age (i.e. anything under 25 or so) or wish to acquire professional skills to enable them to have other livelihood opportunities. Pressure on the land is so high that alternative livelihoods or more “modern” agricultural methods to improve land exploitation and diversity of crop choices are vital. A related issue is whether there is an existing or potential market in which to make a living from those skills. Imbalanced spending allocations may yet hamper progress on reintegration. Although significant sums remain to be spent, the

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid

finance allocated for logistics, management and planning has more or less been exhausted. A reallocation will now need to happen. A re-orientation or “accommodation” as regards funding will also be necessary to reduce the number of former combatants who are now members of the “police”. This may require them to be re-categorised as soldiers in the Burundian Defence Force in order to meet the current disbursement requirements.

- Structures are expensive and so it is important to reduce the size of CE/CNDDR on the national level. Focus must be on provincial and local coordination.
- Authorising process from NGO’s via CE/CNDDR on provincial level to national level as well as duplication is too long and time consuming.

6. *With the benefit of hindsight, would the MDRP staff take a different approach to the design and implementation of the DDR processes in the future? If yes, why, and what would they do differently?*

Most of the role-players interviewed agreed that the same process could be followed with some changes. The following were suggested:

- Using the same structures, but focus on provincial and regional levels;
- Adopting a much more practical operating procedure. The process is electronically compatible but still everything must be done by hand and authorised at national level. This delays the implementation process;
- Appointing more NGO’s for reintegration programs;
- Be realistic about time-lines and make provision for political events such as the FNL issue; and
- Look at the possibility of mixing the beneficiary family from the beginning before moving them to the reintegration area.

7. *What do the MDRP personnel envisage as the way forward for their respective national programmes, and what are their assessments of the effectiveness of the programmes they are administering?*

During interviews with PADCO and Africare, it was clear that the programmes had some success. The two NGO’s had detail statistics on the number of ex-combatants that are in the reintegration process. The success rate of reintegration at this stage was difficult to establish, possibly, 50% of the ex-combatants in the program of reintegration are successful. The program on amputees has only just started. Feedback from PADCO was that program is effective, but the timeframe set aside for completing the program is too short and the process will not be completed. For example, when I left, PADCO was to close down its operations. The program could not clarify from the CE/CNDDR if funding for the continuation of the program was forthcoming. Africare is to close down operations in December 2007 as well.

8. *What is the assessment (positive or negative) of the MDRP by relevant government officials and civil society representatives? If it is a negative assessment, what do they think the MDRP should have done differently?*

Positive inputs:

- The general feedback from CE/CNDDR and BINUB, as well as NGO's was positive.
- Good cooperation between CE/CNDDR and NGO's according to CE/CNDDR.
- Suspicion between communities and ex-combatants have been turned to more positive interaction.
- The beneficial impact of MDRP/CE/CNDDR programs on the economy.
- Demobilisation was successful.
- Reinsertion was successful.
- Reintegration is still in progress and will depend on the political will of the government to implement post-conflict reconstruction programs. Specifically, the economy, education and land reform strategies.

Challenges:

- The CE/CNDDR lacks the capacity to ensure completely the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities.
 - More involvement of government, International NGO's and private sector.
 - Finding funds to sustain the reintegration process.
 - Ensuring an effective operational and cost effective process.
 - Disarmament not the responsibility of the CE/CNDDR but was not very successful
9. *Where possible, please compile an objective analysis of the effectiveness of the MDRP projects in facilitating sustainable DDR. In particular, what is the potential of the MDRP processes to achieve sustainable reintegration into civilian life of ex-combatants?*

This question has been addressed in the background discussion.

Working Paper 2: Linkages between DDR and SSR

1. *Have ex-combatants joined the police, military, militias or private security companies following the conflict? Where this has been managed through the proactive recruitment and vetting of ex-combatants as part of DDR or SSR projects, what procedures were used and what were the results (e.g. in terms of quality of personnel, their conduct while on duty, levels of crime and violence)?*

Yes ex-combatants have joined the security forces. However, because a SSR policy has not been approved, no structured recruitment or vetting took place. A draft SSR policy document is currently with government.

2. *Have there been any efforts to link DDR projects with traditional justice mechanisms (e.g. involvement of tribal councils in reconciliation efforts with ex-combatants returning to their communities). Where links were not made between a DDR process and traditional justice mechanisms, what effects has the return of ex-combatants had on these mechanisms?*

None.

3. *Have there been efforts to incorporate SSR planning in DDR mandates and operations including estimates of the size of a future national reformed army and consequently the numbers of ex-combatants that need to be disbanded during DDR and absorbed into the security sector?*

None.

4. *How have DDR processes dealt with the apparent trade-offs between justice and reintegration?*

None.

Working Paper 3: Linkages between DDR and SALW Control

1. *Have there been any SALW control programmes beyond the disarmament within DDR? If so, at what point was it decided to launch a SALW control programme, by whom, and according to what criteria?*

Yes, a government policy was accepted on 29 March, 2007, to deal with SALW. However, because of the ongoing clashes with FNL, the population is reluctant to participate

2. *Have SALW programmes linked up with, or followed up on, shortfalls in DDR programmes such as lack of collection of civilian weapons including hunting rifles?*

None.

3. *Have DDR and SALW control programmes been integrated / co-ordinated in terms of:*
 - i. *Sensitisation and education;*
 - ii. *Mandates;*
 - iii. *Civilian weapons collection;*
 - iv. *Implementing actors (local, national and international) and structures, including with regard to training and pooling of capacity;*
 - v. *Implementation of national SALW control strategies (where they exist);*
 - vi. *The collection and use of information as a basis for programme development;*
 - vii. *Public information campaigns;*
 - viii. *Infrastructure;*
 - ix. *Funding;*
 - x. *Sequencing; and*
 - xi. *Monitoring and Evaluation.*

The detail is all spelled out in the government policy on SALW accepted on 29 March 2007.

4. *Has integration meant anything beyond putting it under the same umbrella - have there been real attempts to find further synergies, crossover, etc. Or, are they still two separate entities, just under one roof?*

On grassroots level reintegration has mostly been successful; the surrender of weapons is still very sensitive because of the threat of FNL.

5. *If there has been integration, do people recognise that this is a conscious attempt to integrate, or has it been more spontaneous? What was the thinking behind the attempts to integrate them into one programme - whose idea was it and according to what mandate? Did they face any opposition? How much has it been driven by internationals and how much have local actors gone with it?*

The process of integration of DDR and SALW is still pre-mature. Although, the government plan on SALW makes provision to address the question it has not started.

6. *What is the general feeling on the ground: has this attempt to integrate/coordinate been successful? What has worked and what hasn't? What do the locals think of this? Do they understand the difference between the different programmes?*

Not yet implemented

7. *How do funding levels for the initial disarmament of ex-combatants compare with funding for wider SALW control measures? (There's a line of argument that DDR gets lots of money whereas longer term measures are ignored - is this fair?)*

SALW plan not yet implemented. The plan makes for provision for a starting budget of \$500,000.

8. *Has there been clarity about the objectives of the DDR process and the SALW programmes, the different beneficiaries and targets? If yes, has this made things any easier on the ground?*

Not yet

9. *Do people believe that DDR and SALW programmes are in any way dealing with the root causes of conflict, and therefore making it less likely?*

Such a study has not been done by any of the role-players involved.

10. *How common is it, in fact, for ex-combatants to demobilise, hand over their weapon, and then (supposedly) reintegrate and soon get hold of weapons again? Are they any more likely to acquire, and use, weapons that other sections of society?*

No detail information is available except hearsay about such incidents

11. *Have SALW programmes drawn upon local conflict resolution / dispute mechanisms to help deal with issues not addressed in DDR programmes? Does this suggest opportunities in linking DDR and SALW programming?*

Not known.

12. *Have SALW programmes helped to address arms flows into communities including across borders – an area where DDR has often proved to be weak – and can this be incorporated into DDR planning?*

Program not yet implemented.

13. *Referring to MDRP programmes:*

- i. Given that MDRP does not do disarmament, to what extent are MDRP programmes linked to disarmament processes?*
- ii. In such cases, what happens to SALW that are collected – are records maintained? Are SALW destroyed?*
- iii. In such cases, what are the incentives used to encourage ex-combatants to hand in weapons?*
- iv. How does MDRP ensure that ex-combatants have been demobilised before they enter the demobilisation and reintegration programme?*
- v. If disarmament is de-linked from demobilisation and reintegration, what is the impact of this in terms of the success of the programme and in terms of human security?*

No detail available.

Working Paper 4: Linkages between DDR and Other Transitional Assistance Programmes in the Reinsertion Phase

1. *Was any humanitarian / recovery programming undertaken in parallel with re-insertion (emergency relief, cash programming, assistance to civilian returnees, QUIPs, community rehabilitation projects etc) which might have been complementary?*

According to CE/CNDDR and NGO's were involved, but little has been done because of a lack of infrastructure and economies.

2. *What efforts (if any) were made to link the re-insertion phase of DDR to other humanitarian / recovery programming at a community level? If any activities were undertaken, what are some of the lessons?*

Support to ex-combatants to start small businesses in the rural communities indirectly contributed to the improvement of infrastructure such as schools, water and hospitals.

3. *Was there any community participation in the re-insertion phase (information, allocation of land, input into the programme etc)?*

No.

4. *What are community perceptions of re-insertion packages (fact of it occurring, size, timing, targeting etc)?*

The community on the grass-root level positively accepted the program.

5. *What are ex-combatant perceptions of re-insertion packages (reward for disarming, reward for fighting, compensation, size, timing, targeting, etc.)?*

In general positive, some however rather want the cash component of \$600.

6. *How long does a re-insertion package generally last for?*

Normally, it makes provision for the ex-combatant to move to the area of origin and establish himself until he becomes part of the reintegration program, a time line is difficult to establish because it differ from ex-combatant to ex-combatant. Estimated at 12 months

7. *What people benefit from it?*

The ex-combatant and his immediate family, if the ex-combatant manage his benefits correctly.

8. *What is it used for?*

Some ex-combatants will use it to start small businesses but other use it on food, liquor and women and soon run out of income.

9. *What supplementary support is found during the re-insertion phase?*

Programs run by international and limited local NGO's.

10. *When the package is spent, how are ex-combatants supported (self / re-integration?)*

At this stage, there is no other means to support ex-combatants.

11. *There is a recommendation to de-link the logistics element of the re-insertion package (travel, accommodation etc) from the resettlement element (entry and settlement into community). This would allow greater integration of the resettlement process with other community processes, in particular other return processes?*

The feeling from some NGO's are mixed and with specifically the planning for the FNL DDR process a decision must still be made.

12. *What are community / ex-combatant / practitioner perceptions of the feasibility and usefulness of this recommendation?*

The process is perceived to be welcomed, the biggest concern is timelines.