



Centre for
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Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Sudan

Mini Case Study

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Contribution to the Project:

DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building
in the Interests of the Poor



UNIVERSITY OF
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MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

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1. Introduction

This case study of the DDR process in Sudan is a contribution towards the project “DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security Building in the Interests of the Poor”. It is based upon a desk review of relevant literature, programme documents and evaluations, as well as limited field research and interviews with those involved in the design and implementation of the programme conducted between July and September 2007 in Nairobi, Juba, London and Khartoum.

There are a number of features of the DDR process in Sudan that are of relevance to the project and that have framed the approach to this mini-case study:

1. The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) had a significant impact on programme design, and Sudan was selected as an early test of the standards and a pilot for implementing an integrated approach to DDR among the different UN agencies. On paper, the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) strongly reflects IDDRS principles. However, in practice, implementation of DDR to-date is widely perceived as poor and there is a huge gap between the principles contained in the IDDRP and what is actually being implemented on the ground. It is interesting therefore to investigate why this has been the case.
2. DDR in Sudan has an explicit human security focus. The overarching aim, as expressed both in the CPA and the IDDRP, is to enhance human security and post-conflict stability.
3. The DDR programme in Sudan sought to integrate SALW control and community-focused security programming from the beginning. However, implementation of this component has been problematic, and there is a growing consensus that this should be de-linked from the DDR programme. Again, it is interesting to consider why ‘integration’ has not worked in practice.
4. The implementation of DDR in Sudan is still at an early stage. Furthermore, the first phase focuses upon DDR of disabled, children and women associated with armed groups, rather than DDR of able combatants. It was also designed to build capacity of national DDR institutions to plan for longer-term DDR programming, and to address wider SALW control and community security issues in the interim period, including issues arising from the need to disarm or incorporate the large number of militia involved in the conflict.
5. DDR is being implemented in the context of a fragile North-South peace agreement and unresolved conflicts in Darfur and other parts of the country. Two-and-a-half years after its signing, key aspects of the agreement have not been implemented, and the ruling party in the North is actively obstructing CPA reforms that would ultimately threaten its political and economic agendas. This

incomplete peace – and faltering implementation of the CPA itself – has significantly impacted upon implementation of DDR.

This case study finds that the weakness of DDR in Sudan is symptomatic of four major factors:

1. The fragility and weakness of the CPA as a basis for peace in Sudan, and specifically as a framing document for DDR.
2. The inability to translate the IDDRS principles into practice and, in particular, the failure of an ‘integrated’ UN management of DDR.
3. The breakdown in international political engagement and cooperation on the CPA and the security sector.
4. Unrealistic expectations of what DDR programming could achieve and weak capacity to deliver.

This report is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the conflict context, the CPA, and the political dynamics shaping DDR in Sudan. Section 3 provides an overview of the mandate for DDR and SSR as derived from the CPA. Section 4 examines the design of the DDR programme, while Section 5 provides an overview of its implementation. The case study then examines the linkages between DDR and related areas of programming in Sudan, with Section 6 focusing on DDR and security and justice sector development. Section 7 focuses on DDR and SALW control, and Section 8 focuses on DDR and transitional assistance and reintegration. The final section identifies emerging issues, priorities and lessons from the Sudan experience.

2. Conflict and Political Context

2.1 Historical Framework

Sudan’s civil war dates back to its independence from Britain, with war between North and South of the country breaking out in 1955, a year before independence. However, the patterns of uneven development, slave raiding and exploitive relations which lie at the root of the conflict can be traced back even further. In 1972, the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement put a temporary end to North-South hostilities for 11 years. However, Southern resistance resurfaced due to: disillusionment and grievances over breaches of the peace deal; limited Southern autonomy; imposition of *sharia* law; exploitation of Southern oil fields; and the status of former rebels in the national army. In 1983, the second Civil War broke out between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), which emerged as the dominant political movement in the South.¹

Over time, the North-South conflict developed into a much wider war, with the SPLA/M extending its support to other marginalised constituencies in the largely Muslim north, and the GoS allying with non-Muslim militia in the South. By the time the CPA was signed in 2005, Sudan was divided by multiple conflicts affecting different regions: the South; the western region of Darfur; the East; and the central belt (i.e., the ‘transitional’ areas). These crises are regionally distinctive and each has

¹ For a history of the conflict, see Johnson, D, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars*.

its own historical trajectory and dynamics. However, at their heart is resistance to a pattern of exploitation and neglect by the National Congress Party (NCP)-dominated central government, and demands for a greater share in the country's wealth and greater political autonomy. The regions share similar grievances against a highly centralised and militarised regime that has: closed down political space; sought to impose religious beliefs on culturally diverse peoples; exploited oil and other local resources for the benefit of a central elite; and armed and mobilised local groups against one another and civilian populations.²

Sudanese society – and Southern Sudan in particular – is dealing with the consequences of over five decades of civil war. It is a polarised and traumatised society defined by: ethnic and religious identities; deep-rooted poverty amid significant oil and natural resource wealth; minimal infrastructure to enable the administration and development of a vast and difficult territory; and a militarised governance and society with millions of weapons in the hands of civilians and militia.³ The second North-South civil war, which lasted 21 years, is estimated to have killed at least 2 million people and displaced over 4 million within Sudan.⁴

Throughout the war, the SPLA/M built alliances with Northern opposition groups, extending its war beyond the colonial North-South border. Since the mid-1980s, the SPLA fought alongside insurgents in the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Southern Blue Nile, located geographically north of the 1956 border in Sudan's central belt and gaining control of territory. Similarly, the SPLA/M helped train and fought alongside rebels in Eastern Sudan (with support from Eritrea), together occupying and administering significant territory in the late 1990's. The SPLA/M has also supported rebels in Darfur in 2003-2004, though it officially denies this, and has nonetheless been a political ally.⁵

Internal divisions within the South led to rifts within the SPLA/M and the formation of splinter political and military groups, which the GoS supported as part of its counter-insurgency strategy. GoS support for Southern militias was part of a strategy to divide and destabilise its opposition and to protect its interests in the southern oil fields. However, the alliance of these groups with GoS was tactical rather than ideological – most Southern militia had their own political and ideological goals (e.g., opposing mainstream SPLA/M, while at the same time, rejecting northern rule), organised along ethnic lines, and often played a role in community defence and protection of (or competition over) cattle, grazing and water rights. Many of these groups fall under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), the largest coalition of opposition militia.⁶ GoS also supported the Ugandan Lord's Resistance

² See ICG (2003), 'Sudan's Other Wars', an early analysis of conflicts in the Three Areas, Darfur, the East and Nubia.

³ Small Arms Survey estimates between 1.9 and 3.2 million SALW in Sudan, of which approximately two-thirds are held by civilians. SAS (2007), 'The militarisation of Sudan', Briefing 6.

⁴ USAID (2007), Situation Report 17, Sudan – Complex Emergency.

⁵ The SPLA/M provided military support to Darfur rebels as part of a strategy to gain leverage during CPA negotiations. This political alliance has been a tentative one, as the SPLA/M has been afraid to unravel its partnership with the NCP completely, but since the CPA was signed has used political support for Darfur rebels to increase pressure on the NCP. See ICG (2007) Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report No 137.

⁶ For an analysis of the roots and profile of the SSDF, see Young, J (2006), The South Sudan Defence Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration, Small Arms Survey, Human Security Baseline Assessment Working Paper 1.

Army (LRA), which operated from bases in Southern Sudan, in opposition to the Ugandan Government's support for the SPLA/M.

In mid-2003, conflict in the western region of Darfur intensified, with government-supported militia carrying out large-scale attacks on the civilian population, in response to growing pressure from rebels. Attacks by government forces and allied militia in Darfur are estimated to have displaced over 2 million people and killed at least 200,000 civilians. The rebellion in Darfur grew out of frustration over exclusion of the region from Sudan's power and wealth. The eruption of government-sponsored violence in the midst of talks between the GoS and SPLA/M to end the North-South war brought into question the GoS's commitment to peace and the ability of a North-South deal to satisfy constituencies who were not party to negotiations. Despite a separate peace deal between the government and one rebel faction signed in 2006 and considerable international attention, the region has not moved towards peace. The humanitarian and security situation in Darfur has continued to deteriorate as the government has continued aerial bombardment and support to allied militia, rebel factions have splintered, and Darfur has become a playing field for a proxy war between Sudan and Chad.⁷

2.2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on 9 January, 2005 by the GoS and the SPLM/A bringing a formal end to hostilities. It was a culmination of over two years of mediation efforts by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and was negotiated as a series of protocols, beginning with the Machakos Protocol in 2002, and followed by five others between 2003 and 2004⁸. The CPA was agreed in the context of significant external pressure and engagement. The US, in particular, had considerable leverage over the GoS, and other countries were also instrumental in supporting the agreement, including Norway, Britain, Italy, the EU, AU and UN.⁹

The CPA establishes a six-year interim period in which significant national governance reforms are to be carried out, including: general elections in 2009; decentralisation and devolution of authority to State governments; and the creation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) with authority over the Southern States and considerable autonomy. The interim period culminates in a referendum on Southern independence scheduled to take place in 2011. The parties agreed to implement the agreement so as to make the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of the South.¹⁰ However, the CPA embodies two competing visions: one for a unified and reformed Sudan; and the other, for Southern autonomy and independence. As

⁷ ICG (2007) Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report No 137.

⁸ These are Protocols on Security Arrangements (2003), Wealth Sharing (2004), Power Sharing (2004) as well as separate Protocols dealing with the resolution of the conflicts in the three areas: Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (2004), and Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (2004). Detailed implementation modalities were also agreed in 2004 which detail how the protocols will be implemented. These include the Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements, signed in December 2004.

⁹ For a detailed analysis of various peace initiatives in Sudan and the IGAD process, see Rogier, E (2005) 'No more hills ahead? Sudan's Tortuous Ascent to the Heights of Peace', Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.

¹⁰ This was a central tenant of the 2002 Machakos Protocol.

implementation has progressed, the gulf between the different interpretations of the CPA has widened and 'making unity attractive' is a very far reality for either side.

The CPA was ultimately a deal between the two dominant parties – the NCP and SPLM/A – which did not fully engage other political constituencies in both North and South. It only partly addresses conflicts in Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei (the transitional areas) and it neglects conflicts in Darfur and the East. The power-sharing formula in the CPA confirms the ruling National Congress Party political control over the Northern States and within the national government (i.e., the Government of National Unity (GNU)). It likewise ensures the SPLA/M's dominance within the GoSS and the Southern States, while also giving it a stake in the GNU. This has allowed both parties to consolidate their positions in the lead-up to elections at all levels of government, scheduled for 2009. Many see it as a deal that speaks to the problems of the South rather than to the country as a whole.¹¹ Furthermore, by legitimising NCP rule in the North until elections in 2009, the deal has arguably fuelled grievances in Darfur and the East, where rebels have had similar demands for greater autonomy and the sharing of power.

The CPA could provide a framework for addressing conflicts in Sudan as a whole. However, this is dependent upon bringing in broader political constituencies and building confidence in national reforms as it is being implemented. The national reforms called for in the CPA, including democratic reforms and decentralisation to State governments, could go some way to addressing the demands of other marginalised regions and to addressing the root causes of conflict in Sudan as a whole.¹² However, a number of factors have precluded this.

At the heart of the problem is the NCP's lack of political will to implement reforms that would ultimately weaken or threaten its hold on political power and its economic interests.¹³ Instead, the NCP has tried to ring-fence conflicts in different regions and to distract from a national reform agenda. A strategy which the international community has played into and that has ultimately undermined progress on all fronts. Attempts to resolve the conflicts in Darfur and the East have been pursued through separate negotiating tracks. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006 between the government and one of three rebel factions, after multiple rounds of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the AU. However, this has failed to bring about peace because it lacks support from people in Darfur, was rejected by two rebel factions, in addition to being weak on key issues.¹⁴ Rebel demands for power and autonomy have increased over time and have been difficult to reconcile with the CPA, particularly on issues of power-sharing.¹⁵ In eastern Sudan, the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), brokered by Eritrea, was signed with the Eastern Front in October 2006. However, this deal also suffers from lack of popular support, slow implementation and lack of international attention.¹⁶

¹¹ Berghof Foundation for Peace Support (2006) Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation: A Southern and a Northern View.

¹² See ICG (2007) A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan, Africa Report No 130.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ See ICG (2007) Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report No 137.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ ICG (2007) A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan.

The SPLA/M has the political will to implement the CPA and to advocate for a national reform agenda, but has had limited capacity and influence within the GNU. This is partly because the NCP retained control of key ministries (including energy and defence) when the GNU was formed, and partly because the SPLA/M is pre-occupied with the enormous task of consolidating its authority in the South.

The death of SPLM/A leader John Garang shortly after he was sworn in as the First Vice President of Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan also had a significant impact on CPA implementation.¹⁷ Garang was a strong advocate of the vision of a united 'new Sudan' – based on secular and democratic principles – and inspired confidence that unity was possible despite aspirations of the majority of Southerners for independence. Under Salva Kiir's leadership, there has been a much stronger shift in the political orientation of the South towards secession and an erosion of the 'partnership' between the NCP and SPLM/A, which was built on trust between the personalities involved.

CPA implementation is behind schedule and the North-South peace process is extremely fragile. Delays in the census and the demarcation of the North-South border (pre-requisites for elections at all levels of government in 2009 and the referendum on Southern self-determination in 2011), incomplete redeployment of SAF and SPLA to their respective sides of the border, and the NCP's continued rejection of the Abyei Boundary Commission's 'final and binding' ruling delivered to the Presidency on 14 July 2005, all point to potential for renewed hostilities. There are growing signs that the North-South border could become a focus of renewed conflict.¹⁸ Deliberate obstruction by the NCP in key areas is contributing to distrust and putting the agreement at risk. Implementation is also being undermined by the weak capacity of the SPLA/M and its tendency to disengage from national processes, and by the absence of concerted external pressure from international actors whose attention has been focused on Darfur.

3. Mandate for DDR

The CPA contains detailed ceasefire and security arrangements, which provide the framework for DDR and other security-related programming. According to the CPA, the North and South maintain separate armed forces until the referendum on Southern self-determination in 2011. The main focus of the first phase of the security arrangements (the period ending 9 July 2007) is upon:

- the redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA to their respective sides of the 1 January 1956 North-South border (withdrawal of SPLA from Eastern Sudan and the transitional areas, and withdrawal of SAF from the South);
- the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) composed of equal numbers of SAF and SPLA to be deployed in selected areas of the ceasefire zone (particularly in contentious areas such as the transitional areas and the

¹⁷ For further analysis of the implications, see ICG (2005), 'Garang's Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan' Africa Briefing No 30.

¹⁸ Young, J. (2007), 'Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War', Small Arms Survey, HSBA Working Paper 7.

southern oil fields) under the command of a Joint Defense Board to be established under the Presidency; and

- the incorporation of all ‘Other Armed Groups’ (OAG’s) (A term used primarily to refer to GoS-allied militia operating in the South) into the organized forces of either side, or their disarmament and dissolution, to be overseen by Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee (OAGCC).

The section of the CPA on DDR mainly makes provision for the establishment, composition and responsibilities of the national DDR institutions, and outlines broad principles for DDR, but does not elaborate detailed implementation modalities for DDR. The CPA calls for: a National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) which is to formulate and oversee DDR policy and is accountable to the Presidency; Northern and Southern DDR Commissions to design, implement and manage DDR at the sub-national level; and State DDR Commissions, which are responsible for implementation of DDR in each of the States of Northern and Southern Sudan, in-line with the decentralized federal structure called for in the CPA. These institutions are responsible for DDR with the international community providing support. The CPA allows for the voluntary DDR of ‘non-essentials’ (i.e., children, elderly, disabled, etc.), and requires the demobilisation of all children within the first six months of the signing of the CPA.

The CPA envisages key decisions regarding downsizing of forces and security sector reform (SSR) taking place after a considerable period of time. For instance, negotiations on the proportionate downsizing of forces are to begin after the full redeployment of the SAF to the North, the deadline for which was 9 July 2007. Furthermore, decisions regarding the ultimate shape of the armed forces are deferred until after the 2011 referendum on self-determination. If the referendum results in Southern independence, then the JIUs dissolve and the SPLA and SAF become the armies of the two States, while if it results in unity, the two armed forces merge with the JIUs forming the nucleus of the new national army.

While the CPA contains provisions relating to the disarmament of OAG’s, it is relatively silent on this issue of civilian disarmament. The only reference to this issue is in Article 14.6.5.15, which mandates the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, “...to monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally armed.” The ceasefire and security arrangements do contain provisions relating to control and use of arms by the SAF and SPLA during the interim period, and require the parties to provide detailed data on their inventories and stocks of weapons and ammunition, including their locations, and to agree on ways of monitoring these stocks so that they are “no longer accessible to the parties”.

The DDR mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), according to Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), is, “...to assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction.”

4. Design of DDR Programming

Planning for DDR in Sudan began during the IGAD sponsored peace negotiations, well before the signing of the CPA in January 2005. Early technical assistance was provided through advisors seconded to IGAD and to the parties to support negotiations on ceasefire and security arrangements. This improved the quality of negotiations and helped ensure that the CPA provisions provided the necessary framework for DDR and SSR. Planning process for DDR programming took place in parallel to the negotiations and was carried out in partnership with DDR Interim Authorities for SPLA and GoS. An important aim of this early support was to build national ownership and strengthen capacity of the parties to design and later implement DDR and SSR programming.

DDR programming in Sudan was designed to take a phased approach, and is currently in an interim phase. The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) was designed to be a one-year initiative that would lay the groundwork for developing and implementing a multi-year DDR programme. It was first presented to donors in July 2005, was formally endorsed by the GoSS and GNU in January and May 2006 respectively, and then started in January 2006. It continues to be the framework for DDR programming as of September 2007.

The IDDRP explicitly identifies enhancing human security as the overall goal of DDR in Sudan. According to the IDDRP,

“the overall goal of DDR in Sudan is to enhance human security through disarmament, demobilisation and sustainable reintegration of former combatants and special groups, and the promotion of community security and arms control.”¹⁹

The stated objectives of the IDDRP are:

- to set-up and build the capacity of the DDR institutions and civil society;
- to begin the DDR of “selected priority target groups”; and
- to prepare for a multi-year DDR programme.²⁰

In line with CPA provisions, the first phase of DDR was not intended to demobilise significant numbers of able-bodied SPLA and SAF combatants, but rather: to target ‘non-essentials’ including the disabled, women and children associated with the armed forces; and to support efforts to incorporate or disarm and demobilise OAG’s. The second major phase of DDR was envisioned to occur following a Defence Review that would determine the appropriate size of the armed forces.

The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) had a significant impact on the design of the IDDRP. Sudan was seen as an early test of the standards and was selected as an official pilot for implementing an integrated approach to DDR.²¹ The IDDRS places a strong focus on integrated programming (i.e., design, implementation and support) between the UN agencies as well as, other relevant international agencies. In line with

¹⁹ Pages 22-25 of the IDDRP Document. http://www.unmis.org/English/2006Docs/ddr_IDDRP%20Programme-Jul05.pdf

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The other pilot is Haiti.

this, an integrated UN DDR Unit was established in Sudan, in which UNDP and DPKO staff sought to work together under a single chain of command and management structure.

The focus of the IDDRS on establishing linkages between DDR and SALW control, SSR, and other related areas of programming is also evident in the design of the IDDRP. The IDDRP: incorporates 'Arms Reduction and Control' (ARC) programming; calls for the creation of a Security Sector Transformation (SST) Unit to coordinate with SSR efforts; includes a Community Security Support (CSS) component intended to support reintegration through community-focused programming to enhance stability of communities; and envisions support to 'community policing' as part of this strategy. Community security and ARC programming were envisioned as major foci of the first phase of the DDR programme.

The aim of enhancing human security is to be achieved partly through the sustainable DDR of ex-combatants and special groups, such that the risk of ex-combatants contributing to new violence is mitigated, and partly through targeted support to communities to address their security needs. In line with the principles contained in the IDDRS, the IDDRP recommends a balance between support to individual combatants and support to communities. It states that:

- individual combatants and target groups receive personalised support;
- reintegration support for ex-combatants should aim to create a secure environment for the entire recipient community;
- support should be provided to communities to identify, prioritise and address their immediate security needs; and
- families, women, youth and other local civil society groups should be involved in reintegration planning through a participatory planning process.

There was also a strong emphasis on national ownership in the design of the IDDRP and development and implementation of longer-term programming, reflecting IDDRS principles. The IDDRP was officially signed by both the parties and presented as a 'Sudanese document for Sudan'. The emphasis on capacity-building of the national DDR institutions, both while the IDDRP was being developed, and as a central focus of the first phase of programming also reflects this. However, throughout the design and planning process, there have clearly been tensions between the need to drive forward the DDR process quickly and to ensure that it was developed in-line with progressive international 'thinking' and standards on DDR and the desire to ensure full buy-in and understanding of all the relevant national stakeholders. As frictions developed between the UN and the DDRC's in the first phase of implementation, the understanding of national ownership has shifted over time.

Planning for the next phase of DDR has begun, but faces significant challenges. The National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) has established a technical sub-committee to oversee the drafting of a National DDR Strategy, which has been developed, but has not yet been finalised or approved by the NDDRCC. While UNMIS has provided technical support to the sub-committee with the drafting of the

strategy, it has no formal relationship with the NDDRCC, which has impeded political and policy dialogue and DDR planning.²²

5. Implementation of DDR Programming

Implementation of the IDDRP and planning for the next phase of DDR has been slow to-date. In line with the IDDRP, the main focus of implementation has been upon establishing and building the capacity of the national DDR institutions. In February 2006, both the NDDRCC and the NSDDRC were legally established by Presidential Decree. In Southern Sudan, the SSDDRC Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson were appointed by Presidential Decree, but the Acts and regulations governing the work of the Commission have yet to be finalised, largely due to limited capacity.

While in Northern Sudan, the NSDDRC is relatively well established and resourced, in Southern Sudan, the process of establishing and staffing the SSDDRC and State DDR Commissions has been slow and the capacity of the SSDDRC is still very weak. Staff have now been appointed to State DDR Commissions, however they still lack offices and infrastructure, have received little or no formal induction or training, and lack direction and clarity regarding their roles and responsibilities and relationship to SSDDRC. The SSDDRC is under-resourced, with most of its budget going to salaries, and is dependent upon the UN and other donors to support activities (including transport to the field) and to build infrastructure.

Efforts to prepare for the DDR of children and special needs groups are ongoing. UNICEF is the lead agency implementing child DDR, and although formally part of the integrated UN DDR Unit, it is implementing child DDR activities largely independently, whilst coordinating with UN DDR and the DDRC's. In Northern Sudan, 25 children have been demobilised and reunited with their families while in Southern Sudan over 1,000 children have been demobilised and 250 children are participating in reintegration programmes.²³

Identification and pre-registration of combatants expected to be incorporated into DDR programming is underway in both the North and South, although DDR of combatants will not begin until the National DDR Strategy has been approved. In January 2007, the SAF produced estimates that its pre-registered target group totals over 60,000 personnel, including regular SAF, Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and members of SAF-aligned OAGs. Of these, the NSDDRC Chair has announced that 26,000 former combatants will enter into DDR programmes by the end of the year.²⁴ The SAF and NSDDRC are preparing for the voluntary DDR of ex-combatants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States and have pre-registered 25,000 combatants for this process, with DDR of roughly half this number expected to begin in the next phase of programming.

In Southern Sudan, the SSDDRC, with support from the UN DDR Unit, attempted to register SPLA candidates for DDR throughout most of 2006, and the SPLA has now submitted a list of some 25,000 pre-registered candidates. These comprise of elderly, women and disabled combatants – the group identified as non-essentials eligible for

²² UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, 20 August 2007, S/2007/500.

²³ S/2007/500

²⁴ CPA Monitor, July 2007

voluntary DDR in the CPA.²⁵ However, the SSDDRC has struggled to obtain complete information on DDR candidates and commenced an emergency process to re-register DDR candidates that was still underway as of September 2007.²⁶ Beyond practical and logistical challenges, the process has been stalled because the identification of DDR candidates is dependent upon the restructuring of the SPLA and the incorporation of former militia.

While Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programming was envisioned as a major component of the first phase of DDR, implementation has been limited. While pilot CSAC activities have been implemented,²⁷ these represent only a fraction of what was envisioned in the IDDRP, and little progress has been made to develop the policy, legal and institutional framework for arms control and to develop a longer-term CSAC strategy and programme.²⁸ In the absence of significant international support for CSAC programming, and with limited SSDDRC capacity to engage on these issues, the GoSS and State authorities have initiated civilian disarmament campaigns that have often been coercive and have triggered violence.²⁹

The SPLA has made progress in the formal integration of OAG's following the 8 January 2006 Juba Declaration, which brought the largest militia grouping, the SSDF into the SPLA. However, engagement of the SSDDRC on issues relating to the integration and disarmament of OAG's has been limited. The majority of Southern militia have been brought into the SPLA through the Southern reconciliation process largely driven by political and economic agendas, and the disarmament of remnants has in some cases been dealt with through coercive approaches, led by the SPLA.

There have been delays and challenges in implementing other aspects of the CPA security arrangements, which have a bearing on DDR. The deadline for the full redeployment of SAF to the North of the 1956 border, which was to have been completed by 9 July 2007, has not been fully met. While much of the withdrawal has been carried out, the continued presence of SAF troops in the South – primarily in concentrations around oil fields in Upper Nile and Unity States – is a source of dispute with the SPLA. This is further complicated by delays in demarcating the North-South border. Both parties and UNMIS agreed that 66 percent of the required reduction of SAF forces in the South had taken place (i.e., 32,221 of an estimated 46,403) as of 17 July, 2007³⁰.

There have been significant DDR challenges associated with the SAF withdrawal, as some SAF or SAF-aligned groups have remained in the South and their continued association with the SAF or reintegration into Southern society has been a source of tension. The SAF have 'voluntarily demobilised' some 8,900 troops in the South, who the SPLA claim still receive salaries and should be considered active soldiers until they have gone through the formal DDR process. Similarly, in May 2007, SAF

²⁵ Email communication with senior UN DDR official, September 2007.

²⁶ Interview with senior SSDDRC official, August 2007.

²⁷ The UN has supported pilot civilian disarmament activities in Jonglei State and pilot community security mapping in Southern Kordofan, and the NGO PACT Sudan is implementing an IDDRP funded Community Security programme in Lakes, Warrap and Jonglei States.

²⁸ Interviews with UN officials involved in CSAC, July 2007.

²⁹ See SAS (2006) Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State – Recent experiences and implications, HSBA Briefing No 3, for examples of this in Jonglei State in 2006.

³⁰ S/2007/500

unilaterally disarmed and discharged SAF-aligned OAG's (i.e., 827 militiamen) in the South, collecting weapons in exchange for payments.³¹ This occurred outside the framework of the DDR institutions and programming, raising serious concerns about the lack of DDR planning. These former SAF and SAF-aligned militia are a potential source of instability in the South, and the responsibility for their reintegration and reconciliation with Southern society remains a source of dispute.

The formation of JIUs is also a major obstacle. Although a significant proportion of troops have been assembled for inclusion in JIUs, the SAF and SPLA components have not integrated and remain under separate chains of command.³² The formation of JIUs is a pre-requisite for full withdrawal of the SPLA from the transitional areas, where the JIUs will fill the security vacuum, and is also important for building confidence in contested areas, such as the oil fields, to facilitate full SAF withdrawal.

The 'national' CPA mechanisms, such as the NDDRCC, Joint Defence Board and OAGCC, have not functioned effectively in providing policy guidance, with the real centres of power and decision-making located outside these institutions. There have been delays in establishing these bodies and once set-up they have not functioned effectively or met infrequently³³ – a situation that reflects the breakdown in trust as the NCP has sought to dilute or obstruct its obligations under the CPA and the SPLM/A has focused its energies on state-building in the South.

6. Linkages between DDR and Security and Justice Sector Development

There were opportunities and attempts to integrate SSR mandates into DDR programming. During the early planning for DDR throughout the CPA negotiations, an integrated approach was taken to the broad spectrum of security arrangements. Reflecting this, the IDDRP includes a section on Security Sector Transformation (SST) that proposes the establishment of an SST Unit within the UN DDR Unit and SST teams within the Northern and Southern DDR Commissions, in order to develop SST capacity and strategies for the multi-year DDR programme. According to the IDDRP, the SST Unit would: support the preparations for force reduction by the parties; coordinate with bilaterally supported defence review processes; and coordinate with mediation processes relating to the incorporation of OAGs into the DDR programme.

The focus of the IDDRP also reflects the need to sequence DDR with other interventions affecting the security sector. For instance, at the time the programme was designed, it was felt that the integration of the OAGs would need to occur before decisions on force reduction could be made, and the decision to front-load CSAC interventions stemmed from the recognition of the blurring of civilian and military roles throughout the conflict, the potential for OAG and SAF remnants in the South to destabilise, and the need to address the web of local conflicts not addressed by the

³¹ S/2007/500

³² S/2007/500

³³ There were significant delays in setting up the JDB, NDDRCC and OAGCC and the OAGCC has only met four times to date.

CPA and to stabilise communities so as to create an enabling environment for reintegration.³⁴

The links between DDR and security provision to communities is also recognised in the IDDRP and ‘community policing’ is included as a component of ‘community security’ programming. There was concern from the beginning that the withdrawal of forces, the dissolution of OAGs, and civilian disarmament during the interim period could create security vacuums, as armed civilians and groups were playing a central role in community protection in some areas. The security vacuums would be filled by newly formed JIUs in some areas, and it was envisioned that ‘community police’ capacity would need to be developed quickly in coordination with UN Police, ahead of the development of rule of law institutions.

Despite its inclusion in the IDDRP, the SST component was never implemented and the SST Unit and capacity within the DDR Commissions has not been established. The main reason for this is that in the North, the NCP has blocked all discussions of SSR. In the South, where there is political space to engage on SSR, the reasons why this capacity was not developed are less clear. There are SPLA liaison officers in the SSDDRC and the Southern UN DDR office, however their roles remain ill-defined.

Furthermore, while early planning for DDR envisioned a Defence Review to inform DDR and SSR planning, this review has never taken place.³⁵ A planned International Military Assistance Team (IMAT), a joint operation to provide assistance with restructuring the security sector set-up by the US, Norway, UK, and Dutch governments, was unilaterally shut down by Khartoum in 2006.³⁶ Donors were slow to re-engage and there have been delays in technical and financial assistance to SPLA reform in the South, despite SPLA requests for international assistance with SSR and promises of support.

While in the early planning for DDR and SSR there was good coordination amongst bilateral donors on security issues, this broke down with the end of the IGAD process and consensus was further hampered by the obstruction of the IMAT. In the absence of the SST Unit, there is a serious problem of lack of coordination between the UN and bilateral international support to military reform, with nine different countries currently involved in some form of SSR or military assistance.³⁷ Within Southern Sudan, bilateral support for SPLA reform is being provided by the US and UK amongst others. However this is not being effectively coordinated and sequenced with DDR programming. The UN DDR Unit and DDR Commissions are entirely reliant on the SPLA and SAF to identify and provide them with information on candidates for DDR. The UN has engaged with parties on the issue of establishing criteria for entering the programme. However, these discussions were initiated belatedly and some do not perceive them to have been effective.³⁸

The interdependence of SSR and DDR is very clear in Southern Sudan and yet, these issues are not being addressed holistically and through a coordinated approach. A

³⁴ Interviews with former UN DDR official and security advisor to IGAD negotiations, July-August 2007.

³⁵ Interview with former security advisor to IGAD negotiations, August 2007.

³⁶ ICG (2006) Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, Africa Report No 106.

³⁷ Interview with former security advisor, August 2007. Need to check this figure – this includes military assistance not just ‘SSR’

³⁸ Interview with donor official, July 2007.

fundamental challenge is that the SPLA is emerging from being a largely volunteer-fed, payroll-less rebel army and requires a thorough professionalization process. Verifiable numbers of soldiers are difficult to obtain, but total numbers of SPLA have been estimated at 170,000 by internal sources. The SPLA is consuming over one-third of the GoSS budget (most of which is on salaries) at a time when the GoSS is in the midst of a fiscal crisis that has been triggered by a reduction in transfers of oil revenues to the South - another point of contention with the North.³⁹ The SPLA is under pressure to cut expenditure from some donors and is facing demands for greater accountability for military spending from the GoSS Legislative Assembly. However, pressure to spend within its means without a broader strategy for SSR and DDR would be a recipe for instability.

The challenge is compounded by the need to incorporate some 34,000 former SSDF combatants who joined the SPLA following the Juba Declaration. Senior militia commanders have been given key positions within the GoSS, but the full integration of lower ranking officers into the SPLA and other organised forces is far from complete. Their successful integration is crucial to stability and will be dependent upon major reforms to and restructuring of the SPLA. The challenges of integrating these former OAGs – who are disorganised and often illiterate and inexperienced – into a similarly un-institutionalised and unprofessional SPLA with an already overstretched payroll are immense. In some cases, it appears that aligned-OAGs have simply continued their operations under the SPLA banner, which has left tensions between the senior SPLA and militia officers. Until SPLA reform has taken place, former militia are integrated, and political constituencies satisfied, the practical process of identifying which combatants should be candidates for DDR is not possible.

While few unaligned OAGs remain, they are significant in their potential to disrupt. A clash between SPLA and SAF in Malakal in late November, triggered initially by OAG activity, demonstrates the ability of the situation to escalate rapidly. The engagement of the UN DDR Unit and DDR Commissions on issues of OAG incorporation and disarmament has been inadequate, and in the absence of this, the GoSS has resorted to coercive measures to disarm and neutralise OAG remnants through its civilian disarmament campaigns, a process that has triggered serious violence and still threatens stability in the South.

The fact that the DDR institutions have struggled to plan for and engage proactively on these emerging challenges, highlights the serious lack of coordination and planning between DDR, OAG integration, military reform and the development of rule of law institutions. First steps towards greater coordination within the South have been internal discussions within GoSS and SPLA. The first of which took place within the SPLA meeting held in March 2007, resulting in broad review of the various processes including DDR, OAG integration, Police and Prisons reforms and key appointments within GoSS. This was framed within the larger process of the Juba Declaration and need to absorb remaining, smaller militia groups and to downscale the SPLA in general.

³⁹ Young (2007).

6.1 DDR, SSR and Rule of Law Development

In Southern Sudan, most legal and civilian security systems were administered by the SPLA/M in the territories it controlled during the war, while the GoS maintained its own administrative structures – the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council – in the areas of the South it controlled. This was complemented by strong traditional systems for law and justice. In addition, significant areas of the South were effectively controlled by the opposition militia, who played an important role in guaranteeing security of their communities.

The principal challenge in the post-CPA period is to transform existing SPLA/M institutions, and to integrate the parallel structures and personnel of SPLA/M and the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council into one efficient, professional system for civil administration, security, law and justice, in accordance with the CPA and Constitutions. The starting point has been weak or non-existent institutions and infrastructure and very low skill levels and human resource capacity.

At the time the CPA was signed, formal police and law enforcement agencies, and related rule of law institutions were extremely weak or completely absent in many parts of Southern Sudan. While in those areas where they were more institutionalised and structured, namely in the former GoS garrison towns, the forces retained a poor reputation as feared instruments of the military. The report of the 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) estimated that there were around 5,000 police, of which about 4,000 were transferred from the SPLA. The remainder include former GoS police and it reported that most of these police lacked adequate training and equipment. Likewise, the JAM estimated that there were only about 800 prison wardens in Southern Sudan, many of whom were former military officers, without formal training.

The SSPS and other rule of law institutions are still in the very early stages of development. Core issues relating to the policy and legal framework, organisational structure, and operational guidelines for the SSPS are still being resolved. Priorities for the development and reform of the SSPS include putting in place a registration and vetting process for those already serving, and establishing recruitment standards. In addition, there is recognition of the need for a comprehensive (re-)training of the police based upon a uniform training curriculum. An objective of this is to ‘demilitarize’ former soldiers and train them in the principles and practices of democratic policing.

The Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and other law enforcement agencies have absorbed a large number of former combatants and this can be expected to continue. However, the transition of SPLA and OAGs into other organised forces (e.g., police, wildlife, prisons, etc.) or into other parts of civil administration is not being actively addressed within or coordinated with DDR programming. This is seen by senior UN and DDRC officials as falling outside the DDR mandate.⁴⁰ This is partly because the target groups for the first phase of DDR are primarily ‘non-essentials’ – and DDR is seen as a means to retire unnecessary personnel rather than as part of a strategy to transform the security sector. The very limited planning for reintegration that has

⁴⁰ Email communication with senior UN DDR official and interview with senior SSDDRC official, August-September 2007.

taken place has not considered opportunities for ex-combatants in re-organised security forces.

In Southern Sudan, there is a widespread perception that police, prison and other law enforcement agency personnel conduct themselves as ‘soldiers’ rather than in accordance with international professional standards. The challenge of transforming the mentality of the police is illustrated by the following statement by GoSS Minister for Internal Affairs,

“Being former combatants, it is hard for them to understand how they were to be transferred to the police ... to be friendly to the community as these are people, who only know how to kill and we were asking them to transform in less than two weeks.”⁴¹

Dissatisfaction with the capacity of the police to protect is also voiced by civil society. For instance, a woman leader interviewed in Eastern Equatoria pointed to the need for thorough re-training of police so that they could become a “proper police” and effectively protect communities from cattle raiding and violence. Another major challenge is building trust and understanding of mutual rights and responsibilities between the new police force (and attendant rule of law institutions) and communities, who are not used to being policed and are unaware of the rights under the CPA and new Constitutions.

However, perhaps an even greater issue in Southern Sudan is the weakness of civilian law enforcement agencies relative to the army, and their extremely limited capacity to provide security and their near absence outside of towns. This has meant that the SPLA continues to play a central role in internal security provision and other aspects of law enforcement, such as border controls. According to information collected by the UNMIS Protection Unit, misconduct by SPLA is pervasive and many more incidents of abuse are reported involving SPLA than the police and other law enforcement agencies. The dominance of the army and the weakness of civilian structures for security provision has been evident in SPLA-led civilian disarmament operations, which have involved use of force and military rather than law enforcement approaches.

As described above, in recognition of the development of rule of law institutions and the need to fill security vacuums, the IDDRP envisioned that ‘community policing’ capacity would need to be developed quickly in coordination with UN Police, as part of ‘community security’ programming. The model of ‘community policing’ and the means of linking this to longer term police development has been unclear, and there have been concerns that this would create yet another parallel and unaccountable security force. The UN Police are supporting ‘community policing’ training in some parts of Sudan though this appears uncoordinated with any DDR activities.

6.2 DDR and Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

It is certain that DDR planning will have to rely heavily on the traditional authorities in any area where DDR will take place. As the overall recognised leadership at

⁴¹ Interview with GoSS Minister of Internal Affairs, H.E. Paul Mayom Akec, Gurtong, March 2007.

community and even sometimes at county level, they will hold much of the knowledge of: the composition of society; the needs and tensions within the community; and the role ex-combatants could play in stabilising or destabilising the community. They will also assist in resolving any conflict between those returning, although this may overload an already stretched system, and those who have remained resident.

Community security programming as articulated in the IDDRP and UNDP CSAC Programme provides a basis for engaging with traditional authorities on reintegration, reconciliation, peacebuilding and community mobilisation (e.g., for disarmament). However, implementation has so far been limited. The IDDRP-funded community security programme implemented by the NGO Pact Sudan and UN-supported pilot disarmament activities have involved significant engagement with traditional authorities. Nonetheless, strategic and programmatic linkages between DDR and traditional justice mechanisms are only beginning to be explored (e.g., in discussions within UNDP between CSAC and Rule of Law programmes). There has been very little, if any, interface as of yet between SSDDRC and the lower tiers of traditional authorities, and it remains unlikely that this has even been considered.

There is an emerging debate within Southern Sudan about the issue of 'transitional justice'. However, there is very little, or almost no, engagement on this issue. The profile of the issue has been raised as a result of concerns over the presence of former SAF and SAF-aligned OAGs in the South. Many SAF-aligned former OAGs have been incorporated into JIUs, which have then been deployed in areas where they previously were in direct confrontation with local populations.⁴² Some see this, as well as unilateral disarmament and the discharge of SAF and SAF-aligned OAGs in the South, as a deliberate tactics by the SAF to destabilise the South.

The potential trade-offs between transitional justice and peace are evident in the current context. The CPA has essentially consolidated the power of the two main parties to the conflict, creating a difficult environment in which to reopen past crimes. In addition, internal conflicts within the South have been resolved by bringing senior opposition militia commanders into key positions within the GoSS. Key amongst these figures is the Vice-President of Southern Sudan, Riek Machar Teny, who previously led a split with the SPLA in the early 1990s. This has been accelerated by the Juba Declaration and the integration of OAGs. For example, former SSDF commander Paulino Matip is now Deputy Commander in Chief of the SPLA.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement in investigating war crimes in Darfur, and its indictment of senior LRA leaders, both have a bearing on transitional justice processes in Sudan. In Darfur, the referral of the case to the ICC for investigation in March 2005⁴³ has increased pressure on the NCP and added international leverage. However, it has not yet brought anyone to justice or demonstrated accountability for crimes. It has also been somewhat diluted by a lack of international consensus. The dynamics of any potential trade-off between justice and

⁴² Interview UNMIS Civil Affairs

⁴³ Security Council Resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur since July 2002 to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and required the government to cooperate with the tribunal. This was in line with the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, which found substantial evidence of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by government forces, and named 'high-ranking' central government officials who may bear individual criminal responsibility.

peace may shift over time – at the moment the investigation supports peace by pushing the NCP to comply out of fear of being held accountable and the main challenge is its weakness. However, so long as peace depends on an NCP that is still in power, there will be trade-offs with bringing it to justice for crimes committed in Darfur. The indictment of senior LRA leaders has had a mixed effect, both increasing pressure to negotiate and closing down space for the LRA to operate, but also ultimately proving to be a key obstacle to reaching a resolution through the talks. There has been active debate about whether the LRA should be brought to justice through the ICC or through traditional justice and reconciliation mechanisms, which many northern Ugandans affected by the conflict feel would ultimately support peace. The issue of justice has been a major focus of the latest phase of negotiations.⁴⁴

7. Linkages between DDR and Small Arms Control

Planning for small arms control programming in Sudan began prior to the signing of the CPA, and in parallel to, but linked with the DDR planning process. In 2003, UNDP developed a concept note for a ‘Small Arms and Violence Reduction’ Programme in Sudan, in cooperation with the Sudanese Ministry of the Interior, focusing upon nomadic pastoralist communities. Building on this initial concept and linked to the DDR planning process, in 2004, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) initiated a Preparatory Assistance programme to develop a small arms control programme for Sudan. A separate Preparatory Assistance programme funded DDR planning, but there was recognition of the overlap and complementarities between the two. Given the large number of arms control issues relating to the draft CPA, the decision was made to consider all of these issues in their totality, rather than treating arms control associated with DDR and arms control relating to OAGs, Popular Defence Forces (PDF), civilians, etc, as separate issues.

From September 2004 to October 2005, UNDP facilitated a planning process to develop a small arms control programme, with representatives of both of the parties. From the beginning, both parties identified small arms control as a critical area for post-conflict stability and actively engaged on the issue. A joint planning process was carried out with small arms focal points within the SPLM and the GoS Interim DDR Authorities and supporting committees of six representatives from each party. Joint planning was seen as critical to developing complementary programming and, in particular, to addressing the transitional areas. This small arms planning and negotiating process was carried out in parallel to the process to develop the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) for Sudan. The small arms team would report to the plenary of their respective DDR authorities and the UN DDR for ratification.

There was an effort to link the small arms planning process with regional small arms processes from the inception. On the GoS side, the small arms focal point was also the Coordinator of the GoS National Focal Point (NFP), Abdul Aziz Malik Mohammed, while for the SPLA/M, it was headed by Lt. Col Monyjok Kong M. Agook. Both attended the Nairobi Secretariat meetings and the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol commitments was a central component of the programme design.

⁴⁴ See Refugee Law Project on these issues, as well as Uganda mini-case study.

The initial small arms programme concept covered both arms control for SAF and SPLA according to the ceasefire and security modalities of the then draft CPA and broader civilian arms control and associated programming. However, it differentiated between the two. The focus of the component targeting the SAF and SPLA (and associated paramilitary forces, such as the PDF) was on neutral monitoring, verification, data collection of arms and ammunition during the withdrawal of forces as called for in the CPA. The Arms Reduction and Control (ARC) component of the programme focused on everything outside of this, including: civilian arms control; stockpile management; public awareness-raising; and border strengthening. The civilian arms control component included plans for Interim Arms Control and Community Security measures, which became 'Community Security and Arms Control' in the IDDRP.

The ARC component, as originally designed, had clearly stated target groups and beneficiaries, which were distinct from those for the wider DDR programme. The target groups included: SAF; SPLA; PDF; OAGs; armed civilians; foreign insurgency groups; and intended beneficiaries included: communities in North and South Sudan; NGO and civil administration; and law enforcement agencies (i.e., police, customs and immigration, etc).

Although the small arms programming was funded by Japan, the UK and Canada as part of the IDDRP, with roughly \$2.5 million USD allocated to ARC activities, this did not lead to programming. Subsequent to the signing of the CPA, only the verification of the withdrawal of forces according to the CPA by UN Military Observers (UNMO's) took place.

The lack of arms control programming was due to a number of factors. Poor management of the UN DDR Unit and conflict between UNDP and DPKO led to a dispute over whether the ARC should be part of DDR programming. As a consequence, aspects of the ARC programme were dismantled while others were folded into a Community Security Support (CSS) component of the IDDRP and funds for ARC put into the Community Security Fund (CSF). At the same time, internal power struggles crippled the Northern and Southern DDR Authorities. This was particularly true in the South, where John Garang's death and the formation of the GoSS led to a political reshuffle and shift in priorities. There was also a significant turnover in staff within the SSDDRC, including the departure of the SALW focal point, who was never replaced.

The Community Security Support (CSS) component was designed into the IDDRP as a mechanism to support communities to prioritise and address their security needs. It was intended to:

- mitigate threats to peace and security caused by particular highly insecure communities, by targeting communities that pose the greatest strategic risk to peace and security in Sudan and providing assistance to address their security needs; and
- support reintegration through community-based projects in areas of return that would create a more stable and secure environment in which ex-combatants can reintegrate.

According to the IDDRP, a Community Security Fund would be established in order to support projects to enhance community security. The CSF would support community-led interventions developed through a participatory planning process, and an important component of this would be support for arms control and community policing interventions. The CSF is also envisaged as part of the reintegration strategy, with each individual supported through the DDR programme receiving a community support voucher, which along with CSF funds, would be applied towards projects in the community of his or her return.

In order to provide a mechanism for assessing and targeting support to communities, a 'Community Security Threat Mapping' process was being developed and piloted under the IDDRP. The methodology involved gathering threat and security data that is entered into a database and used to produce maps using GIS references. As of 2007, it has been piloted in the State of Southern Kordofan and the maps produced there have been well-received. The current concept is that the maps will be produced in collaboration with State authorities and used by the Northern and Southern DDR Commissions and State authorities to prioritise interventions. However, there are concerns that the methodology is highly technical and will be difficult to sustain and integrate into government planning processes given their weak capacity, particularly in Southern Sudan.⁴⁵ Another risk is that State authorities, who have ultimate power to sign-off on the maps, could use them to manipulate conflict dynamics, though initial tests suggests they could also introduce greater transparency.

While CSS was originally envisaged as an early focus of the DDR programme and as a means to rapidly mitigate threats to peace and stability in the interim period, it has been very slow to operationalise and implementation has been very limited. The implementation challenges are analysed in more detail in Section 9. In the absence of effective international support, the GoSS and SPLA have addressed arms control and community insecurity outside the DDR framework and largely without international support.

In response to mounting pressure to address internal security threats, the GoSS and State Governors initiated disarmament campaigns led by the SPLA during the first half of 2006 in various parts of Southern Sudan, including Jonglei, Warrap, Unity and Lakes States. While initial exercises proceeded peacefully and were successful in collecting weapons, the SPLA met with organised resistance from some communities, including OAG elements, leading to significant loss of life, injury, looting of cattle and destruction of property in Jonglei State in 2006.

As an urgent response to this and in an effort to prevent further violence, UNDP initiated a Pilot Voluntary Disarmament Intervention in Akobo country in Jonglei State, with support from UNMIS and in coordination with PACT. This was later extended to the neighbouring Pibor county. At the same time, in recognition of the need to support the GoSS to peacefully address civilian arms control issues and widespread insecurity, UNDP developed a concept for a Community Security and Arms Control Programme, initially focusing upon Jonglei State. This programme document was later expanded to cover all of Southern Sudan.

⁴⁵ There are plans to pilot the approach in two states in Southern Sudan, and an additional state in the North.

The UNDP CSAC Programme encompasses a broad range of measures to support the GoSS to peacefully reduce and control small arms, while enhancing community security in Southern Sudan. It envisages support to the development of the policy and legal framework for arms control, to civilian weapons collection programmes, and broader support to rule of law and local government-led development in order to improve the security environment for communities. While the programme exists on paper, it is not yet funded and implementation, beyond the above mentioned pilot activities, has not yet begun.

The UNDP CSAC Programme was intended to be funded from the IDDRP and to be a mechanism for implementing it, though it also goes beyond the scope of the IDDRP to address longer-term challenges and would also be funded from other sources. However, the programme has not yet received funding from the IDDRP. A major challenge to getting the programme up and running has been defining the institutional relationship between UNDP and UNMIS in the context of competition between agencies and between offices (i.e., Khartoum, Juba, and Geneva). There is an emerging consensus that UNDP will lead on CSAC programming with the main function of the CSS unit of UN DDR being to harness the resources and assets of UNMIS in support of operations. However, this has not yet been formally institutionalised.

There are also a number of NGOs involved in SALW control and related peacebuilding or DDR activities, who link with the DDR institutions and programming to varying degrees. PACT is the only NGO directly funded by the IDDRP, but in addition to its Community Security Programme, it also has additional grassroots peacebuilding and capacity-building programmes that are relevant to CSAC. Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment of Sudan is conducting in-depth assessments of the small arms and human security situation in particular States, as well as analytical research on different aspects of small arms control. The Bonn International Center for Conversion has begun supporting capacity-building for civil society actors on the small arms issue. Saferworld is supporting the development of policy and legal framework for arms control. These efforts have thus far not been well coordinated.

7.1 Addressing Conflict Causes and Ensuring Conflict-sensitivity

'Do no harm' is one of the principles of the ARC component of the IDDRP. In the early design of the ARC programme and the IDDRP, a critical concern was that disarmament could contribute to the vulnerability of communities or create 'security vacuums' and strategies were discussed in order to address this. The linking of arms control with measures to enhance community security (e.g., through support to rule of law and police) is based upon the recognition that the two must go hand-in-hand, in order to be sustainable and to prevent further vulnerability.

Pilot civilian disarmament activities in Jonglei state carried out as part of PACT and UNDP CSAC programmes have involved components of local-level conflict resolution and peace-building. These have primarily involved working through the local government, traditional authorities, youth, women, religious groups, and have used peace meetings, information rallies, and church gatherings for information dissemination and/or dialogue. The UN-supported voluntary disarmament in Akobo

and Pibor counties in Jonglei State included a sequence of elements. A peace process mediated by PACT between Luo Nuer and Murle communities enabled plans for reciprocal disarmament to be developed which would be organised through chiefs, local government authorities and community disarmament committees. The process itself engaged a wide range of community actors, including the training of school teachers to register weapons and the creation of mobilisation teams to sensitise communities.⁴⁶ The first phase of the disarmament took place in Akobo county and was followed by a similar operation in Pibor county (i.e., the Murle areas) which was closely coordinated with the incorporation of Murle militia, under the leadership of Ismael Kony, into the SPLA.

While the 'do no harm' principle is enshrined in the programme design, little has yet been done to develop tools to operationalise this or to ensure disarmament interventions are conflict-sensitive. It will be crucial to develop a systematic approach to conflict-sensitivity in both the design and evaluation of interventions as CSAC programming develops. UN-supported pilot voluntary disarmament interventions in Jonglei State began as an urgent response to the unfolding crisis in Jonglei triggered by SPLA-led forced disarmament and were successful in preventing serious clashes between SPLA and communities, including OAG elements, in 2006. However, UN-support for these initiatives was not sustained because the institutional and programmatic base was not in place and in 2007, there were: serious violent incidents involving communities that had been voluntarily disarmed; renewed calls for forced disarmament by some elements in the government; accusations that some communities had been made vulnerable to attack by their neighbours; and reports that communities were re-arming from neighbouring countries.⁴⁷

This highlights the urgent need to develop a systematic approach to assessing the potential impact of disarmament interventions on local conflict dynamics, evaluating associating risks and for ensuring the sustainability of interventions. As of yet, there has been no evaluation of pilot CSAC interventions, and there is an urgent need both to evaluate past interventions so that lessons can be learnt for future programming and to develop systematic monitoring and evaluation.

There are also broader sets of actors involved in different aspects of peacebuilding in Sudan. However, it is not yet clear how CSAC would link strategically to other peacebuilding programmes and structures. These include: the Southern Sudan Peace Commission; efforts to establish councils of traditional leaders; peace committees; and church initiatives. A number of international NGOs are supporting peacebuilding activities at different levels, including through the churches and traditional authorities. These include: World Vision; Norwegian Church Aid; Christian Aid; and Danish Church Aid. Some of these organisations are developing specific small arms related activities.

The UNDP CSAC Programme sees the need to support community security planning through linking with local government structures, including through linking with local government planning processes supported through Local Government Recovery programming implemented by UNDP, PACT, and Catholic Relief Services.

⁴⁶ See SAS, The anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei, for an account of the disarmament in Akobo county.

⁴⁷ Interviews with NGO and UN officials, August 2007.

7.2 Arms Transfers and Cross-border Arms Flows

The ARC component of the IDDRP was designed to include measures to address cross-border arms flows as well as to link with regional small arms processes. Raising awareness of the regional small arms processes was an important component of capacity-building with the Small Arms Focal Points, who attended Nairobi Secretariat meetings and workshop on cross-border collaboration between Kenya, Uganda and Sudan. The implementation of the Nairobi Protocol commitments is reflected in the original programme document and also includes specific measures to develop border controls.

Similarly, the UNDP CSAC Programme document envisages some measures to address cross-border issues, including support for dialogue between Sudanese stakeholders and neighbouring countries on small arms issues. It also envisages that the programme will be coordinated with specific border strengthening measures and increased patrols and monitoring by UNMIS Military Observers.

The small arms issue extends beyond Sudan's borders and will require coordination with neighbouring countries and regional approaches. The movement of armed pastoralist communities across Southern Sudan's borders with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda and patterns of conflict and cattle raiding involving communities on both sides of the border highlight the cross-border dimensions of the problem. While a cross-border approach will be critical, it will also be extremely challenging given existing capacities for border control, law enforcement in Southern Sudan and equally persistent challenges in addressing small arms in neighbouring countries (e.g., Karamoja and the North Rift).

The conflict in Sudan has drawn in a large number of regional players over the years, with neighbouring countries providing support to insurgencies in Sudan. For example, Eritrea's support for rebels in the East, Ugandan support for the SPLA/M and Sudan supporting and hosting rebellions in neighbouring countries. With the CPA, the northern military establishment significantly cut off support to the LRA operating from bases in Southern Sudan, and negotiations between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, under GoSS mediation in Juba. The current ceasefire has brought tangible improvements to security in both Southern Sudan and northern Uganda. However, cross border arms transfers and proxy fighting continue to contribute to complexity of conflicts in other parts of the country, for instance between Chad and Sudan in Darfur.

The issue of arms transfers to the Sudanese government has also been contentious. In March 2005, the UN extended an earlier arms embargo that had been imposed on non-governmental forces in Darfur to the Sudanese government as part of a strategy to push the government to end attacks and their support for militia operating there. The arms embargo has been largely ineffective because it only restricts transfers of weapons to Sudan that are used in Darfur (something more difficult to prove) and because of the lack of real enforcement and monitoring. Strengthening the arms embargo is one measure that could increase external pressure on Khartoum to resolve the conflict in Darfur, and to implement the CPA.

8. Reinsertion, Transitional Assistance and Reintegration

The IDDRP envisioned Community Security Support as a significant component of its reintegration approach, based on the principle of ‘balancing support to individual combatants with support to communities’. While this looks good on paper, it is not yet clear how community support will be operationalised and the CSS component in general has faced challenges (see Sections 7 and 9). While plans have been developed for transitional assistance, there is little thinking about reintegration and very little consideration of how to link either with other related transition and recovery programming.

There are a number of distinctive features of DDR in Sudan that have an impact on the design of transitional assistance and reintegration support. Firstly, the decision was made not to ‘encamp’ combatants as part of the ceasefire arrangements or for the purposes of demobilisation, but rather to demobilise combatants in their communities. Secondly, the first phase of DDR focuses on ‘non-essentials’ personnel (i.e., disabled, children and women associated with armed groups) with decisions relating to the DDR of able combatants deferred until the withdrawal of forces is complete and other aspects of SSR are addressed. Thirdly, there is a blurring of civilian and military roles in Sudan, particularly in the South, where the SPLA was a largely payroll-less, volunteer army with many part-time fighters, and in general, due to the large number of militia with varying degrees of organised command.

Because of these factors, spontaneous demobilisation, or the continued blurring of military and civilian life, is common. Many SPLA have and will continue to opt to return home or make a new life for themselves unsupported or, depending on the opportunities available to them. There is also a risk of crime, abuses and tensions between soldiers and communities over resources such as land. There is also the potential for an increase in ‘warlordism’, as former rebels continue to use their power within communities to pursue economic agendas. Much of the ‘social’ reintegration will be carried out in the family and clan contexts, while the ‘economic’ reintegration will largely depend on what the ex-combatants and their families can pool and make use of together. There is a lot of concern over the effects of psychological trauma, the use of alcohol and abuses that could result from the process.

Planning for reinsertion and transitional assistance has begun and is being discussed by the UN and the DDR Commissions. This assistance will likely take the form of:

- (i) a one-off cash payment for transportation and resettlement immediately after demobilization;
- (ii) non-food items to support the resettlement;
- (iii) three-months of food rations distributed on a monthly basis; and
- (iv) reinsertion support, which is likely to be monetized.⁴⁸

The types of support currently being discussed are controversial. There is a risk that such payments will create tensions between those elements eligible for payments and

⁴⁸ Email correspondence with senior UN DDR official, September 2007.

those not, or between combatants and communities. Some will likely feel that this package is minimal in what it offers. While others, particularly those nearing or past retirement age, will see this as a reward or an incentive and an honourable way out of their service. The process of downsizing and the packages provided will be scrutinized by many, including through an ethnic lens, where people will look for any domination by any group and fear ethnic marginalization within the military and their army.

Furthermore, because the first phase of DDR in Southern Sudan targets ‘non-essentials’, individual transitional assistance and support for reinsertion provided through the DDR programme is unlikely to target those elements that are most likely to threaten peace and to undermine security at the community level. The GoSS budget shortfall and delays in progress with military restructuring have led to delays in paying soldiers, and protests by the SPLA in 2006 and 2007.⁴⁹ Delays in reorganising the SPLA and in paying salaries have lowered morale and contributed to problems of indiscipline, abuse and predatory behaviour. In general, transitional assistance to address these sorts of challenges, associated with SSR, has not been considered part of DDR programming.

There appears to have been very little thinking about how transitional support to ex-combatants could link with other transitional programming, such as programmes to support the return and reintegration of IDPs or to provide food aid and promote food security. Even within the UNMIS, there appears to have been little discussion or cooperation between the UN DDR Unit and the Recovery, Return and Reintegration Section. However, there have been examples of good cooperation, even if it has been disorganised and unplanned. For example, in March 2007, the SSDDRC and the World Food Programme organised an emergency distribution of food to nearly 5,000 SAF in Juba who did not want to move north, were ‘voluntarily’ discharged and were considered a serious risk to security.

Planning for reintegration is still at a very early stage. The development of a national reintegration strategy is being discussed within the UN DDR Unit and with the DDR Commissions. However, North and South will need to develop their own reintegration plans based upon the specific priorities and needs in each region. A system for mapping socio-economic opportunities for ex-combatants has been developed and pilot mappings have been conducted in Juba, Rumbek and Khartoum.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, current thinking about reintegration and exploration of linkages with related areas of programming is still embryonic.

The NDDRC and the SSDDRC currently do not have the capacity in-place to plan for reintegration and will require support, training, additional staff and technical advice. The UN DDR Unit also does not have the capacity to support and organise reintegration. This will need to be addressed urgently if serious attention is to be given to developing reintegration plans.

⁴⁹For instance, in May and June 2007, SPLA blocked the Juba-Bor road to protest not receiving their allowances. S/2007/500.

⁵⁰ Transition International has conducted a mapping of socio-economic reintegration opportunities in Juba, Rumbek, and Khartoum, and developed a methodology for opportunity mapping for UN DDR, April 2007

9. Emerging Issues and Priorities

9.1 Fragility of the CPA and Weakness as a Framework for DDR

In the absence of renewed engagement on CPA implementation and a holistic approach to Sudan's conflicts, there is a risk that both parties will continue to use the interim period before the referendum on Southern self-determination in 2011 to consolidate and strengthen their power and military positions, in anticipation of renewed hostilities. At best, DDR will serve as a holding mechanism and a deterrent to further conflict through the creation of more professional armed forces. While on the other hand, in the worst case, it will be used as a means for the parties to reorganise and strengthen their respective positions in preparation for a new conflict that could be wider in scope.

It is unclear whether the DDR of able combatants was ever a possibility in the context of a 'frozen conflict' and in terms of the desires of both parties to maintain power. Throughout negotiations, the SPLA sought to maintain a separate army and to keep its forces intact until the referendum on self-determination. The mandate for DDR as contained in the CPA reflects the desire to delay decisions on downsizing and suggests that the DDR may have been envisioned as a 'holding mechanism' during the interim period, designed to 'do nothing' so as to maintain the threat of force and negotiating power in case of breaches in CPA implementation.

Whatever the original intention, the dynamics that have unfolded as the CPA has been implemented have undermined prospects for meaningful SSR and DDR. In the North, the NCP continues to rely on military strategies to protect the regime's power and economic interests in the face of growing internal opposition and the ongoing rebellion in Darfur. There is little prospect for meaningful demilitarisation and reform of the security sector while the NCP is actively arming itself and its proxy militia, all the while conducting aerial bombardments in Darfur. In the South, there is hesitation to move towards DDR due to a growing distrust that the NCP will not hold to its side of the peace deal and respect the outcomes of the referendum on Southern self-determination, which for many is the ultimate goal.

This is reflected in the views of Northern and Southern military establishments who see DDR as a means to retire personnel that are no longer fit for military service. The current focus on disabled, women and children associated with armed groups can be seen as a product of the ongoing tensions and requirements of both sides to maintain and even enhance their positions, whilst being seen to be doing something constructive.

9.2 Reviving High-level International Political Engagement on the CPA and the Stability of the South

Two-and-a-half years after its signing, key aspects of the CPA have not been implemented and international engagement on this issue remains weak. The CPA was negotiated in the context of considerable external pressure on the NCP. However, international consensus has broken down since the CPA was signed, and the overwhelming focus of international attention has been on the military and humanitarian responses to the crisis in Darfur. The crisis in Darfur became the focus of much of the attention of UNMIS, distracting it from its core mandate to monitor

CPA implementation.⁵¹ This was compounded by the fact that UNMIS was without a chief for nearly a year, after Jan Pronk was expelled from Sudan in October 2006. The appointment of a new UNMIS chief, SRSG Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, and a series of high level visits to Sudan focusing on CPA implementation in September 2007 are a welcome step in the right direction.

There is an urgent need to revive high-level international political engagement on the CPA based on a more holistic approach to all of Sudan's conflicts and a common political strategy. Strong leadership is needed to re-build consensus among international actors, especially amongst the original supporters of the IGAD negotiations, on a political strategy and to engage with the growing number of actors with interests in Sudan.

9.3 Linking DDR to SSR and Establishing Institutional Coordination Across the Security Sector

The early design of DDR programming recognised that the disengagement of forces, military reform and downsizing, integration of OAGs, disarmament and arms control, and community security and rule of law development are all interdependent and would require a well-coordinated and sequenced approach. However, mechanisms for coordinating and ensuring linkages between these processes, both by the UN and international donors, partners and within the respective governments have not been established.

In Southern Sudan, DDR is not going to be effective unless it is linked with a framework for SSR. To-date, a lack of coordination between DDR, SPLA reform, OAG integration and withdrawal of forces has undermined DDR planning. The DDR institutions have been reactive and responded to crises that could have been anticipated if coordination and joint planning were undertaken. The SSDDRC and DDR programming is only one component of the security sector, and it has been unclear how the SSDDRC should link and coordinate with other GoSS institutions. The incorporation of SSR and CSAC mandates into the responsibilities of the SSDDRC is not sufficient to address these challenges – and has arguably contributed to confusion about the over-lapping mandates of different institutions.

Furthermore, the focus on structural symmetry between the DDR programming in the North and the South has not done justice to the particular needs and circumstances of the two regions. While the North has fervently blocked any attempts to engage on SSR, there is political space to engage on these issues in Southern Sudan and the SPLA requires much greater assistance. The challenges of coordinating SSR, DDR and CSAC will be very different in the South. So long as the North continues to obstruct SSR and resist other CPA reforms, it will be extremely challenging to link SSR and CSAC issues to DDR institutions and programming and so the South will continue to pursue sensitive issues outside of these structures.

Within Southern Sudan, there is a need for a GoSS-wide approach to the security sector that connects DDR, SSR, CSAC and longer-term development of the rule of law institutions. This will require the establishment of coordination mechanisms to provide strategic and policy direction, and to develop a well-sequenced and

⁵¹ See ICG (2007)

coordinated approach, to inter-related issues affecting the security sector as a whole. There has been some debate regarding establishing a coordination mechanism under the GoSS Security Committee to provide policy direction on matters of internal security and to oversee the four main pillars of: SPLA reform; DDR; CSAC; and police development. This has been discussed at the GoSS Council of Ministers, but no decision has been forthcoming.

9.4 Coordination of International Assistance to the Security Sector as a Whole

International assistance to the security and justice sector in Southern Sudan has also been fragmented, with little formal coordination between support to DDR, SSR, SALW control, and rule of law programming. This needs to be better coordinated, based upon a common strategy that mirrors a synchronized GoSS-wide approach. The creation of an SST Unit within the UN DDR Unit, as called for in the IDDRP, could help to enhance coordination between DDR and SSR planning as well as coordination between the UN DDR Unit and the UN Military. However, the UN lacks the mandate to address SSR issues and its ability to engage at the political level on sensitive security issues is also limited. Therefore, other mechanisms should be explored for coordinating international assistance. For example, through the leadership of bilateral donors already involved in different aspects of the security sector.

9.5 Failure of ‘Integrated’ UN Management and the Coordination of DDR

In practice, there have been numerous challenges associated with functioning of the integrated UN DDR Unit in Sudan. Despite the attempt to ‘integrate’, the UN DDR Unit has been fractured by internal divisions and competition between UN agencies, and between centres of power in Khartoum, Juba, Geneva and New York. This has undermined its performance and delayed programming in certain areas, such as CSAC. Unfortunately, greater ‘integration’ has not translated in more effective and efficient support for DDR and to the national DDR institutions.

A chief obstacle has been poor management of the Unit. The Unit has struggled with fighting between different UN agencies, with UNDP and DPKO, in particular, unable to resolve differences in approach to the content and management of programming. This internal competition between agencies, particularly at senior levels, undermined programme implementation, and has been exploited by the parties.

While many assumed that the major obstacles to integration would stem from high-level political issues, UN DDR Unit staff indicated that in fact the logistical and administrative challenges posed by integration of mission were far more problematic for the day-to-day running of the UN DDR Unit. Despite integration, UNDP and DPKO maintained separate systems for recruitment, procurement, etc. which hampered joint operations and contributed to lack of cohesiveness within the Unit.

While some progress has been made, there continue to be challenges associated with defining the institutional relationships and the division of responsibilities between agencies within the UN DDR Unit. Where cooperation has been effective, this appears to have been based upon the proactive and problem-solving approach of individuals and the quality of management rather than institutional arrangements.

9.6 Structural Problems with UNMIS and the Lack of Continuity with its Deployment

The political decision to centralise UNMIS and the UN DDR Unit in Khartoum led to insufficient UN decision-making capacity and technical support in the South, undermining confidence in the DDR process in Southern Sudan. Prior to the CPA, planning for DDR had been supported from both Nairobi and Khartoum. However, with the deployment of UNMIS, the UN DDR Unit centralised management and decision-making in Khartoum and located the majority of its technical and programme support staff there. At a political level, this seriously undermined confidence in the DDR process in the South and contributed to a breakdown in engagement with Southern actors on DDR. It also meant that the SSDDRC did not receive the level of technical and capacity-building support that it needed in the critical transition, despite its disproportionate capacity-building needs and the fact that the bulk of programming would take place in Southern Sudan. The decision was finally taken in July, 2006 to decentralise UNMIS and to increase staff and decision-making capacity in the UN DDR office in the South. A new Chief and Deputy Chief for the South were appointed in 2007 and a restructuring process is currently underway.

In addition, UNMIS is highly compartmentalised with little cooperation between different sections. It is important to remember that: DDR; Rule of Law; Protection; Triple 'R'; Military, and Civil and Political Affairs sections all have a potential role to play in DDR programming. Nonetheless, they operate in relative isolation with little encouragement for coordination. This has undermined the development of coordinated approaches across UNMIS itself, let alone between UNMIS and other UN agencies and implementing partners. Recent moves to establish a Conflict Working Group⁵² within UNMIS that would bring together the relevant units, including DDR, Rule of Law and Protection, with Civil and Political Affairs, is a welcome step towards a more coherent approach and should be supported.

Lack of continuity in the transition from the security and DDR planning that was supported through the IGAD supported peace process, to the deployment of UNMIS also appears to have undermined programming. Many technical advisors who supported the parties in planning for DDR during the negotiations were withdrawn when the CPA was signed. Although key elements were incorporated into the IDDRP document, there was a loss of continuity in the vision and the interpretation of concepts and in relationships with national stakeholders during the transition. This also coincided with a breakdown in coordination amongst international actors who had supported the IGAD negotiations. Many felt that the structures that existed before UNMIS was deployed were more integrated, flexible and better engaged with national stakeholders and communities.

9.7 De-linking CSAC from DDR Programming and Establishing a Mechanism to Coordinate CSAC

There has been considerable debate regarding whether CSAC programming should be separated from the DDR process, and spun off and linked with wider programmes for development, recovery and rule of law. This has stemmed from a number of factors, including:

⁵² Interviews with UN officials, August 2007. I need to check the name of this group.

- difficulties defining the scope of CSAC given the magnitude of the security challenges faced in the interim period and limited resources available for DDR;
- recognition of the need to coordinate and link ‘transitional’ support for community security (e.g., aimed at addressing immediate threats to stability) with longer-term programmes (e.g., to develop rule of law structures and with State and local government planning processes);
- recognition that effectively addressing community security and arms control issues will require coordination amongst many different government agencies and ministries (e.g., the SPLA, the law enforcement agencies, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Legal Affairs, etc); and
- reluctance within the South at a political level to address CSAC, which is viewed as a matter of internal security for the South, through ‘national’ DDR processes.

Added to this is the practical reality that the SSDDRC has not had the capacity or field presence to lead CSAC activities as originally envisaged to be one of the first major tasks of State DDR offices which are already overstretched with their responsibilities for a ‘formal’ DDR process that is perceived by some to be ‘failing’. It is also not politically or institutionally well placed to coordinate the different actors involved in CSAC.

The inclusion of CSAC in DDR programming has led to confusion over the overlapping mandates of different GoSS institutions. For example, some see CSAC as primarily a matter of internal security and therefore a responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Others believe that a separate Commission should be established to oversee and coordinate CSAC in Southern Sudan, or that it should be overseen by the GoSS Security Committee. Lack of clarity over who should lead this issue area has contributed to competition within GoSS, linked with perception that control of CSAC would bring with it financial resources.

This has been mirrored, and made worse, by a lack of consensus within the UN over how CSAC should be managed and the division of roles between UN agencies. Differences of opinion extend beyond different UN agencies, to tensions between Khartoum, Juba, Geneva and New York.

There is an urgent need for the GoSS to establish an inter-agency coordination mechanism to synchronize among different government actors on CSAC and to identify a lead agency to play a harmonizing role. In parallel to this, the UN needs to clarify and institutionalise the roles of different agencies in CSAC. However, progress on the issue of how to coordinate CSAC and situate it institutionally will be dependent upon, and should be considered in conjunction with, the broader issue of how to coordinate across the security sector as a whole - linking DDR, SSR, CSAC and the Rule of Law (see above).

9.8 Differing Concepts of ‘Community Security’

The concept of ‘community security’ is central to the IDDRP. However, there are widely differing interpretations of the concept and how it should be applied at a practical level. Some see ‘community security’ as the end goal of DDR, while others see it as a process whereby communities participate in identifying and prioritising

their security needs and developing appropriate responses. There are also very different views on how to operationalise the concept. The IDDRP presents ‘community security’ as means to support to community-based solutions in particular high-risk communities that are a strategic threat to stability. On the other hand, the UNDP CSAC Programme places stronger emphasis on linkages with longer-term national, state or county development and rule of law programming so as to have a greater impact on the security of communities. There is also a common popular conception that ‘community security’ refers to communities providing for their own safety and security, for instance, through local defence forces, or alternatively, an expectation that it could provide a mechanism to address all of their security needs.

The linking of arms control and ‘community security’ is rational because the two are interdependent, however, it has also contributed to a further blurring of the concepts. Some have come to see CSAC as synonymous with civilian disarmament, rather than encompassing complementary peacebuilding and rule of law interventions. There is also widespread misunderstanding of the differences between DDR and CSAC programming. The distinction that DDR deals with the disarmament of former-combatants, while CSAC is concerned with civilian disarmament, is not widely understood and is further complicated by the blurring of civilian and military roles on the ground. Therefore, it is not clear that this distinction is helpful.

9.9 Unrealistic Expectations and Weak Capacity to Deliver

The ‘failure’ of DDR in Sudan can be seen as symptomatic of unrealistic expectations of what DDR could realistically deliver. The framing of DDR as a programme that aims to enhance human security may in fact set an unrealistic goal for what is actually a much narrower programme that is capable of achieving limited objectives given both the political context and the capacities of local actors.

In Southern Sudan, the weak capacity of the GoSS and related institutions to deliver on DDR programming was probably under-estimated. The process of establishing the SSDDRC and State-level DDR Commissions has been slower than anticipated given the challenges of a: lack of infrastructure; low skill base and human resources; and weak governance and rule of law structures in the South. It is also questionable whether the focus of capacity-building has been in the right places, that is, developing infrastructure and staffing structures that lack focus, management skills, technical knowledge and strategic direction.

Unrealistic expectations of DDR have also derived from misunderstanding of the IDDRP and the actual commitments of the parties. For instance, many have expected that the parties would begin DDR of ex-combatants sooner and see DDR as having failed in the absence of this. The parties have in fact moved more quickly towards DDR than originally anticipated and DDRC’s are not yet prepared and equipped to manage the demands of the anticipated caseload.

The inclusion of CSAC in DDR mandates has also contributed to unrealistic expectations that a programme with limited resources could address a whole range of post-conflict security challenges and problems of insecurity and the community level. For instance, the SSDDRC has come under criticism from governments and communities alike for a lack of progress in addressing insecurity that it arguably has limited capacity and resources to do anything about.

9.10 Indicators of Success and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

There has been no systematic monitoring and evaluation of the IDDRP to-date. While external evaluations and reviews have been conducted, these have been confidential, and there is a need to develop a transparent M&E system with agreed outputs and indicators of success.⁵³ The UN DDR Unit is still developing a monitoring and evaluation system for the IDDRP. UN DDR reports that a results framework has been developed to capture the overall goals, impacts and outcomes of the IDDRP, and that based on this results framework, a set of indicators has been developed in consultation with Small Arms Survey (SAS) and the CSS staff of the UN DDR Unit. The collection of baseline data for M&E has not yet been systematised.

If the IDDRP and the DDR process are to achieve the stated overall goal of enhancing human security, then this will need to be reflected in the M&E system and the results and analysis ultimately linked to human security indicators. Current thinking on how existing assessment tools and data collection processes, such as the Community Security Threat Mapping and the SAS Human Security Baseline Assessments, will be used for M&E purposes is still embryonic. Vital to the process will be linking the data from the SAS Human Security Baseline Assessments and conflict mappings to the DDR and CSAC planning processes. This development would allow the evaluation to assess whether targets are met and link these indicators to broader sets of development goals. This is still incomplete.

There is a need to conduct an evaluation of the IDDRP and to make this evaluation publicly available, in order to enable lessons to be learnt and to introduce greater accountability. There is also a need to evaluate pilot community security activities, including the UN-supported disarmament in Jonglei State, as well as GoSS disarmament activities that were not internationally supported, in order to enable both positive and negative lessons from these initiatives to inform future programming.

⁵³ An evaluation was conducted by DFID in 2006, and a joint UNDP-DPKO evaluation took place in 2007. However, these remain confidential.