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Support for DDR and SSR after Conflicts in Africa: Lessons-Learnt and New Agendas in Africa

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Executive Summary

This paper describes and conceptualises the experience in Africa of three key processes that impact upon post-conflict reconstruction: DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), SALW (small arms and light weapons) and SSR (security sector reform) initiatives. It does this with the objective of distilling lessons-learned and good practice. It then uses this to put forward key recommendations and findings that may be of significance for the Finnish EU Presidency as well as providing information for those with an interest in SSR/SALW and DDR and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. Key recommendations and prioritisations put forward in the paper are:

Develop European cross-pillar approaches. Seek to put forward proposals to develop or take forward what the EU Small Arms Strategy identifies as currently lacking across the EC, a cross pillar approach to the proliferation of SALW and security sector issues.

Promoting longer-term perspectives. Consider how Commission policy and frameworks might support longer-term SALW/DDR interventions, as opposed to some short-term interventions currently in place. Prevention might also be accorded more prominence.

Introducing training/information on DDR and related processes to add to the effectiveness of EU and member state programming. Research and training on DDR, SSR, and SALW issues and coordination among policymakers and programme officers, in-country and regionally, would be beneficial.

Improving DDR through engagement in international mechanisms and fora. Member States and the Commission should seize the opportunity (if not already doing so) to further engage in current international work on improving DDR, such as the recent work done by the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR).

Pro-poor/human security perspectives. Drawing upon the recognition that armed violence has strong linkages with poverty/under-development, the Commission and Member States may consider engaging in ensuring that DDR/SALW/SSR programming and policy have a strong pro-poor and human security dimension.

Addressing root causes of SALW acquisition. DDR, SALW and SSR initiatives often neglect the motivations for possessing and acquiring weapons. SALW programming undertaken by the Commission and member states might, in particular, be more directly targeted at some of the 'root causes' and motivations of armed violence, such as exclusion, poverty and poor governance.

Strengthen customs and regional SALW non-dissemination. There is a clear need to assist in strengthening police and customs capabilities in ACP countries to prevent the further proliferation of SALW in areas of tension and vulnerability.

Support reformed national armies processes. There is a need to design transitions from DDR to SSR that are connected, seamless, and part of an overall strategy. Too often in Africa, SSR strategies take little account of DDR.

Community-oriented approaches. Community-based, or sensitive, programming is a key area of shortfall in programming, which the Commission and Member States might consider reviewing in terms of improving responses.

Gender orientation. Gender could be an area of focus, particularly in regard to the special difficulties women face in reintegrating into society following their involvement in armed violence as ex-combatants, and in re-establishing their social capital when returning to communities.

Supporting vulnerable groups. Initiatives need to take into account their impact upon the vulnerable, including children in Africa. It is noted that children are a priority group under the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention.

Linking conflict/security and mainstream development programming. Consider, where appropriate, integrating or linking DDR/SSR into some aspects of mainstream development. Promote a greater dialogue between those with a 'traditional' development perspective and those working on conflict and security.

Controlling SALW exports to conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa. If the harmful impacts of SALW on post-conflict reconstruction and development are to be mitigated, EU co-ordinated action might also be further taken forward in terms of brokering, the marking and tracing of SALW, and in transparency in terms of reporting.

Identifying areas of expertise and knowledge pooling. Consider identifying thematic and country-specific areas of intervention in DDR and related processes where Member States can make a difference in Africa, such as in West Africa and the Great Lakes. This could draw, for example, upon the experiences of France, the UK, The Netherlands, and Germany, particularly in DDR and SSR.

Developing linkages across DDR, SSR and SALW initiatives. There are opportunities to take the lead in promoting strategies and approaches that link DDR, SSR and SALW programming more effectively. There is a particular need to create linkages between SSR reform of the police and SALW weapons collection both at the community level and regionally.

Linking DDR/SALW and SSR with SSAJ, peace-building and peace operations. Commission/Member State policy and programming needs to be cognisant of the linkages between these modes of programming. Without access to justice, for example, ex-combatants and civilians are likely to seek to re-engage in grievance-based armed violence. This implies that Commission policy and programmes should seek to link with or include SSAJ and related processes in DDR and SSR.

1. Introduction

DDR and related processes such as SSR and SALW initiatives present a particular challenge in Africa. Over the past few decades Africa has been the most conflict prone continent in the world. It is also the only continent in the world that has grown poorer in the last 25 years.¹ It has proved particularly difficult to collect arms, remove former combatants from armed violence, and to bring about a responsible and accountable security sector in this highly insecure environment. By triggering and spreading conflict, SALW are said to have cost the lives of almost 4 million people since 1990 and forced over 18 million people to leave their homes or countries. SALW are thought to be responsible for almost 500,000 deaths a year of which 300,000 occur in armed conflicts.² Many of these have been in Africa.

Since the ending of the Cold War, the UN and other actors working with African countries have managed to halt a number of civil conflicts in Africa. In Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Eritrea/Ethiopia peace processes have been set in motion and some of these countries have experienced periods of relative stability. However, elsewhere conflicts continue, such as in the DRC, Sudan, and Uganda. A prime component of many African peace processes has been DDR, SSR and SALW initiatives. These have sought to remove SALW from conflicts, return combatants to civil life (or a reformed military), and to turn the security sector into a responsible and accountable sector that contributes to post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and development, as well as maintaining security. However, the record of achievement in Africa in these areas has been mixed and sometimes extremely poor. The failed UN and USA DDR and security operations in Somalia in the early-mid 1990s, the protracted Angolan DDR initiatives, and current SALW collection setbacks in the East of the DRC, are indicative of the difficulties involved.

These difficulties across DDR and related initiatives can be attributed to both poor implementation by the international community and local actors, but also to the huge challenge of moving from conflict to peace, and the continuing endemic problems of poverty and poor governance in Africa. In this milieu, armed violence is frequently regarded as having utility in terms of addressing disputes, securing livelihoods, or having a stake in war economies and peace transitions. In particular, DDR and related initiatives have to confront:

- The continuing proliferation of SALW across much of Africa, with boundaries providing little barrier to movements and with countries outside Africa maintaining supplies. Many of these arms are used for armed robbery or the re-ignition of armed conflict.
- Large-scale unemployment and poverty for many ex-combatants contributing to armed violence.
- Continuing inter-group, identity, and resource disputes.

¹ Despite the wealth of natural resources in many African countries, the continent's share of world trade fell from 6% in 1980 to less than 2% in 2002.

² See Council of the EU (13 January 2006), 'EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of SALW and their Ammunition', 5319/06, Brussels, pp. 2-3.

- The large numbers of discontented youths in Africa that can be readily recruited for violent ends.
- The lack of effective regional organisations to underpin security, weapons collection, peace processes, and recovery.
- Continued high levels of external interventions in the region, some of which can be regarded as harmful to African recovery.
- Uncoordinated or poorly co-ordinated DDR, SSR and SALW responses.
- Repressive security sectors and armed groups.

However, notwithstanding this, DDR, SALW and SSR interventions have in a number of instances (as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Mozambique) been decisive in preventing warring parties returning to conflict and in putting these countries on a path of relative stability during which national recovery and development may take place. There are opportunities for the EC and member states to build upon these positive aspects.

This paper proceeds by first setting out the conceptual and operational basis of DDR, SSR and SALW processes. It then examines positive and negative experiences in terms of implementation and looks at opportunities to create linkages between these components of programming, drawing upon lessons-learnt and good practice. Finally, it analyses key opportunities relevant to the Finnish EU Presidency.

2. Conceptualising DDR/SALW and DDR Processes

2.1 DDR and SALW

DDR has typically taken place during peacekeeping or peace operations with the purpose of removing arms and combatants from conflict and preparing the ground for peace-building. DDR, as the acronym suggests, consists of three sequential phases – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – although, in practice, phasing has not necessarily followed this order.

Disarmament, according to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), involves the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants.³ This has been typically undertaken by observers or peacekeepers as part of peace-building interventions. It has involved:

- Weapons disclosures by the parties to the conflict, or less often, weapons surveys;
- Weapons collection;
- Weapons destruction;
- Weapons redistribution to national armies and other security forces.

³ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2000), 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines', New York, p. 15. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/DD&R.pdf>

Demobilisation has been described as the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Demobilisation involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who usually receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life.⁴

Reintegration is defined as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe. Reintegration includes cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well as vocational training and income-generating activities.⁵

SALW programmes have tended to take place separately to DDR processes. They have addressed gaps in DDR and have tended to be sequenced towards the end or after DDR. Weapons for development programmes (WfD), for example, have sought to persuade arms holders – often civilians or armed groups who were outside the formal DDR process – to give up weapons for specific incentives such as integration into community work schemes. This programming has often tended to be more driven by developmental, community peace-building objectives and individual incentives than DDR which, at least in its initial phases, has been predominantly a military function.

SALW programmes cover a wide range of activities. These have included:

- Voluntary weapons collection programmes from civilians;
- Weapons collection for small-scale development;
- Weapons amnesties;
- Public arms destruction events;
- Public awareness campaigns to reverse gun cultures through public education;
- The development and implementation of regulations to control SALW possession, trade and use;
- Measures to prevent, combat and reduce illicit trafficking of SALW;
- Sub-regional co-operation – for example, border controls;
- Efforts to improve the management and security of authorised SALW holdings by the police, army and civilians;
- Discouraging crime and promoting arms legislation through public sensitisation;
- National actions plans for arms management and disarmament including permanent national frameworks and arms reduction/management and legislation strategies;
- Weapons collection in exchange for tools and implements (for example for agricultural purposes).

2.2 SSR

SSR involves the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. This can

⁴ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2000), p. 15.

⁵ Gleichmann, Colin et al (2004) 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide'. GTZ/NODEFIC/PPC/SNDC, Germany, p. 15.

include, for example, down-sizing of the army (to release funds for non-military activities in post-conflict states), professionalisation, and oversight by civilian authorities. The objective is to prevent the security sector being a threat to its citizens as well as giving it the capacity to protect them. The security sector is defined as including all organisations which have the authority to use, or order the use of, force (or the threat of force) to protect the state and its citizens. This embraces: the military, police and other security actors; civilian/security oversight bodies; justice/law enforcement organisations; and informal/non-statutory security actors, such as guerrillas, liberation armies/movements, body guards, private security companies, and militias. In the context of this paper, SSR can be said to have special significance in that following DDR processes a number of ex-combatants are normally integrated into new national reformed armies.

3. Constraints and Opportunities

3.1 DDR and SALW Programming

Since the first operation in Namibia in 1989, DDR has been beset by problems. These have ranged from insecurity and the incomplete collection of weapons, to the resumption of fighting in DDR processes in places such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola. There have been further poor outcomes in many reintegration and reconciliation initiatives. Many parties to conflicts in Africa, such as guerrilla and government forces, have feared the consequences of giving up arms in DDR processes – will they, for example, be wiped out if their opponents fail to reciprocate? They also face the prospect of losing political, military and economic power once they give up arms and are demobilised, hence the often protracted nature of DDR. In particular, reintegrating ex-combatants into society in a comprehensive way has proved to be beyond the capacity of almost all DDR programmes that have been implemented in Africa. At the same time, more positively, DDR processes have helped consolidate peace processes, taken relatively large numbers of SALW out of circulation, and fulfilled a confidence-building measure in terms of signalling the cessation of conflict and the return to some form of normalcy. Countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Sierra Leone that have been through DDR processes do not seem likely to revert to civil conflict at present. This section reviews the key problem areas that seem to run generically through DDR programmes with the objective of using this to make suggestions for good practice and future possible programme interventions for the EU and member states.

Disarmament and arms collection programmes, although sometimes successful in collecting significant number of weapons, have frequently failed to amass all the weapons specifically scheduled for collection under DDR agreements. Some weapons have remained hidden in arms caches as insurance against failed DDR programmes or for use in criminal activities. DDR initiatives have sometimes turned a blind eye to the problem of caches, instead prioritising the maintenance of a ceasefire over comprehensive disarmament. Another problem has been the drift of individual ex-combatants back to communities, still retaining weaponry.

In Sierra Leone – viewed as a successful programme – the collection of weapons was spasmodic in many phases. Phase I lasted between September and December 1998. It targeted about 75,000 combatants and the programme was further reviewed in July 1998, and targeted a considerably smaller number of ex-combatants – about 45,000. However, only about 3,200 combatants were disarmed. Similarly, DDR Phase II which was part of the Lomé Peace agreement, signed on 7 July 1999, was incomplete. A total of 18,898 persons were disarmed, but once again DDR was interrupted by the resumption of fighting in May 2000 and the re-arming of many ex-combatants.

One way of taking weapons out of commission in Africa has been to offer incentives. Schemes to collect illicit weapons from ex-combatants by offering cash incentives have sometimes run into difficulties as they have inflated prices and created parallel markets where weapons have proliferated rather than been reduced. They have also created resentment among civilians who have interpreted cash incentives as rewarding combatants who they often regard as responsible for the conflict.

Critically, many DDR programmes in Africa have failed to address armed groups which have been a significant factor in the perpetuation of conflict. This was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and currently in the DRC, where armed groups have proved to be virtually impossible to disarm comprehensively in the East. A parallel problem has been that armed groups have often fallen outside disarmament mandates as they have not tended to be a party to the peace agreements that have articulated DDR initiatives. Further, armed groups have posed considerable problems in post-conflict phases, particularly in terms of banditry and violent criminality. DDR programmes are seldom backed up by interventions to collect and control armed groups and civilian weapons, which have tended to be hidden in homes and communities rather than handed over, although WfD programmes have made a contribution in this area.

In fact, the disarmament of armed groups, including militias and paramilitaries, has tended to be poorly conceived and unsystematic. Sometimes it has been conceived as an *ad hoc* law and order issue – individuals caught using guns in criminal activities have been arrested and their guns seized – or organisations such as the UN have used voluntary weapons collection programmes, as with Hutu and other elements in the east of the DRC. Alternatively, coercive disarmament along with war-fighting tactics have been used against armed groups following attacks on international personnel, in part to deter further attacks and possibly for retributive purposes, as in multinational operations in Somalia between 1992-1995. However, DDR programmes have not historically tended to use properly conceived and designed methods specifically targeted at militias and paramilitaries to collect arms. In Northern Uganda, if peace breaks out, there are likely to be huge problems with the disarmament and disbandment of militias/civil defence forces which have acquired considerable autonomy and power and are not fully under the control of the Ugandan army, which is itself accused of human rights abuse in the north. Although there is on-going work on how to better factor in armed groups into DDR there is scope for further refinement of approaches and thinking in this area.

The experience of voluntary weapons collection seems to be more successful than that of coercive disarmament. While the former has sometimes failed or disarmament has only been partially accomplished, DDR operations in places such as Mozambique, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Namibia, have at least collected substantial numbers of weapons. There is very little evidence that coercive disarmament other than at a local level has achieved its objectives, and even at this level it has frequently failed. Nationwide coercive disarmament has not been imposed upon a country during peace operations in the post-1945 period and rarely at all in historical terms.

Box 3.1 The Challenge of Rebel Armed Groups and Appropriate Programming Responses

Armed rebel groups are a source of major concern in post-conflict transitions, particularly when they fall outside of DDR agreements or SALW initiatives. This may happen because they are not part of peace agreements that usually determine DDR arrangements, or because they have been able to resist disarmament, or they do not register as significant. Little policy/programming work has been articulated to grapple with these issues. However, there may be opportunities for Member States and the Commission to move the agenda forward in terms of:

- *Clarifying coercive disarmament responses.* DDR/SALW initiatives do not have a good record of using force to disarm armed groups. Some disarmament has taken place in the East of the DRC, for example, which has involved the use of force, but this has not strictly been a formal DDR disarmament requirement. Clarity is needed regarding appropriate responses.
- *Creating incentives.* Incentives to rebel armed groups, such as offers of employment/training, engagement in reintegration programmes, joint work programmes with the communities they come from, are worth examining, particularly given the poverty of many within rebel armed groups.
- *Include armed groups in DDR mandates* or follow-up SALW programming.
- *Integration opportunities.* Introduce policies/programming that enables armed groups to be easily assimilated into reconstituted national armies and SSR.

Significant numbers of ex-combatants have failed to register in African DDR initiatives. These unregistered ex-combatants pose significant risks for post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) as they are likely to feel resentful and may engage in violence or become socially disruptive. DDR programming has often been powerless to provide adequate incentives to engage them in meaningful disarmament. At the same time, there has been the problem of non-entitled combatants and civilians trying to infiltrate DDR initiatives to claim benefits. Women and child soldiers, particularly in the early days, were inadequately integrated into reintegration initiatives, or as is still sometimes the case, their special needs have been inadequately catered for. Whether combatants' dependents should receive reintegration support is a continuing unresolved problem in DDR initiatives.

When SALW have been collected during DDR programmes they frequently have not been stored in secure and safe facilities. As a result, collected arms have often been reclaimed, stolen or recycled into criminal networks, militias, and the security sector. Moreover DDR programmes have failed to institutionalise comprehensive measures, such as substantive border checks and customs, to prevent

re-arming through regional arms flows. Nor have they tended to be linked into regional arms control measures and agreements.

Reintegration programmes have often failed to meet the needs of ex-combatants with poor targeting in terms of livelihoods training. Further to this, many ex-combatants have had unrealistic assumptions regarding their future employment prospects and they have been reluctant to consider training that might provide them with a sustainable living. A tendency not to fully engage communities in the reintegration process has also been apparent in some DDR initiatives. However, more recent DDR operations, as in Sudan, have sought to identify strategies and mechanisms to ensure the representation and inclusion of communities, including youths, women, elders and combatants, in DDR implementation and design.

There have been considerable problems in planning and implementing national army reform following DDR processes. In the post-conflict period, re-constituted national armies have usually only absorbed small numbers of ex-combatants while large numbers have been released into society with few prospects of employment. In a few cases in Africa, such as in Zimbabwe, large numbers were given government jobs, but this has not proved economically sustainable. In the DRC, attempts to integrate ex-combatants, including some from armed groups, has not proved successful, with some elements not fully subscribing to the notion of an integrated national army and indeed elements have clashed with other national army units. However, there have been transitions from DDR to integrated national armies. Countries such as Mozambique, Uganda, and Namibia which have been through demobilisation processes can be said, to varying degrees and despite problems, to have re-constituted national armies. However, forming a national army that is regarded as legitimate in civil society, sensitive to human rights and accountable, and that is also inclusive of minorities, remains a challenge that few African militaries have managed to meet. A key lesson in this respect is to plan early and incorporate these factors and sensitivities into SSR, and link DDR and SSR processes.

A further facet of DDR initiatives has been that they have not necessarily enhanced peace-building. In countries such as Angola or Congo-Brazzaville, where disarmament was pursued with a lack of rigor at certain stages, the parties returned to armed conflict. Further, many parties in disarmament initiatives have included 'spoilers' with little or no commitment to giving up arms. And the developmental component of DDR (reintegration) has tended to be relatively short-term and under-resourced in Africa. There tends to be a disjunction between the 'security' phase of DDR (disarmament/demobilisation) implemented primarily by the military and well-funded, and the reintegration phase funded from voluntary contributions and implemented by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and development agencies with considerably less resources. Economic reintegration efforts have often yielded inconclusive outcomes. In Sierra Leone, for example, most ex-combatants remain unemployed since the conflict was formally declared ended in January 2002.

DDR programmes have frequently failed to connect sufficiently with the police and the justice sector to mitigate the problems of increasing crime levels that often follow the demobilisation of ex-combatants. There have also been problems in terms of absorbing ex-combatants into the police as ex-combatants do not necessarily make suitable police officers. Further, the availability of SALW if DDR is incomplete facilitates armed crime, which places a high burden on policing.

The needs of vulnerable ex-combatant groups, such as disabled veterans, and child and women soldiers, have frequently been insufficiently addressed in DDR programmes. As a consequence, in the PCR phase their specific needs and concerns have gone unfulfilled. DDR programmes have also tended to achieve only partial success in assisting in reconciling ex-combatants with communities to which they are returning. Reconciliation remains inherently problematic when ex-combatants have committed atrocities in their own communities and are seen as 'part of the problem' by many civilians. 'Segregated settlement' of ex-combatants in communities has sometimes hampered reconciliation. However, reconciliation has not necessarily been seen as a DDR programme priority in Africa. In many African countries indigenous traditional community reconciliation approaches offer opportunities for reconciliation, but these have not often been connected with DDR programmes.

As noted above, DDR programmes have been problematic in certain areas. SALW programmes, prior to, during, or following DDR, have made a particular contribution to addressing shortfalls and a lack of coverage in DDR programming in Africa. SALW programmes have sometimes been phased to cover arms collection shortfalls during and after DDR initiatives. In particular, they have been useful in targeting armed groups and individuals that tend to fall outside the DDR process. They have also engaged with ex-combatants who have failed to register in formal DDR processes. In this sense, SALW programmes usefully complement, as well as offer follow up, to DDR.

Weapons for development programmes have tended to prove more successful than DDR in kick-starting development. They have, for example, offered community-based development or community-building programmes (such as building of water wells, schools, health centres or community centres) following the voluntary hand-in of weapons by civilians. Weapons-for-livelihoods programmes have provided further useful entry points in demilitarising communities and creating livelihoods for groups in Africa who have legitimate reasons for weapons possession but have fallen outside DDR. For example, hunters have used their weapons in conflict as well as for livelihood purposes. Following conflict, they may still require their weapons for livelihood purposes but their continued possession of weapons poses a potential threat to communities. Retraining in, for example, fishing skills and the provision of nets and equipment in exchange for their weapons can provide an incentive for the handing in of weapons. In the immediate post-conflict environment, DDR has not tended to prioritise these activities.

SALW programmes have the capacity to address the insecurity that has often followed incomplete DDR in Africa. SALW programmes have built confidence by creating weapons-free zones in

communities and issuing certificates to confirm this. Even if some weapons are secretly retained, they tend to be hidden and become less available. This has created local confidence in a number of post-conflict situations in Africa. The difficult issue of civilian disarmament has also been undertaken in SALW programmes, typically involving the police. This has happened in a number of communities such as in Sierra Leone over the past few years.

SALW programming has addressed regional arms flows that have undermined many DDR initiatives in Africa. This has been achieved, for example, through training and strengthening customs, border police, and cross border commissions. However, regional arms flows remain a massive problem in parts of Africa, particularly West Africa and the Great Lakes region, despite DDR and SALW initiatives. SALW programming has also added to the effectiveness of DDR by addressing attitudes to SALW possession. DDR programmes have tended to target immediate weapons collection priorities rather than attitudes. SALW programmes have undertaken sensitisation and social mobilisation against SALW possession through, for example, educational programmes, the use of theatre, dance, the media, and other mediums. Establishing local dispute mechanisms is a SALW programme technique that has facilitated weapons handovers in areas where arms are for some a means of protecting livelihoods, as in Northern Kenya. In Kenya, peace and development committees have had a role to play in persuading weapons to be handed over.

In Sierra Leone, as in other African countries, vulnerable groups have been victims of armed violence. However, they have not been adequately catered for in DDR programming and many, such as combatants' dependents, have fallen into poverty. SALW programmes have had an important role in protecting vulnerable groups who have often been given inadequate support during DDR.

3.2 SSR Programming

Reconstituting national armies has a number of potential benefits. It removes soldiers from the temptation of banditry, avoids them going, at least in the short-term, through the potentially problematic process of retraining and finding new employment, and it may also form a bond between combatants that have been formerly fighting and lead to mutual acceptance or reconciliation. However, in Africa this component of SSR has been problematic. Although in a few instances the formation of a new national army has proved relatively uncontroversial, it has also in many instances proved divisive. In the DRC, for example, recent attempts to form an integrated national army, including armed groups, has made little headway with many groups remaining as independent units and continuing to fight and pillage in the East. In Zimbabwe in the 1980s there was a mutiny shortly before elections in part due to divisions within the Patriotic Front (PF), which had united to fight the Rhodesian government.⁶ There were complaints in South Africa over the inequitable division of army posts – for example white officers were seen as favoured within the reconstituted South African National Defence Force (SANDF) – and tensions between the favourable settlements given to

⁶ See Jeremy Ginifer (1995), 'Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe', UNIDIR/95/41, Geneva.

demobilising soldiers and the terms offered to non-demobilising soldiers. In the Angolan peace process, only 17.7% of the projected total of 50,000 troops had been integrated into a national army as elections approached in September 1992. After the elections, UNITA withdrew from the peace process and full-scale conflict broke out. In other countries, the take-up on integration has been poor and it has not proved possible to persuade combatants to join and make up projected totals for national armies.

However, SSR is a broader process than absorbing demobilising soldiers into national armies. It is also concerned with police, army reform and civilian oversight. These elements, once retrained, have the capacity to engage with DDR and SALW processes. Appropriately retrained police, for example, have the capacity to collect civilian and left over SALW from DDR. The army and police can also take part in customs and patrolling duties to intercept arms from neighbouring countries. However, SSR is a complex and difficult process because it:

- Requires taking power from those who have been powerful.
- Needs rapid change in the security sector that is usually conservative and resistant to change.
- Sometimes causes resentment among civilians – why should, for example, the army get resources when it has often failed to protect civilians?
- Is vulnerable to reversal: are re-trained highly professional militaries a threat to civil society/the government?
- It is difficult to provide effective and legitimate oversight in countries that lack a tradition of civilian oversight.
- Involves re-orientation: the prime role of many developing countries' armed forces has been to preserve the government and ensure the security and continuation of ruling elites.

Box 3.2: Challenges of Small Arms Flows and Landmines

In countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, and the DRC, DDR and related processes have not stemmed cross-border arms flows. This has been due to the lack of effective border policing capacities and internal demand that has drawn in SALW for crime, livelihood and armed violence rationales. SALW possession in Africa has become a livelihood earner through rental to combatants/criminals or rebel activities. In regions such as West Africa, SALW have moved freely across countries according to supply and demand. Regional SALW regimes/agreements, such as the ECOWAS Moratorium, the Nairobi Convention and the SADC Protocol, and controls in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, have not proved sufficient to halt weapons flows, despite some incremental progress. Fully effective arms transfer controls, including brokering, to curb new supplies moving into the region are not in force internationally.

At the same time, land mines continue to present a considerable challenge in Africa. Despite the Mine Ban Treaty entering into force in 1999, prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of landmines, each year globally up to 20,000 civilians are killed or injured by landmines. About a third of these are children. There are an estimated 70 million mines left in the ground in 90 countries. The numbers left in Africa are uncertain, but are thought to be considerable. Landmines are a developmental, as well as a security issue, which are, among other things, hampering the achievement of the MDGs. Individuals injured or killed by landmines represent a

human cost, but their impacts are wider. These include: making agricultural land unusable; creating food shortages and nutritional deficits; restricting access to water; hindering the construction and maintenance of infrastructure and access to social services; and creating insecurity that impacts upon social relations and networks.

4. Good Practice Guidelines and Lessons-Learnt

This section analyses the types of lessons that have emerged from DDR and related processes in Africa and what this suggests in terms of good practice.

4.1 DDR/SALW Programming

DDR shortcomings in Africa suggest the following good practice should be taken account of in terms of ongoing and future programming:

- Provide comprehensive security for the handling/storage/destruction of weapons. Half-hearted or poorly funded disarmament programmes are likely to contribute to the break down of DDR processes, particularly given the security dilemmas that confront many parties. Confidence building is critical.
- DDR operations need to have clear timelines and mandates that are achievable.
- Mandates need to be framed to collect weapons from not just combatants but all sectors of society.
- DDR needs to be linked to long-term SALW strategies.
- DDR initiatives should include elements designed to change attitudes to weapons, not just facilitate their collection.
- More emphasis on the reintegration/developmental end of DDR may improve the long-term chances of avoiding returns of conflict or disorder emanating from disgruntled ex-combatants and other elements within war-torn societies.
- DDR might benefit from linkages with more community orientated approaches (such as weapons for development programmes).
- Regional SALW co-operation is vital to avoid neighboring countries refueling conflict. This should be factored into DDR at an early stage.
- Assistance packages given to ex-combatants need to be carefully balanced against the needs/perceptions of communities they are returning to. Community consultation and engagement, in fact, is critical to successful DDR.
- DDR needs to be linked to SSR (e.g. attitudes within the security forces needs to change) if the state and society is to be fully demilitarised.
- Vulnerable groups need to be prioritized more in African DDR operations (particularly women and children).
- African DDR operations need to focus more on creating weapons-free communities where civilian, as well as combatant, weapons are collected.
- The police have been insufficiently integrated into African DDR and SALW initiatives.
- DDR needs to utilise local conflict prevention/dispute mechanisms to facilitate weapons reduction and reintegration/reconciliation.

The key lessons that emerge from SALW programmes in Africa in terms of good practice particularly relate to the advantages they have in terms of engaging with communities and with filling gaps in other forms of programming. Lessons-learnt include:

- Start sensitisation programmes in communities early, preferably linked to DDR programmes to help prepare and facilitate the effective reintegration of returning ex-combatants from DDR programmes.
- Community arms collection programmes should be specifically designed into DDR programmes or designed to cover shortfalls, such as civilian weapons, that fall outside DDR.
- Use the police more effectively in community arms collection. While the police have been co-opted into or have supported SALW arms collection in some African countries, there is room for further engagement. Better training of the police is also required in this area.
- Weapons for development programmes have had an impact in mitigating the impact of SALW in communities but they remain vulnerable to corruption in the police who have been known to receive incentives not to collect weapons. Hierarchies in communities have also used development funds for their own interests and personal benefits. Oversight is required and active efforts to ensure that development benefits go to the community as a whole.

4.2 SSR Programming

The following lessons and good practices emerge from an analysis of African experiences of reconstituting national armies and security sector engagement in arms collection and related activities:

- *Promote integration.* Joining a new national army has to be made an attractive proposition for ex-combatants if suitable candidates and numbers are to be enticed in.
- *Equitable distribution of posts.* The distribution of posts, particularly at the higher levels of the army, has to be seen as non-discriminatory and fair. Posts may have to be given on a proportional basis to groups that have been fighting to foster reconciliation and unity.
- *Disorder and breakdowns.* Outbreaks of fighting, desertion and mutinies cannot be ruled out during and following the formation of a national army. This needs to be taken account of in planning reconstituted national armies.
- *Reform of national armies.* The size of a new national army should be fixed at a level that is not economically damaging and which avoids the continuing militarisation of a country following conflict.
- *The police and community security.* Use the police, in particular, to address issues of community and civilian arms collection and to enhance local security.
- *PCR and recovery roles for the military.* Involve national armies to a greater extent in post-conflict reconstruction and development, to prevent the potential outbreak of conflict through engaging civilians and formerly armed groups who might resort to future armed violence.

Box 4.1: Difficulties in 'Hunting' Weapons Collection

Hunting weapons collection is a contentious issue in much of Africa. Many hunters are dependent on shotguns for their livelihood through selling 'bush' meat and farmers use them for life stock or crop protection. However, hunting weapons have often been used in conflicts or for purposes of criminality. Their continued possession in communities where tensions remain is potentially damaging to post-conflict reconstruction and development. One approach is to allow retention and make distinctions between military weaponry and civil weapons on livelihood grounds. In some contexts this may be sustainable. However, in insecure conditions it may not be.

In Sierra Leone, as part of an Arms for Development (AfD) programme, hunters/farmers were given incentives to hand in hunting weapons. Wires for traps and fishing nets were offered in exchange for these weapons. However, some of these did not materialise as promised and many hunters have become disillusioned with these schemes. This was part of a broader approach that offered around US\$20,000 to chiefdoms once they were weapons-free to spend on development projects.⁷ These types of approaches engage in people-centred, locally-owned approaches, seeking to provide freedom from fear, as suggested by OECD DAC's policy guidelines.⁸

5. Designing Effective Linkages Between DDR/SALW and SSR Programmes

A major problem in Africa, and elsewhere, is a lack of integration between DDR and related programmes. While the above lessons-learnt and good practice suggests ways that DDR, SSR, and SALW programming can be individually improved, combining approaches can have significant pay-offs in terms of conflict prevention, management and reduction. Ways in which effective linkages can be built are elaborated below.

DDR and SALW programmes have tended to be phased separately. DDR programmes have usually been set up as part of ceasefire arrangements involving the parties to the conflict and are implemented by external bodies, such as the UN, during PCR processes. SALW programmes have tended to be follow-up initiatives that often address areas which DDR has failed to take on or have not fully followed through. Recently, there has been a greater awareness of the need to coordinate and link SALW and DDR. However, the opportunities have still not been fully realised. This might be achieved through:

- Joint planning and coordination mechanisms between SALW and DDR programming.
- The early integration of SALW programming into DDR initiatives. For example, civilian arms collection programmes could be written into DDR mandates.
- Training for those working on SALW and DDR to improve their understandings of the two types of programming.
- More research into the connections between DDR and SALW and how they can be integrated.
- Factoring SALW/DDR issues into conflict assessments prior to the initiation of programming.

⁷ See Alison Lochhead and Owen Greene (April 2004), 'Assessing and Reviewing the Impact of SALW Projects on Small Arms Availability and Poverty: A Case Study of Sierra Leone UNDP Arms for Development Project', CICS Report, Bradford.

⁸ See OECD DAC (2005), 'Security Sector Reform and Governance', DAC Guidelines and Reference Series.

- Engaging a wider audience of donors, INGOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and national governments in SALW and DDR issues.
- Co-ordinating DDR and SALW with other components of PCR, and longer-term peace-building and development efforts.

DDR and SSR programmes are to an extent linked, but these links need to be strengthened particularly in the area of reconstituting national armies. There needs to be close co-ordination between DDR and SSR authorities in terms of determining numbers of demobilising combatants and what the security sector can absorb. Further, elements of the security sector can make contributions to DDR through community arms collection and SALW stockpile management or destruction.

In terms of SALW and SSR linkages, the lack of cohesive mechanisms and approaches to link SALW programmes and SSR has been a feature of post-conflict reconstruction in many African countries. Opportunities to better connect SALW and SSR initiatives exist in the following areas:

- *Civilian arms.* The security sector, such as the police, can usefully engage in SALW programmatic areas such as: control over domestic arms markets; civilian arms registration and licensing; Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes (VWCPs); and gun amnesties. Conducted with communities, these can assist in reducing arms availability as well as raising community awareness, which can contribute to conflict management and reduction.
- *Customs and border controls.* Retrained customs and justice officials under SSR can usefully link with SALW programmes in combating arms trafficking through, among other things, customs and border guards.
- *Stockpile management and security.* Within SSR, the management and security of arms and ammunition stockpiles is often seen as a technical issue or conducted later in SSR programmes, sometimes when the problem is well developed. The leakage of arms and ammunition from state arsenals is often a major source of arms in illicit circulation. Linkages with SALW programmes that specifically target weapons storage and management can be beneficial to SSR.

There are also opportunities to be gained in linking SSR/DDR with SSAJ, good governance, peace-building and peace operations. To avoid unstable post-conflict transitions SSR and DDR programming needs to be further connected to Safety, Security and Access to Justice (SSAJ), good governance, peace operations and related activities following conflict cessations.

SSAJ programming is directed at bringing about an effective and independent penal and judicial system, effective and accountable policing, and an internal security system that respects human rights and the legal system. In the absence of effective DDR (and SALW programming), SSAJ programming is likely to be at risk. Shortfalls in DDR, for example, can lead to outbreaks of armed violence and the undermining or destruction of justice and policing systems. DDR is also unlikely to be achieved without a justice system that addresses grievances that leads to SALW possession.

In terms of SSR, linkages with SSAJ are important because a prime objective is to achieve a democratic, accountable and transparent security sector. This is only achievable if there is an effective justice system that emphasises and seeks to bring about human rights compliance and that has oversight of the security sector.

DDR and SSR also need to be connected with peace operations/peace-keeping initiatives both during conflict and following it. A classic problem during peace operations and the initiation of DDR and SSR has been a lack of properly constituted programme plans that link these modes of programming with peace operations/peace-building. SSR has only partly been connected to DDR in terms of moving ex-combatants following DDR into a reconstituted army. It has not included planning for security sector transparency and accountability. This has tended to be addressed later and often outside the peace operations framework in separate donor programmes. This has not been an ideal approach.

6. Commission/Member State Frameworks

SALW are recognised within the Commission and Member States as contributing to violence and insecurity, to a lack of development and poverty, and the potential non-achievement of the MDGs – the latter being a major EU priority.⁹ The EU has become increasingly active in addressing small arms, and related processes such as DDR and SSR, and recognises that their dissemination and possession cause instability. Through the EC external assistance programmes and the CFSP the Commission is addressing these issues.

6.1 The EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and their Ammunition

Action to address SALW has recently been articulated in ‘The EU Strategy’. The aim of the Strategy is to develop an approach specific to SALW that is integrated and constitutes a comprehensive plan of action to combat the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition.¹⁰ It prescribes:

- Promoting measures addressing the underlying factors of SALW demand.
- Supporting the strengthening of the effective rule of law in unstable countries so as to limit the propensity of local people to provide for their own self-defence and hence SALW possession.
- That the Joint Action needs to be supplemented by a comprehensive and coherent approach that harnesses all forms of leverage at the EU’s disposal.
- Developing new elements of EU action: preventive and reactive and setting geographical priorities.
- Meeting requests by states seeking to reduce their surplus stocks of SALW and ammunition.¹¹

⁹ UNIDIR (December 2005) ‘European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War’. Interim Report, Geneva, p. vi.

¹⁰ Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 30.

¹¹ See for references to these bullet points, Council of the EU (13 January 2006), pp. 6, 7, and 9.

Further, it makes recommendations regarding co-ordinating international, regional, and EU actions including.

- *International action*: supplying small arms to governments in accordance with restrictive and appropriate regional and international criteria on arms exports. Strengthening and supporting sanctions machinery/ sanctions and monitoring including the illicit trade in raw materials and the plundering of natural resources (as in West Africa).¹² Supporting the strengthening of export controls and participating in strengthening border controls in countries affected by the illicit trade in SALW. Promoting an increased role for peacekeeping missions under SCRs in the area of SALW and ammunition.¹³
- *Regional*: support regional initiatives to combat the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition. Also, support for peacekeeping missions in their monitoring of arms embargoes.¹⁴
- *Within the EU*: continue the financial assistance provided by the EU since 1993 under DDR operations, while improving effectiveness under the direct participation of European experts in those programmes. Push back the culture of violence through promoting public education and awareness campaigns. Take appropriate measures to deal with the causes and consequences for human development of the illicit spread of SALW. It is also suggested that account should be taken of security issues, such as SSR, in drawing up development and assistance programmes with the ACP countries.¹⁵
- *Structures within the EU*: It is suggested that strengthening of the capacities of the Council Secretariat should be undertaken to ensure the coherent application of the Strategy, while greater co-ordination/information exchange between geographical and thematic expert groups is also called for.¹⁶

The Strategy also recognises that non-state players have increasing access to SALW, and that Africa remains the Continent most affected by the impact of internal conflicts aggravated by the destabilising influx of SALW.¹⁷

6.2 European Security Strategy (ESS)

The ESS, adopted on 13 December 2003, elaborated five key challenges faced by the EU: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, and state failure. The spread of SALW can be said to be central to four of these challenges as SALW are used in 'terrorist' activities, by those engaging in organised crime, they are invariably used in regional conflicts, and they can contribute to state failure – for example when used by rebel movements.

¹² Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 10.

¹³ Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 11.

¹⁴ Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 12.

¹⁵ Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 15.

¹⁶ Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 15.

¹⁷ Council of the EU (13 January 2006), p. 5.

6.3 EU Joint Action

In 2002, the EU adopted the Joint Action. This was used as a basis for specific SALW and SALW-related actions in Africa and elsewhere. The EU within this Action set out three overarching objectives to help:

- End the destabilising accumulation and spread of SALW and reduce them to a level consistent with countries' legitimate security needs.
- Solve the problems caused by these excessive accumulations.

6.4 Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention

The EC's 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention commits the EC to play an active part in controlling the spread of SALW through support to DDR and SALW. It noted that the Commission would give higher priority to controlling the spread of small arms.¹⁸ The Communication also noted that the security sector had not traditionally been a focus of Community co-operation and that it intended to play an increasingly active role in this sector.¹⁹ Further, the Commission suggested it had much to contribute in terms of DDR in place such as Cambodia, Burundi and the DRC. Priority areas were child soldiers (for example, the Commission has funded emergency education in the DRC, Sudan, and Sierra Leone) and reconciliation as in the Commission's support for the TRC in South Africa.²⁰

6.5 SALW and the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, provides a framework for addressing SALW through development co-operation, political dialogue and Article 11, which relates to conflict prevention/resolution and peace-building. It has provided a basis for a dialogue between EU and ACP countries on issues such as the arms trade.²¹ Under the agreement a number of projects/programmes have been supported, including:

- Financial support for Small Arms National Action Plans (NAPs).
- SSR, justice and police reform.
- Country/regional DDR initiatives (e.g. through the EDF Great Lakes DDR, via the Multi-Donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme, (MDRP).
- Integration of SALW control into development and rehabilitation programmes as in Northern Uganda.²²

7. Developing and Improving Existing Frameworks and Responses

¹⁸ EC (2001), Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, COM (2001), Brussels, p. 17.

¹⁹ EC (2001), p. 14.

²⁰ EC (2001), p. 15.

²¹ Sarah Bayne (in association with Saferworld), 'Mainstreaming Small Arms Issues into the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement', Report for UNIDIR Project – EU Action on SALW, undated, p. 1.

²² Sarah Bayne, p. 3.

The EU Small Arms Strategy, in particular, has been viewed as a positive development that demonstrates Member States moving towards 'collective, innovative and comprehensive solutions to small arms problems'.²³ It signals a stronger emphasis on the linkage between human security and development, the setting of geographical priorities, and the adoption of a more comprehensive approach including preventive and reactive measures. However, it does not signal a strong cross-pillar approach to small arms. While it recognises that Community action has a role to play, this is not well elaborated.²⁴ There are a number of opportunities to take forward the Strategy in conjunction with other European frameworks, it has been suggested:²⁵

- The Commission could consider paying more attention to processes related to SALW such as good governance, development, access to justice, and peace-building.
- Support preventive and reactive approaches to SALW.
- Strengthen linkages between SALW and DDR programming.
- Clarify the institutional legal competence for European action on small arms.
- European small arms assistance might be broadened to include: strengthening border management/controls; more support to DDR/child soldiers; and more assistance to NAPs.
- The Commission could focus the Strategy at the community level.
- Greater support for civil society, NGOs, and women's groups could be given and their concerns addressed in programming.
- Clearer geographic priorities need to be established.
- Develop a broad conceptualisation within the Stability Instrument that enables the EC to fund a wide range of SAL/DDR related activities.²⁶
- The Cotonou Agreement could play a stronger role in integrating small arms within EU development co-operation including analysis in appropriate Country and Regional Strategy papers.²⁷
- The EU could usefully provide financial, technical and political assistance to partners at all levels to improve their handling of small arms issues.

8. Opportunities for Policy and Programming Development During the Presidency

A number of potential opportunities exist for adoption by the Presidency across SALW/DDR and SSR, taking into account both the above European framework priorities and earlier areas of shortfall identified in these modes of programming in Africa. Priority areas might include the following:

Identifying areas of expertise and knowledge pooling. The Commission and Member states might consider identifying thematic and country-specific areas of intervention in DDR and related processes where they can make a difference in Africa, such as in West Africa and the Great Lakes. This could

²³ UNIDIR (December 2005), p. 22.

²⁴ UNIDIR (December 2005), p. 22.

²⁵ These following bullet points draw upon observations made in UNIDIR (December 2005), pp. vii, viii, ix, and x.

²⁶ See UNIDIR (December 2005), p. viii.

²⁷ UNIDIR (2005), p. ix.

draw upon the experiences of countries such as France, the UK, The Netherlands, and Germany, particularly in DDR and SSR. The UK, for example, has provided support to DDR in Sierra Leone; Germany has supported a number of programmes to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants and their families in the Great Lakes Region; while Belgium has supported community recovery and reintegration through UNDP in the RoC.

Improving DDR through engagement in international mechanisms and fora. Member States and the Commission should seize the opportunity (if not already doing so) to engage in current international work on improving DDR, such as the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR), and with issues being raised within these fora; such as, funding processes, finding ways of making reintegration sustainable, and the increased involvement of civil society in DDR.

Developing linkages across DDR, SSR and SALW initiatives. There are opportunities to take the lead in promoting strategies and approaches that link DDR, SSR and SALW programming more effectively. There is a particular need to create linkages between SSR reform of the police and SALW weapons collection both at the community level and regionally. Further, DDR programming can benefit from the early integration of SALW programming that addresses sensitisation and reintegration issues, which may help to address customary weaknesses in DDR regarding changing attitudes to weapons and securing long-term and sustainable reintegration.

Linking DDR/SALW and SSR with SSAJ, peace-building and peace operations. Commission and Member State policy and programming needs to be cognisant of the linkages between these modes of programming. For example, without access to justice ex-combatants and civilians are likely to seek to re-engage at some point in grievance-based armed violence. This implies that Commission policy and programmes should seek to link with or include SSAJ and related processes.

Addressing root causes of SALW acquisition. DDR, SALW and SSR initiatives often neglect the motivations for possessing and acquiring weapons. SALW programming undertaken by the Commission and member states might, in particular, be more directly targeted at some of the 'root causes' and motivations of armed violence, such as exclusion, poverty and poor governance, linking up with the Strategy's comment that underlying factors of SALW demand need to be addressed.

Pro-poor/human security perspectives. Drawing upon the recognition that armed violence has strong and pervasive linkages with poverty/under-development, the Commission and Member States may consider engaging in ensuring that DDR/SALW/SSR programming and policy have a strong pro-poor and human security dimension.²⁸

²⁸ CICS, at the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK, is being funded, as part of the CHF, over 2006-2008 by DFID to investigate pro-poor and human security dimensions of DDR and related processes, such as SSR.

Strengthen customs and regional SALW non-dissemination. There is a clear need to assist in strengthening police and customs capabilities in ACP countries to prevent the further proliferation of SALW in areas of tension and in vulnerable post-conflict transitions.

Develop cross-pillar approaches. Seek to put forward proposals to develop or take forward what the Strategy identifies as currently lacking across the EC, a cross pillar approach to the proliferation of SALW and security sector issues.

Support reformed national armies processes. There is a clear need to design transitions from DDR to SSR (where ex-combatants join new national armies following DDR), that are connected, seamless, and part of an overall strategy. Too often in Africa, SSR strategies take little account of DDR.

Community-oriented approaches. Community-based, or sensitive, programming is a key area of shortfall in programming, which the Commission and Member States might consider reviewing in terms of improving responses.

Gender orientation. Gender should be an area of focus, particularly in regard to the special difficulties women face in reintegrating into society following their involvement in armed violence as ex-combatants, and in re-establishing their social capital in returning to communities. Women also face special difficulties in engaging with and working in the security sector following conflict.

Box 8.1: Gender programming shortfalls/opportunities in DDR/SALW/SSR

Gender issues loom large in SSR, DDR and related lines of programming. Historically, these lines of programming have sometimes lacked gender awareness or sensitivity, in particular, in terms of the needs of women and girls. In DDR programming, it has been increasingly recognised that female ex-combatants require special treatment in demobilising and in returning to their community both in terms of safety and health. Further, when returning to their communities they may experience problems that are different to male ex-combatants leading to difficulties in reintegration. They are likely to find it difficult to marry or return to husbands due to gender stereotypes of the combatant role being inappropriate to women. They may have been raped, taken as 'war brides', or regarded as the property of those who forcibly married them. Further, the experience of conflict may make female ex-combatants reject traditional roles and challenge some of the assumptions of tradition in their communities.

In the security sector there are likely to be few roles for women during peacetime and those who joined up during conflict run the risk of being jettisoned in preference to men. Women are likely to experience inequality including less pay, poor promotion prospects, and negative stereotypes. However, women in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Somalia, and Liberia, have played critical roles in mobilising for peace, and often bringing pressure to bear on rebels and armies to cease fighting, as well taking dialogue and reconciliation roles. They have also played critical combat roles including the defence of communities. This capacity for peace-building in particular opens up opportunities that might be supported by the EU and member states more deeply. OECD DAC notes the potential for:

- Supporting women's organisations during conflicts to enable them to become involved in mediation and peace roles.
- Developing policies and programmes that focus on conflict situations and that encourage women's coalitions and alliances for peace-building across regions and sub-regions.
- Encourage capacity-building for women in public life.
- Support representation of women in peace processes.
- considering designing special programmes to deal with the psychological and emotional trauma of all aspects of violence against women.
- Improving women's access to resources during reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Developing special ways of dealing with women (and men) youth and children who have been victims of gender-based violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict.²⁹

Some of these proposals have relevance when applied to DDR/SSR. For example, women groups have a role to play in negotiating disarmament with armed groups or rebels. Women's groups could help assist in the reintegration of female combatants into traditional society when there are assimilation problems. Similarly, they could help war brides disentangle themselves from forced marriage. More generally, women or women's groups/coalitions can advocate and press for better conditions and representations in the security sector and make their voices heard in parliament and elsewhere regarding SSR and abuses of power by the security sector.

Supporting vulnerable groups. DDR/SALW and SSR initiatives need to take into account their impact on the vulnerable. This continues to be an area of weakness across many international implementing agencies. It is noted that children are a priority group under frameworks such as the Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention.

Promoting longer-term perspectives. Consider how Commission policy and frameworks might support longer-term SALW/DDR interventions, as opposed to some of the more short-term interventions currently in place. Prevention might also be accorded more prominence across all dimensions of DDR/SALW and SSR.

Introducing training/information on DDR and related processes to add to the effectiveness of EU and member state programming. Research and training on DDR/SSR/SALW issues and coordination among policymakers and programme officers, in-country and regionally, could be beneficial in terms of taking debates forward in these areas in the EU and among member states.

Linking conflict/security and mainstream development programming. Consider, where appropriate, integrating or linking conflict/security thinking (as in DDR/SSR) and programming into some aspects of mainstream development. Promote a greater dialogue between those with what might be termed as having a 'traditional' development perspective and those working on conflict and security.

²⁹ OECD DAC (2005) 'Security Sector Reform and Governance'. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, p. 18.

Box 8.2: DDR/SALW& SSR Programming: Linkages with Development

The thinking behind these modes of programming is that they reduce insecurity and hence have the capacity to contribute to development. SSR, for example, can reduce the potential of the security sector to act in a predatory manner against civilians. It also can provide security from external threats, and create an environment of security where, for example, livelihoods can be pursued, infrastructure repaired during the PCR phase, and where internal discontent is less likely to spill over into violence. Moreover, the MDGs are unlikely to be met in the absence of, or where there is ineffective SSR. Further, by strengthening justice and providing proper redress to citizens, the possibility of the outbreak of armed violence is further lessened. Moreover the state strengthens its legitimacy with citizens when the security sector is seen to be under democratic control.

Similarly, DDR/SALW programmes remove the incentives to return to violence by providing developmental opportunities. Reintegration processes often offer ex-combatants livelihoods training, employment opportunities, and allowances to tide them over. These are frequently combined with development-oriented SALW approaches such as WfD programmes which also benefit whole communities in developmental terms, not just ex-combatants. In the absence of these types of approaches, armed violence has the capacity to: disrupt economic activities; reduce revenue and savings; diminish access to social services (which are also likely to decline in quality); lead to a rise in armed criminality; and create an environment where external humanitarian and developmental assistance is likely to be impeded.

Controlling SALW exports to conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa. If the harmful impacts of SALW on post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) and development are to be mitigated, EU co-ordinated action might also be taken forward in terms of brokering, the marking and tracing of SALW, and in transparency in terms of reporting, so that SALW are not introduced or re-emerge in the post-conflict phase, thereby hampering development.

Box 8.3: The Neglected Issues of Repatriation and Reconciliation in DDR/SSR

When rebel elements in particular are integrated into national armies they often have to leave rural areas and join national armies – sometimes based in capitals with risks of social exclusion. Similarly, repatriation and reintegration into communities by demobilising ex-combatants, given the often high levels of hostility to ex-combatants, have proved problematic. One response to the above problems in terms of integration into national armies has been to allow rebel units to stay in their region and ‘badging’ them as a regional unit within the national army. This approach has been tried in the DRC. However, this has often led to difficulties, with poor co-ordination with national HQs, lack of discipline, human rights abuses, and even mutinies, in the absence of proper oversight.

Reconciliation has been a further problematic area both in terms of security sector reconciliation with civilians (which it has often abused) and between rebel and army elements when they come together in new national armies. Sierra Leone is a good example of a conflict where the security sector committed extensive human rights abuses against civilians, and even joined the rebel RUF in attacking them. Subsequently, there has been considerable pressure from civil society and donors for the security services to engage with civil society. This has happened with a series of joint meetings and work. Nevertheless, there has been limited progress. Truth and

reconciliation commissions have been formed in many African countries (including Sierra Leone, South Africa, with Liberia set to follow). However, there is mixed evidence as to whether they have achieved any significant degree of reconciliation. On reconciliation within new national armies, successes have been rare or under threat. SANDF was plagued in its early SSR phases by entrenched racist perceptions of white officers of the black ranks. And in the DRC, attempts at bringing together different armed groups and the Congolese army into an integrated army has made little headway with identity differences and hostilities remaining pronounced.

Responses to these above problems might include:

- Mechanisms for the security sector to meet and engage with civil society on reconciliation.
- Reconciliation/forgiveness ceremonies in communities where the security sector might meet with victims of human rights abuses.
- Joint projects – such as peace-building/reconstruction projects – where the security sector, particularly the army, do community work in conjunction with civil society, thus fostering an atmosphere of potential reconciliation.
- Promotion of reconciliation within the security sector as part of their training and education. This should also be linked with national educational programmes. This might included specific education with the military exploring the basis of past conflict, identity differences, and ways of fostering a ‘non-ethnic’ vision within the security sector.
- Ex-combatants entering the security sector will need to be screened for involvement in human rights abuses and, for example, implication in crimes against humanity. This links into reconciliation in that known or suspected war criminals are unlikely to be accepted by many civilians as legitimate members of the security sector.

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